Charles Vayda v. County of Lake
321 Mich. App. 686
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Vayda, a military veteran, worked as a Lake County sheriff’s deputy since 1991 and was elected to the Lake County Board of Commissioners in November 2014.
- The Board sued for a declaratory ruling that Vayda could not simultaneously serve as both county commissioner and sheriff’s deputy under the Incompatible Public Offices Act and MCL 46.30a of the CBCA; the circuit court agreed he could not hold both positions.
- After the declaratory ruling, Sheriff Hilts told Vayda to resign from one role; Vayda refused and was placed on unpaid administrative leave, and shortly thereafter his sheriff’s employment was terminated by letter.
- Vayda requested a hearing under the Veterans’ Preference Act (VPA), MCL 35.402, claiming the County terminated him without the notice and hearing the VPA requires for veteran employees.
- The trial court granted Vayda’s summary disposition, ordering a VPA hearing; the County appealed.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding Vayda voluntarily made himself ineligible for continued sheriff’s employment by accepting an incompatible county-commissioner position, so the VPA notice/hearing protections were not triggered.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Vayda was entitled to VPA notice and hearing before his sheriff employment ended | Vayda says he was a qualifying veteran and the County terminated him without the statutorily required notice and prosecuting-attorney hearing | County says Vayda voluntarily became ineligible for sheriff employment by accepting a county-commissioner seat in violation of MCL 46.30a, so he was not "removed" by the employer and VPA protections do not apply | Court held Vayda was not entitled to VPA notice/hearing because his voluntary acceptance of the incompatible office made him ineligible for continued sheriff employment; employer did not "remove" him |
| Whether the County had to give Vayda time to choose which position to keep after the declaratory ruling | Vayda contends the prior declaratory judgment did not specify which post to vacate and he should have been given a reasonable time to choose | County contends immediate ineligibility attached on the court’s ruling and continued employment would expose the County and sheriff to civil and criminal liability under MCL 46.30a | Court held no obligation to give time: once the court ruled, Vayda was immediately ineligible and continued employment would subject parties to statutory penalties |
| Whether res judicata or collateral estoppel barred Vayda’s VPA claim | Vayda argued the prior case did not adjudicate his entitlement to a VPA hearing about the manner of termination | County argued the prior declaratory judgment fully resolved the matter | Court rejected res judicata/collateral estoppel as to the VPA claim (issue of termination procedures arose only after the declaratory ruling) but found VPA nonetheless inapplicable on statutory-interpretation grounds |
| Proper remedy and procedural vehicle for Vayda’s request for relief | Vayda sought a writ of superintending control to compel a VPA hearing | County argued other remedies and defenses applied; court discussed mandamus vs superintending control | Court noted superintending control was improper; remedy would have been mandamus if VPA applied, but VPA protections were not triggered here |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. Recca, 492 Mich. 169 (discussing de novo review of summary disposition)
- Bukowski v. Detroit, 478 Mich. 268 (statutory-interpretation standard)
- Sherrod v. Detroit, 244 Mich. App. 516 (purpose and procedural protections of the Veterans’ Preference Act)
- Jackson v. Detroit Police Chief, 201 Mich. App. 173 (VPA enforcement and remedy discussion)
- Koontz v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 466 Mich. 304 (use of dictionaries to ascertain statutory meaning)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (property interest and due process in public employment)
- Casco Twp. v. Secretary of State, 472 Mich. 566 (every word of a statute given plain meaning)
- Nastal v. Henderson & Assoc. Investigations, Inc., 471 Mich. 712 (clear statutory language requires no judicial construction)
- Robinson v. Lansing, 486 Mich. 1 (statutes read in context to give meaning to the act as a whole)