CASCO TOWNSHIP v SECRETARY OF STATE
FILLMORE v SECRETARY OF STATE
Docket Nos. 126120, 126369
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided June 14, 2005
Rehearing denied in Fillmore at 473 Mich 1205
472 MICH 566
Argued March 8, 2005 (Calendar Nos. 2, 3)
Casco Township, Columbus Township, and certain residents of those townships brought an action in the Ingham Circuit Court seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary of State to authorize a referendum, pursuant to a petition, on the detachment of land from the city of Richmond and the addition of part of the land to Casco Township and the remainder to Columbus Township. The court, Peter D. Houk, J., denied the writ, agreeing with the Secretary of State that the Home Rule City Act,
Fillmore Township and certain electors from Fillmore Township, Holland Charter Township, Park Township, Laketown Township, and the city of Holland filed a complaint for mandamus against the Secretary of State in the Court of Appeals, seeking to compel the Secretary of State to authorize a referendum, pursuant to a petition, on the detachment of land from the city of Holland and the addition of the land in separate parts to each of the four townships. The matter was held in abeyance pending the decision in Casco Twp v Secretary of State, 261 Mich App 386 (2004), and the complaint for mandamus was denied by the Court of Appeals, GRIFFIN, P.J., and METER and SCHUETTE, JJ., following the decision in Casco Twp. Unpublished order, entered May 6, 2004 (Docket No. 245640).
The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ applications for leave to appeal in both cases and ordered the cases to be argued and submitted together. 471 Mich 890 (2004).
In an opinion by Justice CAVANAGH, joined by Chief Justice TAYLOR, and Justices WEAVER, KELLY, CORRIGAN, and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
A single detachment petition and a single vote on that petition may not encompass territory that will be detached from one city and added to more than one township. Mandamus was not proper in these cases. The decisions of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed.
- A changе of boundaries for a district to be affected by a detachment encompasses only one city and one township because a township‘s voters can be qualified electors only in relation to their own township‘s proposed change of boundaries and are affected only by their own township‘s proposed change of boundaries.
- Interpreting the district to be affected in detachment proceedings as the city from which the territory is to be detached and the township to which the territory is to be added recognizes that the consequences of detachment may be different for each township that seeks to gain property.
- Allowing a single petition and a single vote on detachment and addition of land to multiple townships does not allow voters to render a vote in support of addition of land to only one township.
- There was no clear legal right to have the Secretary of State authorize each petition for a single vote. The writs of mandamus were properly denied.
Justice YOUNG, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concluded that a plain reading of all relevant language in the act indicates that the act permits the use of a single petition and election when adding land to multiple townships. The act‘s definition of the “district to be affected” by the detachment as including “each” municipality suggests that the Legislature contemplated a single detachment proceeding involving multiple recipient townships. Such a procedure comports with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under federal case law, strict scrutiny review and the one-person, one-vote standard do not apply in the context of municipal boundary changes. The declaratory relief requested in Casco Twp should be granted. Any request for mandamus relief, howevеr, is premature because the Secretary of State has not examined the petitions at issue to determine whether they satisfy all the conditions mandated by the act, and the writs of mandamus were properly denied in both cases.
Affirmed.
1. BOUNDARIES — HOME RULE CITIES — DETACHMENT ELECTIONS.
The Home Rule City Act does not allow a single petition and a single vote to encompass detachment of land from a city for addition to multiple townships (
2. BOUNDARIES — HOME RULE CITIES — DETACHMENT ELECTIONS.
Residents of one township are not qualified electors for purposes of determining a change of boundaries for another township through
Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C. (by William K. Fahey, Stephen J. Rhodes, Eric E. Doster, and Ronald D. Richards, Jr.), and James V. Dubay for Casco Township, Columbus Township, Patricia Iseler, James P. Holk, Fillmore Township, Shirley Greving, Andrea Stam, Larry Sybesma, Jody Tenbrink, and James Rietveld, and Patrick J. O‘Brien and Heather S. Meingast, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Secretary of State and the Director of the Bureau of Elections.
Eric D. Williams and Rex A. Burgess for the city of Richmond.
Kerr, Russell and Weber, PLC (by Robert J. Pineau), for Walter K. and Patricia A. Winkle.
Cunningham Dalman, P.C. (by Andrew J. Mulder, P. Haans Mulder, and Vincent L. Duckworth), for the city of Holland.
Amici Curiae:
Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer & Thall, P.C. (by John H. Bauckham), for Michigan Townships Association.
Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C. (by William B. Beach), for Michigan Municipal League.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
CASCO TWP v SECRETARY OF STATE
Plaintiffs in this case are two adjacent townships—Casco Township and Columbus Township—and residents of those townships who seеk to detach territory from defendant city of Richmond. The territory sought to be detached is territory that was previously annexed to the city of Richmond.
Plaintiffs seek to present the ballot issue covering both townships in a single petition. This would result in a single vote about whether to detach territory from the city of Richmond and add the territory to Casco Township and Columbus Township. The residents of one township would be voting on the return of property to their township, as well as the return of property to a township in which they do not reside. The Secretary of State refused to approve an election on plaintiffs’ petition because an election on the petition would allow residents of one township to vote on, and possibly determine, a change in the boundaries of another township in which they do not reside.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint for mandamus and declaratory relief. The circuit court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to act because it was not clear that a single petition seeking detachment from a city and addition of the territory to two townships was permitted by the Home Rule City Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court. Casco Twp v Secretary of State, 261 Mich App 386; 682 NW2d 546 (2004). We granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal and ordered that the case be argued and submitted with Fillmore Twp v Secretary of State, 471 Mich 890 (2004).
FILLMORE TWP v SECRETARY OF STATE
Plaintiffs are Fillmore Township and electors from four townships—Fillmore Township, Holland Charter Township, Park Township, and Laketown Township—and the city of Holland who want to detach territory from the city of Holland and add the territory to the four townships. Plaintiffs filed a joint detachment petition with the Secretary of State, asking that the petition be certified and that a single election be held regarding the territory that was proposed to be detached from the city of Holland. The Secretary of State refused to certify the petition because the petition involved an effort to detach territory
Plaintiffs filed a complaint for mandamus in the Court of Appeals, and the complaint was held in abeyance pending the decision in the Casco Twp case. Unpublished order, entered May 19, 2003 (Docket No. 245640). Plaintiffs’ complaint was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the Casco Twp decision. Unpublished order, entered May 6, 2004 (Docket No. 245640). We granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal and ordered that the case be argued and submitted with the Casco Twp case. 471 Mich 890 (2004).2
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The proper interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Lincoln v Gen Motors Corp, 461 Mich 483, 489-490; 607 NW2d 73 (2000). A trial court‘s decision regarding a writ of mandamus is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 443; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
III. ANALYSIS
These cases involve an issue of statutory interpretation. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Id. at 411. The first step is to review the language of the statute. If the statutory language is unambiguous, the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning expressed in the statute and judicial construction is not permissible.
The Home Rule City Act,
Detachment means that territory is taken from an existing city and added to an existing township.
Section 6 of the Home Rule City Act,
Additional support for this position is found in the statutory language used in other parts of the Home Rule City Act.
A change of boundaries for the district to be affected encompasses only one city and one township bеcause a township‘s voters can be qualified electors only in relation to their own township‘s proposed change of boundaries and are affected only by their own township‘s proposed change of boundaries. Therefore, it is only plausible that the “district to be affected” encompasses one city and one township. Accordingly, a single detachment petition and a single vote may only encompass territory to be added to one township.5
Language in
Further, interpreting the “district to be affected” in detachment proceedings as the city from which the territory is to be detached and the township to which the territory is to be added recognizes that the consequences of detachment may be quite different for each township that seeks to gain property. For example, property rights and liabilities must be adjusted between the city and the township when there is a detachment.
Moreover, allowing a single petition and a single vote on detachment from one city for the addition of territory to multiple townships does not allow voters to render a vote in support of the addition of territory to only one township.
A question submitted to the electors of this state or the electors of a subdivision of this state shall, to the extent that it will not confuse the electorate, be worded so that a “yes” vote will be a vote in favor of the subject matter of the proposal or issue and a “no” vote will be a vote against the subject matter of the proposal or issue.
However, a single vote on detaching territory from one city and adding the territory to multiple townships does not allow a voter who may only favor one of the multiple additions of territory to cast a “yes” vote. As stated by this Court in Muskegon Pub Schools v Vander Laan, 211 Mich 85, 87; 178 NW 424 (1920), “Separate subjects, separate purposes, or independent propositions should not be combined so that one may gather votes for the other.” In Vander Laan, this Court noted that the erection of three new school buildings showed a common purpose and were part of a comprehensive plan to meet the educational needs of the city. In contrast, we find that detaching territory from one city and adding the territory to multiple townships does not indicate a common purpose because the needs and consequences of the additions to various townships may differ remarkably. Combining multiple additions of territory in a single detachment petition so that there is only a single vote indeed combines independent propositions “so that one may gather votes fоr the other.”
When put into context, the text of the Home Rule City Act is unambiguous—a petition and a vote about detachment must involve only one city and one township. A contrary reading of the statutory language belies the fact that there will always be two parties to a detachment—the city and the township. Justice YOUNG‘s focus on the word “each” in the statute ignores that the provisions must be read in context. Interpreting the word “each” to mean that a detachment petition can encompass more than one township is contrary to the statutory language that relates to qualified electors and ignores the fact that the Home Rule City Act encompasses four distinct procedures—incorporation, consolidation, annexation, and detachment. Language in the statute that at first may appear to indicate that multiple townships may be involved in a single detachment petition and a single vote must be read in context and in consideration of the statutory language regarding qualified electors. Significantly, residents of one township are not qualified electors in a detachment proceeding when it comes to determining a change of boundaries for another township, and the statute cannot properly be interpreted in this manner.6
Our conclusion that a single detachment petition and a single vote on that petition may only encompass territory to be added to one township is in accord with the unambiguous statutory language. Thus, the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning expressed in the statute and judicial construction is not permissible.
Finally, a writ of mandamus could be properly issued in these cases only if plaintiffs proved that (1) they had a clear legal right to the performance of the specific duty that they sought to be compelled, and (2) the Secretary of State had a clear legal duty to perform the act. In re MCI, supra at 442-443. Because the Home Rule City Act does not allow a single detachment petition and a single vote on that petition to encompass territory to be detached from one city and added to more than one township, there was no clear legal right to have the Secretary of State authorize each petition for a single vote. Therefore, there was no clear legal duty that required the Secretary of State to act, and the writs of mandamus were properly denied in both cases before this Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Home Rule City Act,
TAYLOR, C.J., and WEAVER, KELLY, CORRIGAN, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.
YOUNG, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). We granted leave to appeal in these consolidated cases to determine whether (1) the Home Rule City Act (HRCA)1 permits the use of a single detachment petition and election when the territory to be detached from a city is to be transferred to more than one township and, (2) if such a procedure is allowed under the HRCA, whether plaintiffs2 are entitled to mandamus relief. I agree with the majority that plaintiffs are not entitled to writs of mandamus because I believe that any request for mandamus relief is premature at this time. I disagree, however, with the majority‘s conclusion that the HRCA does not permit the use of a single detachment
The Legislature was well aware of the political gamesmanship that occurs between municipalities in the context of boundary disputes. Indeed, our Constitution was changed to free the Legislature from this political quagmire.3 By enacting the HRCA, the Legislature established a standardized procedure to effectuate such changes in a manner that it viewed as fair and
reasonable. A plain reading of all relevant language in the HRCA demonstrates that the use of a single detachment petition when transferring land to multiple townships is permitted. The Court of Appeals focused only on select text in the HRCA and thereby gave the statute a particular meaning that is insupportable when one considers all the language used by the Legislature in the HRCA. Its exercise in selective statutory interpretation not only undermines the Legislature‘s intent in passing the HRCA, but also injects the judiciary—armed only with ill-defined notions of “fairness” and “justice“—as a referee in the inherently political, contentious, and tactical process of altering municipal boundaries. The majority opinion, while avoiding explicit reliance on extra-textual policy justifications, does not, in my view, give full meaning to all the relevant words in the statute.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s conclusion that a single detachment petition involving multiple townships is not permitted under the HRCA. In Casco Twp, I would grant the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief and deny their claim for a writ of mandamus. In Fillmore Twp, because the plaintiffs only sought a writ of mandamus, I would deny entirely their request for relief.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The majority fails to convey adequately the true character of the boundary disputes at issue. By glossing over much of the relevant history, the majority understates the inherently political and calculated nature of the disputes.4
A. CASCO TWP v SECRETARY OF STATE
The land at issue in this case has a long, contentious history. In July 1996, intervening defendants, Walter and Patricia Winkle, filed a petition with the State Boundary Commission (SBC) seeking to annex to the city of Richmond approximately 157 acres of land that they and other residents owned in Casco Township and Columbus Township. The Winkles hoped to develop their land for commercial use, but believed that commercial development could not occur unless their property was connected to the water and sewer lines offered by the city of Richmond.
Before the Winkles’ July 1996 petition, however, Columbus Township and neighboring Lenox Township had entered into an agreement pursuant to
eventually upheld by the Court of Appeals.7 The Court of Appeals found that the 425 agreements between the townships of Columbus, Casco, and Lenox were “sham[s]” and “essentially an attempt to avoid annexation,” and upheld the SBC‘s decision approving the annexation initiated by the Winkles.8 In July 2001, this Court denied leave to appeal.9
In December 2001, plaintiffs filed a single detachment petition with the Secretary of State, seeking to transfer from the city of Richmond to Casco Township and Columbus Township the same land that was involved in the prior annexation.10 The disputed territory consisted of approximately eighty-seven acres in Casco Township and seventy acres in Columbus Township.
Unsure whether the HRCA permitted the use of a single detachment petition to transfer land to multiple townships, the Secretary of State requested an official opinion from the Attorney General interpreting the
HRCA. Citing a pending lawsuit in Eaton County, Michigan, involving a factually similar dispute,11 and the Attorney General‘s policy of declining to issue opinions that might affect ongoing litigation, the Attorney General refused to issue a formal opinion construing the HRCA. However, in a May 2002 memorandum to the Department of State, Bureau of Elections, the Attorney General‘s Office provided “informal advice” regarding the use of a single detachment petition. Recognizing that there were “no cases directly on point that specifically address the issue,” the memorandum informed the Department of State that it was “reasonable to refuse to certify” the petition.12 The
The following month, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Ingham Circuit Court, seeking declaratory and mandamus relief against the defendants. After holding a hearing, the circuit court denied the plaintiffs’ request for mandamus relief, ruling that the HRCA was not “patently clear” regarding whether a single detachment petition may be used to transfer land to more than one township. The circuit court then dismissed the plaintiffs’ lawsuit without having addressed their request for declaratory relief.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the circuit court erred in denying their request for mаndamus relief and in dismissing their lawsuit without deciding their request for declaratory relief. In divided opinions, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.13 The Court of Appeals majority held that the HRCA was ambiguous as to whether a single detachment petition was permitted. Given the ambiguity, the majority decided that it “must consider the object of the statute and apply a reasonable construction that is logical and best accomplishes the HRCA‘s purpose.”14
Acknowledging that there was “no case law that directly addresse[d] the current situation,”15 the majority concluded that it was “clearly unfair” to allow the use of a single detachment petition when transferring land to multiple townships.16 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals denied the plaintiffs’ request for mandamus relief. The Court of Appeals further held that the circuit court had “implicitly” denied the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief and affirmed the circuit court‘s ruling denying declaratory relief.17 The dissent disagreed with the majority‘s conclusion that the HRCA was ambiguous and noted that the plain text of the HRCA permitted the use of a single detachment petition to transfer land to multiple townships. We granted leave to appeal and consolidated the case with Fillmore Twp v Secretary of State.18
B. FILLMORE TWP v SECRETARY OF STATE
As with the territory involved in the companion case of Casco Twp v Secretary of State, the disputed territory in this case also has a complex history. In 1997, Fillmore Township and the city of Holland entered into a 425 agreement through which land in Fillmore Township was to be transferred to Holland. Pursuant to the referendum provision in
Several months after the 425 agreement was defeated, in late 1998, landowners in Fillmore Township filed petitions with the SBC to annex approximately 1,100 acres to the city of Holland. The SBC approved the annexation, thereby transferring approximately 1,100 acres from Fillmore Township to Holland. Seeking to reverse the annexation effectuated by the SBC‘s decision, in February 2000, electors in Fillmore Township filed a petition with the Secretary of State to detach the land that
In October 2002, the plaintiffs submitted a single detachment petition to the Secretary of State,19 again hoping to detach from the city of Holland the territory that was previously annexed from Fillmore Township. In addition to the Fillmore Township-city of Holland detachment, however, the petition also included three smaller detachments by which land would be detached
from the city of Holland and added to Laketown Township, Park Township, and Holland Charter Township. Because the HRCA provides that “the whole of each city, village, or township” to be affected by the detachment is entitled to vote,20 by adding the additional three townships to the single detachment petition, the voting base for the detachment election was greatly expanded.
The following table summarizes the acreage to be transferred by the detachment and the number of voters that would be added to the voting base by including each additional township in the single detachment petition:21
| Municipality | Acres To Be Received from the Detachment | Registered Voters (as of November 2002) |
|---|---|---|
| City of Holland | —— | 19,771 |
| Fillmore Township | 1,054 | 1,854 |
| Laketown Township | 0.77 | 4,166 |
| Holland Charter Township | 3.33 | 15,221 |
| Park Township | 1.27 | 11,989 |
Thus, by including the three additional townships and detaching only an extra 5.37 acres, the voting base of the district to be affected would be expanded by an additional 31,376 voters over what the voting base would be if only Fillmore Township and the city of Holland were involved.
In November 2002, the Secretary of State refused to certify the detachment petition, relying on the September 2002 decision by the circuit court disallowing the use of a single detachment petition in Casco Twp. In resрonse to the Secretary of State‘s refusal to certify the petition, the plaintiffs filed an original mandamus action
in the Court of Appeals seeking to have the Court order the Secretary of State to certify the petition and schedule an election. The Court of Appeals ordered that the plaintiffs’ case be held in abeyance pending its resolution of Casco Twp. In March 2004, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Casco Twp, affirming the circuit court‘s decision disallowing the use of a single detachment petition. Citing its opinion in Casco Twp, the Court of Appeals then denied the plaintiffs mandamus relief by order in May 2004.22 We granted leave to appeal and consolidated the case with Casco Twp v Secretary of State.23
Whether the HRCA permits the use of a single detachment petition to transfer land to multiple townships is a matter of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law that is reviewed by this Court de novo.24 The constitutionality of the HRCA‘s detachment procedure is also a question of law that is subject to review de novo.25 This Court reviews a lower court‘s decision regarding a request for mandamus relief for an abuse of discretion.26
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE HRCA AND THE SINGLE DETACHMENT PROCEDURE
1. HISTORY OF THE HRCA
The HRCA, enacted in 1909, is an intricate statute that has been amended in piecemeal fashion numerous times over the past century. Before the enactment of the HRCA, the Legislature directly enacted municipal boundary changes on a case-by-case basis through special legislation. Delegates to the 1907-1908 constitutional convention recognized the substantial burden this process imposed, as well as the confusion that resulted from hundreds of pieces of such special legislation. The convention‘s Address to the People stated:
One of the greatest evils brought to the attention of the Convention was the abuse practiced under local and special legislation. The number of local and special bills passed by the last legislature was four hundred fourteen, not including joint and concurrent resolutions. The time devoted to the consideration оf these measures and the time required in their passage through the two houses imposed a serious burden upon the state. This section [prohibiting the enactment of special acts when a general act can be made applicable], taken in connection with the increased powers of local self-government granted to cities and villages in the revision, seeks to effectively remedy such condition. . . . The evils of local and special legislation have grown to be almost intolerable, introducing uncertainty and confusion into the laws, and consuming the time and energy of the legislature which should be devoted to the consideration of measures of a general character. By eliminating this mass of legislation, the work of the legislature will be greatly simplified and improved.27
the delegates were referring to
The legislature shall pass no local or special act in any case where a general act can be made applicable, and whether a general act can be made applicable shall be a judicial question. No local or special act, excepting acts repealing local or special acts in effect January 1, 1909 and receiving a 2/3 vote of the legislature shall take effect until approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon in the district to be affected.
Based on this overwhelming dissatisfaction with special legislation as a means
The legislature shall provide by a general law for the inсorporation of cities, and by a general law for the incorporation of villages. . . .
With
2. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE HRCA
As the majority correctly notes, three provisions of the HRCA are directly relevant in the present case. The detachment process is specifically authorized by
Cities may be incorporated or territory detached therefrom or added thereto, or consolidation made of 2 or more cities or villages into 1 city, or of a city and 1 or more villages into 1 city, or of 1 or more cities or villages together with additional territory not included within any incorporated city or village into 1 city, by proceedings originating by petition therefor signed by qualified electors who are freeholders residing within the cities, villages, or townships to be affected thereby. . . .29
However, because both the city of Richmond and the city of Holland are located in more than one county, rather than filing their detachment petitions with the county under
When the territory to be affected by any proposed incorporation, consolidation, or change is situated in more than 1 county the petition hereinbefore provided shall be addressed and presented to the secretary of state, with 1 or more affidavits attached thereto sworn to by 1 or more of the signers of said petition, showing that the statements contained in said petition are true, that each signature affixed thereto is the genuine signature of a qualified elector residing in a city, village, or township to be affected by thе carrying out of the purposes of the petition and that not less than 25 of such signers reside in each city, village or township to be affected thereby. The secretary of state shall examine such petition and the affidavit or affidavits annexed, and if he shall find that the same conforms to the provisions of this act he shall so certify, and transmit a certified copy of said petition and the accompanying affidavit or affidavits to the clerk of each city, village or township to be affected by the carrying out of the purposes of such petition, together with his certificate as above provided, and a notice directing that at the next general election occurring not less than 40
days thereafter the question of making the incorporation, consolidation or change of boundaries petitioned for shall be submitted to the electors of the district to be affected, and if no general election is to be held within 90 days the resolution may fix a date preceding the
next general election for a special election on the question. If he shall find that said petition and the affidavit or affidavits annexed thereto do not conform to the provisions of this act he shall certify to that fact, and return said petition and affidavits to the person from whom they were received, together with such certificate. The several city, village and township clerks who shall receive from the secretary of state the copies and certificates above provided for shall give notice of the election to be held on the question of making the proposed incorporation, consolidation or change of boundaries as provided for in section 10 of this act.30
Lastly, the phrase “district to be affected,” as used in
The district to be affected by the proposed incorporation, consolidation, or change of boundaries is considered to include thе whole of each city, village, or township from which territory is to be taken or to which territory is to be annexed.31
3. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
When interpreting a statute, a court‘s duty is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature based on the actual words used in the statute.32 If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, no further con-
struction is necessary or permitted.33 The statute is enforced as written.34 It is the duty of the judiciary to interpret, not write, the law.35
In Lansing Mayor v Pub Service Comm, this Court repudiated prior case law that held that a statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one meaning or if “reasonable minds can differ” regarding the statute‘s meaning.36 Instead, as this Court stated in Lansing Mayor, a statutory provision is ambiguous only if it “irreconcilably conflict[s]” with another provision, or when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning.37 In ascertaining whether an ambiguity exists, therefore, a court must employ conventional rules of construction and “give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute.”38
4. THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE HRCA PERMITS THE USE OF A SINGLE DETACHMENT PETITION TO TRANSFER LAND TO MULTIPLE TOWNSHIPS
At its core, the Court of Appeals opinion in Casco Twp represents a deliberate decision
in the HRCA and ignoring others, the Court of Appeals substituted its conception of “fairness” for the policy determination made by the Legislature in writing the HRCA.39 While this à la carte method of statutory interpretation that focuses only on certain words in a statute is extraordinarily effective at allowing a court to reach a conclusion that it views as “fair” or “just,” it is an affront to the separation of powers principle. As this Court has stated numerous times, it is the duty of the judiciary to effectuate the intent of the Legislature by giving effect to every “word, phrase, and clause in a statute.”40
A close analysis of the text of the HRCA demonstrates that the statute is not ambiguous and that a single detachment petition may be used to detach land from a city and add it to multiple townships. Although the majority focuses extensively on
The section of thе HRCA under which plaintiffs filed their petitions,
The word “each” is not defined in the HRCA. Pursuant to
resort to a layman‘s dictionary . . . is appropriate.”46 Moreover, it is appropriate to use a dictionary from the period contemporaneous to the statute‘s enactment in order to give full effect to the intent of the Legislature that enacted the statute.47
Although the HRCA has been amended frequently over the past century, the relevant provisions of
It is clear, therefore, that the word “each,” as used in 1909, means “all” and “every,” and plainly encompasses multiple entities. Indeed, by using “each” in
Defendants argue that the Legislature‘s use of the word “each” is not determinative because, by using “each,” the Legislature was simply referring to the two municipal entities that necessarily must be involved in any detachment proceeding: the city that will lose the land and the
limit “the district to be affected” to only two municipal entities by using the word “both.” Instead, it deliberately used the distributive adjective “each,” thereby referring to every municipality affected. It is only by assuming that “each” refers exclusively to the donor and recipient municipalities in a conventional detachment proceeding that the majority position may be sustained. There is no textual basis for making this assumption or otherwise limiting the customary meaning of “each.”54
Justice YOUNG: Doesn‘t “several” mean more than a couple?
Counsel: Yes.
This construction of the HRCA is bolstered by the fact that, throughout
This Court addressed
that a word importing the singular number ‘may extend’ to the plural. The statute does not say that such an automatic understanding is required.”58 We went on to hold that
The same is true in the present case. In
Taken together, all of these textual clues demonstrate that the HRCA permits the use of a single detachment petition and election when transferring land to more than one township. Unlike the majority,
which focuses only on select words in the HRCA, I believe that this Court is obligated to give effect to every word the Legislature used in writing the HRCA. I would hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the HRCA is ambiguous. No provision of the HRCA conflicts, irreconcilably or otherwise, with any other provision of the HRCA. Nor is the HRCA equally susceptible to more than a single meaning. A plain reading of
The majority casually dismisses this Court‘s decision in Walsh v Secretary of State,61 which explicitly recognized and permitted a single petition for a multiple-municipality annexation under the HRCA. In Walsh, we examined
The plaintiffs in Walsh argued that the annexation attempt was divisible and that we should approvе the annexation of the parcels in Lansing Township, given that the Lansing Township voters approved the annexation. This Court disagreed. We held that the annexation was a “package proposition” and that, under the vote tabulation provisions of
While it is true that Walsh involved an analogous annexation rather than a detachment, and that the primary focus in Walsh was on the vote tabulation provisions of the HRCA, not the definition of “district to be affected,” this Court accepted the use of a single “package” petition even though the land that was to be annexed consisted of five distinct parcels in two separate townships. Accordingly, the single petition procedure used by plaintiffs in the present cases is not “novel” as defendants contend. Indeed, as Walsh demonstrates, this Court‘s own case law has countenanced the use of such a procedure under the HRCA in the closely analogous annexation context.
5. THE MAJORITY‘S RELIANCE ON THE HRCA‘S “QUALIFIED ELECTOR” REQUIREMENT AND THE ELECTION CODE IS MISPLACED
The majority bases its holding primarily on the “qualified elector” requirement in
proceedings originating by petition therefor signed by qualified electors who are freeholders residing within the cities, villages, or townships to be affected thereby. . . .64
each signature affixed [to the petition] is the genuine signature of a qualified elector residing in a city, village or township to be affected by the carrying out of the purposes of the petition and that not less than 25 of such signers reside in each city, village or township to be affected thereby.65
The majority concludes that any multiple-township petition always violates the “qualified elector” rule because a signatory who is a qualified elector of township A is obviously not a qualified elector of township B, in that the signatory is not a resident of the territory “to be affected” in township B.
The majority‘s analysis is flawed. The “qualifiеd elector” provision of
The majority‘s reliance on
While it is true that
In fact, the precise case that the majority cites for its
I question the majority‘s reliance on Vander Laan when the Vander Laan Court itself noted that there was no statutory basis for the “separate subjects” electoral rule that it recognized. Rather than rely on a judicially created rule that was premised on policy concerns in an unrelated area, I prefer to base my analysis of the
multiple-township detachment procedure on the actual text of the HRCA. However, to the extent that Vander Laan—a case that did not even involve the HRCA—is controlling in the present cases, I believe that the multiple-township detachments are in accord with its holding because the detachments are united by a “common purpose.”
6. DEFENDANTS’ REMAINING ARGUMENTS
Defendants argue that to construe the HRCA so as to permit a single, multiple-township petition would lead to “absurd results.” However, in People v McIntire,73 this Court rejected the absurd results
The defendants in Fillmore Twp also argue that if the detachment of 1.27 acres from the city of Holland
for addition to Park Township is permitted, it would violate the “contiguity” rule articulated by this Court in Genesee Twp v Genesee Co,76 a case involving an annexation of land from Genesee Township to the city of Mt. Morris. In Genesee Twp, this Court stated:
“So, as to territorial extent, the idea of a city is one of unity, not of plurаlity; of compactness or contiguity, not separation or segregation. Contiguity is generally required even in the absence of statutory requirement to that effect, and where the annexation is left in the discretion of a judicial tribunal, contiguity will be required as a matter of law.”77
Recognizing that the requirement of contiguity was not “covered by any specific provision of the [HRCA],” the Court in Genesee Twp instead based its holding on non-textual policy grounds: “the purpose sought to be served [by the HRCA] and the practical aspects of annexation. . . .”78
However, this Court revisited the contiguity rule eight years later in Owosso Twp v City of Owosso.79 We specifically stated in Owosso that “the judicial requirement of ‘contiguity‘” articulated in Genesee Twp had been “superseded” when the Legislature amended
ently have this Court ignore the legislative intent of
7. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HRCA
Because I believe that the HRCA permits the use of a single detachment petition involving multiple townships, it is necessary to determine whether the HRCA‘s
Given the facts surrounding defendants’ vote dilution claim, it is easy to understand their argument. As discussed in part I(B) of this opinion, it is obvious, for example, that the plaintiffs in Fillmore Twp deliberately included the three additional townships—Laketown, Holland Charter, and Park—as a means to equalize the voting disparity between the city of Holland and Fillmore Township. In the initial August 2000 detachment vote that included only the city of Holland and Fillmore Township, voters rejected the detachment by a vote of 3,917 to 2,614 (approximately sixty percent against, forty percent in favor). Recognizing that the
The idea of “vote dilution”85 as a cognizable constitutional harm originated in the context of congressional and state legislative apportionment cases. Initially, courts refused to get involved in claims regarding vote dilution. The issue was viewed as best left for the political process and considered nonjusticiable. The leading case establishing this view was the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Colegrove v. Green,86 in which voters challenged the Illinois congressional districting scheme because several of the districts were comprised of larger populations than others. Stating that the harm was one to “Illinois as a polity” and not a private wrong, the Court refused to intervene.87 In rejecting the notion that the Court should get involved in what it viewed as a political question, Justice Frankfurter wrote that “[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket.”88 He went on to note:
The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress. . . . The Constitution has left the performance of many duties in our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the exеcutive and legislative action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising their political rights.89
However, approximately fifteen years after Colegrove, the Supreme Court reversed course in the landmark case of
The Court rejected the “political question” rationale used in Colegrove and held that the issue presented by the voters was justiciable. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated that “the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political question.”91 The Court went on to hold that the Equal Protection Clause provided a proper vehicle by which to challenge the Tennessee apportionment system.92 In its sweeping holding, the Court did not provide any guidelines regarding how the Equal Protection Clause should be applied to voting rights cases nor establish any standards by which to implement the new role for the judiciary in such cases. Instead, the Court simply stated, “Nor need the [voters challenging the apportionment], in order to succeed in this action, ask the Court to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking. Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar. . . .”93
The Court later made the one-person, one-vote standard applicable to local governments in Avery v. Midland Co.97 In Avery, the Court invalidated the apportionment system for the Commissioners Court of Midland County, Texas, because it consisted of “single-member districts of substantially unequal population,” which favored rural voters over city voters.98 The Court reasoned that, because the Commissioners Court exercised “general governmental powers”99 and its actions had a “broad range of impacts on all the citizens of the county,”100 the one-person, one-vote standard should apply.101
As Wesberry, Reynolds, Avery, and their progeny demonstrate, the one-person, one-vote standard has become a well-established principle in equal protection jurisprudence. At the same time, two notable
The second, and more relevant, exception to the one-person, one-vote standard involves changes to municipal boundaries. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized the unique nature of boundary changes as early as 1907 in the seminal case of Hunter v. Pittsburgh,103 nearly sixty years before the one-person, one-vote standard was established. In Hunter, the city of Allegheny was annexed to the city of Pittsburgh. Under state law, the votes in both cities on the annexation were aggregated. Voters in Allegheny, who were greatly outnumbered by voters in Pittsburgh, claimed that their votes were unconstitutionally diluted. The Supreme Court rejected the dilution claim and held that states have complete control over municipalities:
The State, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the State is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. Although the inhabitants and property owners may by such changes suffer inconvenience, and their property may be lessened in value by the burden of increased taxation, or for any other reason, they have no right by contract or otherwise in the unaltered or continued existence of the corporation or its powers, and there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which protects them from these injurious consequences. The power is in the State and those who legislate for the State are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive exercise of it.104
This Court fully embraced the rationale of Hunter in Midland Twp. v. State Boundary Comm.105 The case involved an equal protection challenge to provisions of the HRCA that provided for a referendum if the area to be affected included more than one hundred persons, but excluded the possibility of a referendum when one hundred or fewer persons were affected. In rejecting the equal protection argument, Justice LEVIN, writing for the Court, directly relied on Hunter and held, “No
Although Hunter preceded the establishment of the one-person, one-vote standard by half a century, its holding has endured throughout modern equal protection jurisprudence.107 Indeed, municipal boundary changes have traditionally been exempted from the one-person, one-vote rule and strict scrutiny review.108
This issue was addressed in detail by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc.,109 which involved a claim by city voters that their votes were unconstitutionally diluted by rural voters.
In Lockport, Niagara County, New York, sought to amend its charter in order to provide for a strong form of county government headed by a county executive. New York law provided that such an amendment could only become effective upon approval by separate majorities of the voters who lived in the cities within the county and of the voters who lived outside the cities. The amendment to the charter failed both times that it was put to a vote. Although a majority of the city voters and a majority of the overall votes cast were in favor of the amendment, a separate majority of non-city voters in favor of the amendment was never achieved in either election. Residents of the cities filed suit, claiming that the concurrent-majority voting scheme unconstitutionally diluted their voting strength because it gave a small number of rural voters disproportionate voting strength.
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the equal protection challenge.110 In upholding the New York voting scheme,
Lockport is particularly instructive in resolving defendants’ equal protection claims. Similar to the Niagara County referendum in Lockport, the detachment elections in the present cases are also “single-shot” referenda, thus marginalizing much of the rationale surrounding the Reynolds line of cases pertaining to legislative representation. The expressed will of the voters in the detachment elections will be direct and unfiltered.
Like the Supreme Court in Lockport, I also find significant the existence of disparate electoral interests between city and township residents.115 In the present cases, it is undisputed that the voters in the townships and those in the cities have “substantially differing electoral interests.” If the detachments are approved, one municipality will lose land and others will gain land, thereby implicating divergent interests in the city and the townships on a wide range of issues, including police and fire protection, school districts, taxes, sewer systems, road construction, commercial development, garbage collection, etc.116 Indeed, the majority itself recognizes this fact by noting the “potential for dramatically different consequences” among municipalities if the detachments are permitted.116
Given these differing electoral interests, I believe it is rational for the Legislature to permit the use of a single detachment petition to transfer land to multiple townships and that such a procedure does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. As the parties noted in their briefs and at oral argument, boundary disputes between townships and cities are nothing new. Indeed, such gamesmanship is not only commonplace, but to be expected given the inherently valuable nature of land in our society. For example, cities often craft annexation proposals with surgical precision so that the territory to be acquired from a township contains one hundred or fewer inhabitants and is thus exempt from a public referendum.117 By repeating this
In light of such tactical territorial disputes between cities and townships, it is not irrational for the Legislature to permit several townships to amplify their voting strength by combining several different parcels into a single detachment petition. In fact, with the significant population disparities that exist between large cities and small townships, such a bundled petition may be the only way that certain detachments could ever be effectuated. By permitting several townships to combine efforts in a single petition, the Legislature has simply recognized that differing electoral interests exist and that, occasionally, similar entities will need to combine forces in order to have any meaningful opportunity at advancing their interests and achieving the various boundary changes authorized under the HRCA.118 I believe that such a view by the Legislature is entirely reasonable.119
Lockport and Hunter demonstrate that the one-person, one-vote standard does not apply in cases involving municipal boundary changes as it does, for example, in the context of legislative representation.120 Instead, states maintain broad discretion over municipal boundary changes—discretion that is subject to rational basis review.121 The fact that the state has
While the wisdom of such a policy choice by the Legislature might be debated, this Court is not the proper forum for such an undertaking. Our role is limited to determining whether the HRCA conforms to the Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, I believe that it does.
B. MANDAMUS RELIEF
1. NATURE OF THE REMEDY
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to enforce duties mandated by law.122 It is entirely discretionary in nature.123 Before seeking mandamus relief, a plaintiff must complete all conditions precedent to the act that the plaintiff seeks to compel,124 including a demand of performance made on the official charged with performing the act.125 Once this threshold is met, the plaintiff, bearing the burden of proof,126 must demonstrate: (1) a clear legal right to the act sought to be compelled; (2) a clear legal duty by the defendant to perform the act; (3) thаt the
2. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO MANDAMUS RELIEF
While I agree with the majority that plaintiffs are not entitled to mandamus relief, I disagree with the majority‘s rationale. The majority concludes that mandamus relief is improper because the HRCA does not permit the use of a single detachment petition involving multiple townships and, therefore, plaintiffs have no “clear legal right” to the relief they seek.128 For the reasons stated, I disagree with that conclusion. However, I believe that plaintiffs are not entitled to writs of mandamus because a request for such relief is premature at this time.
As already discussed, before a writ of mandamus will be issued, a plaintiff must complete all conditions precedent to the act that the plaintiff seeks to compel.129 While it is possible that plaintiffs may have already satisfied all requirements imposed by the HRCA, the Secretary of State has yet to make such a determination. The Secretary of State deferred her examination of the petitions until the antecedent question of whether the HRCA permits the use of a single petition involving multiple townships was resolved. The Secretary of State has not yet examined the petitions to determine whether they comply with all the other requirements of the HRCA. Therefore, plaintiffs’ requests for mandamus relief are premature.
IV. CONCLUSION
The HRCA is not ambiguous. A plain reading of §§ 9 and 11 demonstrates that the use of a single detachment petition is permitted when seeking to transfer land to multiple townships. Moreover, such a procedure comports with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs are not entitled to mandamus relief, however, because the Secretary of State has yet to examine the petitions to determine whether all the conditions mandatеd by the HRCA have been satisfied. Accordingly, in Casco Twp, I would reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court and grant declaratory relief. Because the plaintiffs in Fillmore Twp did not seek declaratory relief, I would affirm the dismissal of their mandamus action.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
Notes
Pursuant toEvery citizen of the United States who has attained the age of 21 years, who has resided in this state six months, and who meets the requirements of local residence provided by law, shall be an elector and qualified to vote in any election except as otherwise provided in this constitution. The legislature shall define residence for voting purposes.
Because the city of Richmond is located in both St. Clair County and Macomb County, the plaintiffs filed the detachment petition with the Secretary of State pursuant to § 11.When the territory to be affected by any proposed incorporation, consolidation or change is situated in more than 1 county the petition hereinbefore provided shall be addressed and presented to the secretary of state.... [
MCL 117.11 .]
See also Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp Managers, 467 Mich 1, 18; 651 NW2d 356 (2002); Koontz, supra at 312; Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 248-249; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).All words and phrases shall be construed аnd understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.
At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that the word “several,” as used in the HRCA, means “more than a couple.”
Justice YOUNG: I‘m asking you to look at section 11 that refers near the end: “The several city, village and township clerks who shall receive from the Secretary of State copies of the certificates.” I‘m looking at the term “several” there. Does that not indicate at least the potential for multiple—
Counsel: Well again we go to kind of the dictionary look at the definition and “several” can mean one individual.
Justice YOUNG: Really?
Counsel: I‘m sorry, you‘re talking about a city, village or —
The secretary of state shall examine such petition and the affidavit or affidavits annexed. . . . If he shall find that said petition and the affidavit or affidavits annexed thereto do not conform to the provisions of this act he shall certify to that fact, and return said petition and affidavits to the person from whom they were received . . . . [
Id. (emphasis added).]
Except as otherwise provided in this section, and without regard to the discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each officer and employee of a governmental agency . . . is immune from tort liability for an injury to a person or damage to property caused by the officer, employee, or member while in the course of employment or service . . . if all of the following are met:
* * *
(c) The officer‘s, employee‘s, member‘s, or volunteer‘s conduct does not amount to gross nеgligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. [Emphasis added.]
It is important to note that the text of our state Equal Protection Clause is not entirely thе same as its federal counterpart:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. [Emphasis added.]
Voter dilution cases fall into two broad categories. First, there are those in which dilution occurs because (1) some persons are given votes weighted more heavily than others similarly situated merely on the basis of residence, (2) votes are weighted according to a factor which the state determines is reflective of “interest,” or (3) persons are excluded altogether from voting because the state deems them to be “uninterested.” Second, there are those in which dilution occurs because equal franchise is granted to persons allegedly without interest, or with significantly less interest than other voters. [Durchslag, Salyer, Ball, and Holt: Reappraising the right to vote in terms of political “interest” and vote dilution, 33 Case W Res L R 1, 38-39 (1982) (emphasis in original).]
Id. at 237. Commentators have questioned the Supreme Court‘s reliance on the Equal Protection Clause in Baker, suggesting, instead, that the Republican Form of Government Clause,
A districting schеme so malapportioned that a minority faction is in complete control, without regard to democratic sentiment, violates the basic norms of republican government. It would thus appear to raise a constitutional question under Article IV, Section 4, which states that “the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” Constitutional standards under the Republican Form of Government Clause are ill-developed, but surely a government is not “republican” if a minority faction maintains control, and the majority has no means of overturning it. [McConnell, The redistricting cases: Original mistakes and current consequences, 24 Harv J L & Pub Policy 103, 105-106 (2000).]
Professor Pamela S. Karlan has noted:
[T]he doctrinal move to one person, one vote was in no sense compelled, either by precedent or by the absence of any alternative avenues to judicial oversight. The decision to rely on the Equal Protection Clause, rather than on the Guaranty Clause, has always puzzled me. Justice William Brennan‘s explanation—that there was precedent suggesting the general nonjusticiability of the Guaranty Clause—would make more sense if not for the fact that there was also absolutely square precedent refusing to entertain malapportionment claims under the Fourteenth Amendment [citing Colegrove]. If the Court had to overrule some precedent to review apportionment and the refusal to reapportion, then why was overruling Fourteenth Amendment precedent and developing a unique set of equal protection principles that apply nowhere else in constitutional law—the superior alternative? [Karlan, Politics by other means, 85 Va L R 1697, 1717-1718 (1999).]
Baker, supra at 226. In dissent, Justice Frankfurter sharply criticized the Court for casting aside the “political question” rationale of Colegrove. He challenged the majority‘s conclusion that courts were equipped tо handle such voting rights cases. Justice Frankfurter stated:
The Framers carefully and with deliberate forethought refused . . . to enthrone the judiciary. In this situation, as in others of like nature, appeal for relief does not belong here. Appeal must be to an informed, civically militant electorate. . . .
* * *
Unless judges, the judges of this Court, are to make their private views of political wisdom the measure of the Constitution—views which in all honesty cannot but give the appearance, if not reflect the reality, of involvement with the business of partisan politics so inescapably a part of apportionment controversies—the Fourteenth Amendment, “itself a historical product,” provides no guide for judicial oversight of the representation problem. [Id. at 270, 301-302 (citation omitted).]
In addition to minimizing the effects of population disparities between cities and townships, there are numerous other reasons why the Legislature may have permitted the use of a single petition to transfer land to multiple townships. For example, it is possible that the Legislature recognized the substantial financial expense that townships and cities face when holding elections and that, by combining numerous detachments in one election, it would be less expensive for the taxpayers to have a single election than to have several separate detachment elections.
Justice LEVIN recognized the gamesmanship that occurs between cities and townships in Midland Twp., supra at 679, stating that “[c]ity and township strategies based on [the one hundred-resident referendum threshold] are unavoidable. In general, the city will seek to limit the area proposed for annexation so that there are insufficient residents for a referendum and the township will seek to extend the area to require a referendum. The motive or purpose of the city or township in drawing the proposed boundaries or in requesting a revision of boundaries is not material.”
To apply strict scrutiny to the distribution of the vote concerning boundary changes would inevitably entail a constitutional review of the states’ municipal formation and boundary change policies. But there are no generally accepted principles for determining whether a particular local government ought to exist, what that unit‘s geographic dimensions ought to be, or whether a particular territory ought to be in that or another local unit. Thus, deference to the states is consistent with both the lack of a constitutional vantage point for examining state municipal formation and boundary change policies and the traditional jurisprudence of federalism that treats local governments as state instrumentalities and leaves the creation and structure of local governments to the states. [Briffault, supra, 60 U Chi L R at 395-396.]