Charmaine Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services
897 F.3d 835
| 7th Cir. | 2018Background
- Charmaine Hamer worked at a Fannie Mae–contracted Mortgage Help Center operated by Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago (2010–2012); Fannie Mae retained a right to remove individual employees.
- After being passed over for a promotion in February 2012, Hamer told Neighborhood Housing’s HR director she intended to file an EEOC charge; within days she was removed from the Center and offered a lower-paying position, which she declined.
- Hamer sued Neighborhood Housing and Fannie Mae for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the ADEA; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants.
- Hamer’s counsel moved to withdraw and asked the district court to extend the 30-day appeal period by 60 days; the district court granted the extension notwithstanding Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C)’s 30-day backstop. Hamer filed a pro se notice of appeal within the extended period but beyond Rule 4(a)(5)(C).
- On initial appeal the Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the Supreme Court vacated, holding statutory time limits are jurisdictional but rule-based limits are claim-processing rules (i.e., waivable/forfeitable). The case returned to the Seventh Circuit to decide whether defendants waived or forfeited the Rule 4(a)(5)(C) timeliness objection and, if so, to reach the retaliation merits.
- The Seventh Circuit concluded defendants waived the Rule 4(a)(5)(C) defense by affirmatively stating in their docketing statement that Hamer’s notice of appeal was "timely," and affirmed summary judgment on the merits because Hamer failed to show decisionmakers knew of her EEOC-intent and thus failed to establish causation for retaliation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellees had to appeal or cross-appeal to challenge the district court’s extension | Hamer: Defendants forfeited any timeliness challenge by not appealing the extension | Defendants: No appeal necessary to defend the judgment’s timeliness | Held: No appeal or cross-appeal required; appellees may defend the judgment without changing it (American Railway Express principle) |
| Whether defendants waived/forfeited a Rule 4(a)(5)(C) timeliness objection by failing to object earlier or by stating in the docketing statement that the appeal was "timely" | Hamer: Defendants waived/forfeited the objection by not objecting in district court and by stating the appeal was timely | Defendants: Docketing-statement language is nonbinding; they did not intend to waive nonjurisdictional timeliness | Held: Docketing-statement affirmations can waive nonjurisdictional, claim-processing rights; defendants’ unequivocal statements that the appeal was "timely" constituted waiver |
| Whether Rule 4(a)(5)(C) is jurisdictional or waivable in this context | Hamer: Relies on Supreme Court's guidance that rule time limits are claim-processing (waivable) | Defendants: Initially pressed timeliness as jurisdictional in prior appeal | Held: Rule-based time limits are claim-processing rules (not jurisdictional) per Supreme Court; enforceable if properly invoked but waivable |
| Whether Hamer proved retaliation (causal link) on the merits | Hamer: Temporal proximity and suspicious timing of removal show pretext and causation after she complained | Defendants: Decisionmakers lacked knowledge of her EEOC-intent; removal was for performance/communication issues | Held: Hamer failed to produce evidence that the decisionmakers knew of her complaint intent; speculation insufficient — summary judgment affirmed on retaliation claim |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. American Railway Express Co., 265 U.S. 425 (1924) (an appellee may defend a judgment without taking a cross-appeal)
- Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (statutory appeal deadlines are jurisdictional)
- Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004) (distinguishing jurisdictional rules from claim-processing rules)
- Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008) (principle of party presentation and limits on sua sponte appellate alteration)
- Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (definition of waiver as intentional relinquishment of a known right)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard that mere speculation cannot defeat summary judgment)
- Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U.S. 479 (1976) (cross-appeal principles)