CASCO TOWNSHIP v SECRETARY OF STATE
FILLMORE v SECRETARY OF STATE
Docket Nos. 126120, 126369
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided June 14, 2005
Rehearing denied in Fillmore at 473 Mich 1205
472 MICH 566
Argued March 8, 2005 (Calendar Nos. 2, 3)
Fillmore Township and certain electors from Fillmore Township, Holland Charter Township, Park Township, Laketown Township, and the city of Holland filed a complaint for mandamus against the Secretary of State in the Court of Appeals, seeking to compel the Secretary of State to authorize a referendum, pursuant to a petition, on the detachment of land from the city of Holland and the addition of the land in separate parts to each of the four townships. The matter was held in abeyance pending the decision in Casco Twp v Secretary of State, 261 Mich App 386 (2004), and the complaint for mandamus was denied by the Court of Appeals, GRIFFIN, P.J., and METER and SCHUETTE, JJ., following the decision in Casco Twp. Unpublished order, entered May 6, 2004 (Docket No. 245640).
The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ applications for leave to appeal in both cases and ordered the cases to be argued and submitted together. 471 Mich 890 (2004).
In an opinion by Justice CAVANAGH, joined by Chief Justice TAYLOR, and Justices WEAVER, KELLY, CORRIGAN, and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
A single detachment petition and a single vote on that petition may not encompass territory that will be detached from one city
- A change оf boundaries for a district to be affected by a detachment encompasses only one city and one township because a township‘s voters can be qualified electors only in relation to their own township‘s proposed change of boundaries and are affected only by their own township‘s proposed change of boundaries.
- Interpreting the district to be affected in detachment proceedings as the city from which the territory is to be detached and the township to which the territory is to be added recognizes that the consequences of detachment may be different for each township that seeks to gain property.
- Allowing a single petition and a single vote on detachment and addition of land to multiple townships does not allow voters to render a vote in support of addition of land to only one township.
- There was no clear legal right to have the Secretary of State authorize each petition for a single vote. The writs of mandamus were properly denied.
Justice YOUNG, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concluded that a plain reading of all relevant language in the act indicates that the act permits the use of a single petition and election when adding land to multiple townships. The act‘s definition of the “district to be affected” by the detachment as including “each” municipality suggests that the Legislature contemplated a single detachment proceeding involving multiple recipient townships. Such a procedure comports with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under federal case law, strict scrutiny review and the one-person, one-vote standard do not apply in the context of municipal boundary changes. The declaratory relief requested in Casco Twp should be granted. Any request for mandamus relief, however, is prеmature because the Secretary of State has not examined the petitions at issue to determine whether they satisfy all the conditions mandated by the act, and the writs of mandamus were properly denied in both cases.
Affirmed.
1. BOUNDARIES — HOME RULE CITIES — DETACHMENT ELECTIONS.
The Home Rule City Act does not allow a single petition and a single vote to encompass detachment of land from a city for addition to multiple townships (
2. BOUNDARIES — HOME RULE CITIES — DETACHMENT ELECTIONS.
Residents of one township are not qualified electors for purposes of determining a change of boundaries for another township through detachment proceedings under the Home Rule City Act (
Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C. (by William K. Fahey, Stephen J. Rhodes, Eric E. Doster, and Ronald D. Richards, Jr.), and James V. Dubay for Casco Township, Columbus Township, Patricia Iseler, James P. Holk, Fillmore Township, Shirley Greving, Andrea Stam, Larry Sybesma, Jody Tenbrink, and James Rietveld, and Patrick J. O‘Brien and Heather S. Meingast, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Secretary of State and the Director of the Bureau of Elections.
Eric D. Williams and Rex A. Burgess for the city of Richmond.
Kerr, Russell and Weber, PLC (by Robert J. Pineau), for Walter K. and Patricia A. Winkle.
Cunningham Dalman, P.C. (by Andrew J. Mulder, P. Haans Mulder, and Vincent L. Duckworth), for the city of Holland.
Amici Curiae:
Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer & Thall, P.C. (by John H. Bauckham), for Michigan Townships Association.
Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C. (by William B. Beach), for Michigan Municipal League.
CAVANAGH, J. These consolidated appeals present two issues. First, we must address whether a single detachment petition and a single vote on that petition, pursuant to the terms of the Home Rule City Act,
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
CASCO TWP v SECRETARY OF STATE
Plaintiffs in this case are two adjacent townships—Casco Township and Columbus Tоwnship—and residents of those townships who seek to detach territory from defendant city of Richmond. The territory sought to be detached is territory that was previously annexed to the city of Richmond.
Plaintiffs seek to present the ballot issue covering both townships in a single petition. This would result in a single vote about whether to detach territory from the city of Richmond and add the territory to Casco Township and Columbus Township. The residents of one township would be voting on the return of property to their township, as well as the return of property to a township in which they do not reside. The Secretary of State refused to approve an election on plaintiffs’ petition because an election on the petition would allow
Plaintiffs filed a complaint for mandamus and declaratory relief. The circuit court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to act because it was not clear that a single petition seeking detachment from a city and addition of the territory to two townships was permitted by the Home Rule City Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court. Casco Twp v Secretary of State, 261 Mich App 386; 682 NW2d 546 (2004). We granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal and ordered that the case be argued and submitted with Fillmore Twp v Secretary of State, 471 Mich 890 (2004).
FILLMORE TWP v SECRETARY OF STATE
Plaintiffs are Fillmore Township and electors from four townships—Fillmore Township, Holland Charter Township, Park Township, and Laketown Township—and the city of Holland who want to detach territory from the city of Holland and add the territory to the four townships. Plaintiffs filed a joint detachment petition with the Secretary of State, asking that the petition be certified and that a single election be held regarding the territory that was proposed to be detached from the city of Holland. The Secretary of State refused to certify the petition because the petition involved an effort to detach territory for addition to more than one township.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint for mandamus in the Court of Appeals, and the complaint was held in abeyance pending the decision in the Casco Twp case. Unpublished order, entered May 19, 2003 (Docket No. 245640). Plaintiffs’ complaint was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the Casco Twp
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The proper interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Lincoln v Gen Motors Corp, 461 Mich 483, 489-490; 607 NW2d 73 (2000). A trial court‘s decision regarding a writ of mandamus is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 443; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
III. ANALYSIS
These cases involve an issue of statutory interpretation. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Id. at 411. The first step is to review the language of the statute. If the statutory language is unambiguous, the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning expressed in the statute and judicial construction is not permissible.
The Home Rule City Act,
Section 6 of the Home Rule City Act,
Additional support for this position is found in the statutory language used in other parts of the Home Rule City Act.
A change of boundaries for the district to bе affected encompasses only one city and one township because a township‘s voters can be qualified electors only in relation to their own township‘s proposed change of boundaries and are affected only by their own township‘s proposed change of boundaries. Therefore, it is only plausible that the “district to be affected” encompasses one city and one township. Accordingly, a single detachment petition and a single vote may only encompass territory to be added to one township.5
Language in
Further, interpreting the “district to be affected” in detachment proceedings as the city from which the territory is to be detached and the township to which the territory is to be added recognizes that the consequences of detachment may be quite different for each township that seeks to gain property. For example, property rights and liabilities must be adjusted between the city and the township when there is a detachment.
Moreover, allowing a single petition and a single vote on detachment from one city for the addition of territory to multiple townships does not allow voters to render a vote in support of the addition of territory to only one township.
A question submitted to the electors of this state or the electors of a subdivision of this state shall, to the extent that it will not confuse the electorate, be worded so that a “yes” vote will be a vote in favor of the subject matter of the proposal or issue and a “no” vote will be a vote against the subject matter of the proposal or issue.
However, a single vote on detaching territory from one city and adding the territory to multiple townships does not allow a voter who may only favor one of the multiple additions of territory to cast a “yes” vote. As stated by this Court in Muskegon Pub Schools v Vander Laan, 211 Mich 85, 87; 178 NW 424 (1920), “Separate subjects, separate purposes, or independent propositions should not be combined so that one may gather votes for the other.” In Vander Laan, this Court noted that the erection of three new school buildings showed a common purpose and were part of a comprehensive plan to meet the educational needs of the city. In contrast, we find that detaching territory from one city and adding the territory to multiple townships does not indicate a common purpose because the needs and consequences of the additions to various townships may differ remarkably. Combining multiple additions of territory in a single detachment petition so that there is only a single vote indeed combines indеpendent propositions “so that one may gather votes for the other.”
Further, Justice YOUNG‘s reliance on this Court‘s decision in Walsh v Secretary of State, 355 Mich 570, 574; 95 NW2d 511 (1959), is misplaced. Walsh dealt with annexation, not detachment. Notably, in the multiple-township annexation at issue in Walsh, the votes of each territory were considered separately. In essence, a single township could “veto” the annexation from taking place, no matter how many voters approved of the annexation in other townships. In contrast, in the
Our conclusion that a single detachment petition and a single vote on that petition may only encompass territory to be added to one township is in accord with the unambiguous statutory language. Thus, the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning expressed in the statute and judicial construction is not permissible.
Finally, a writ of mandamus could be properly issued in these cases only if plaintiffs proved that (1) they had a clear legal right to the performance of the specific duty that they sought to be compelled, and (2) the Secretary of State had a clear legal duty to perform the act. In re MCI, supra at 442-443. Because the Home Rule City Act does not allow a single detachment petition and a single vote on that petition to encompass territory to be detached from one city and added to more than one township, there was no clear legal right to have the Secretary of State authorize each petition for a single vote. Therefore, there was no clear legal duty that required the Secretary of State to act, and the writs of mandamus were properly denied in both cases before this Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Home Rule City Act,
TAYLOR, C.J., and WEAVER, KELLY, CORRIGAN, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.
YOUNG, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). We granted leave to appeal in these consolidated cases to determine whether (1) the Home Rule City Act (HRCA)1 permits the use of a single detachment petition and election when the territory to be detached from a city is to be transferred to more than one township and, (2) if such a procedure is allowed under the HRCA, whether plaintiffs2 are entitled to mandamus relief. I agree with the majority that plaintiffs are not entitled to writs of mandamus because I believe that any request for mandamus relief is premature at this time. I disagree, however, with the majority‘s conclusion that the HRCA does not permit the use of a single detachment petition and vote thereon when transferring land to multiple townships.
The Legislature was well aware of the political gamesmanship that occurs between municipalities in the context of boundary disputes. Indeed, our Constitution was changed to free the Legislature from this political quagmire.3 By enacting the HRCA, the Legislature established a standardized procedure to effectuate such changes in a manner that it viewed as fair and
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s conclusion that a single detachment petition involving multiple townships is not permitted under the HRCA. In Casco Twp, I would grant the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief and deny their claim for a writ of mandamus. In Fillmore Twp, because the plaintiffs only sought a writ of mandamus, I would deny entirely their request for relief.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The majority fails to convey adequately the true character of the boundary disputes at issue. By glossing over much of the relevant history, the majority understates the inherently political and calculated nature of the disputes.4
A. CASCO TWP v SECRETARY OF STATE
The land at issue in this case has a long, contentious history. In July 1996, intervening defendants, Walter and Patricia Winkle, filed a petition with the State Boundary Commission (SBC) seeking to annex to the city of Richmond approximately 157 acres of land that they and other residents owned in Casco Township and Columbus Township. The Winkles hoped to develop their land for commercial use, but believed that commercial development could not occur unless their property was connected to the water and sewer lines offered by the city of Richmond.
Before the Winkles’ July 1996 petition, however, Columbus Township and neighboring Lenox Township had entered into an agreement pursuant to
In December 2001, plaintiffs filed a single detachment petition with the Secretary of State, seeking to transfer from the city of Richmond to Casco Township and Columbus Township the same land that was involved in the prior annexation.10 The disputed territory consisted of approximately eighty-seven acres in Casco Township and seventy acres in Columbus Township.
Unsure whether the HRCA permitted the use of a single detachment petition to transfer land to multiple townships, the Secretary of State requested an official opinion from the Attorney General interpreting the
The following month, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Ingham Circuit Court, seeking declaratory and mandamus relief against the defendants. After holding a hearing, the circuit court denied the plaintiffs’ request for mandamus relief, ruling that the HRCA was not “patently clear” regarding whether a single detachment petition may be used to transfer land to more than one township. The circuit court then dismissed the plaintiffs’ lawsuit without having addressed their request for declaratory relief.
Acknowledging that there was “no case law that directly addresse[d] the current situation,”15 the majority concluded that it was “clearly unfair” to allow the use of a single detachment petition when transferring land to multiple townships.16 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals denied the plaintiffs’ request for mandamus relief. The Court of Appeals further held that the circuit court had “implicitly” denied the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief and affirmed the circuit court‘s ruling denying declaratory relief.17 The dissent disagreed with the majority‘s conclusion that the HRCA was ambiguous and noted that the plain text of the HRCA permitted the use of a single detachment petition to transfer land to multiple townships. We granted leave to appeal and consolidated the case with Fillmore Twp v Secretary of State.18
As with the territory involved in the companion case of Casco Twp v Secretary of State, the disputed territory in this case also has a complex history. In 1997, Fillmore Township and the city of Holland entered into a 425 agreement through which land in Fillmore Township was to be transferred to Holland. Pursuant to the referendum provision in
Several months after the 425 agreement was defeated, in late 1998, landowners in Fillmore Township filed petitions with the SBC to annex approximately 1,100 acres to the city of Holland. The SBC approved the annexation, thereby transferring approximately 1,100 acres from Fillmore Township to Holland. Seeking to reverse the annexation effectuated by the SBC‘s decision, in February 2000, electors in Fillmore Township filed a petition with the Secretary of State to detach the land that was previously annexed. In August 2000, voters in Fillmore and Holland defeated the detachment proposal by a vote of 3,917 to 2,614.
In October 2002, the plaintiffs submitted a single detachment petition to the Secretary of State,19 again hoping to detach from the city of Holland the territory that was previously annexed from Fillmore Township. In addition to the Fillmore Township-city of Holland detachment, however, the petition also included three smaller detachments by which land would be detached
The following table summarizes the acreage to be transferred by the detachment and the number of voters that would be added to the voting base by including each additional township in the single detachment petition:21
| Municipality | Acres To Be Received from the Detachment | Registered Voters (as of November 2002) |
|---|---|---|
| City of Holland | —— | 19,771 |
| Fillmore Township | 1,054 | 1,854 |
| Laketown Township | 0.77 | 4,166 |
| Holland Charter Township | 3.33 | 15,221 |
| Park Township | 1.27 | 11,989 |
Thus, by including the three additional townships and detaching only an extra 5.37 acres, the voting base of the district to be affected would be expanded by an additional 31,376 voters over what the voting base would be if only Fillmore Township and the city of Holland were involved.
In November 2002, the Secretary of State refused to certify the detachment petition, relying on the September 2002 decision by the circuit сourt disallowing the use of a single detachment petition in Casco Twp. In response to the Secretary of State‘s refusal to certify the petition, the plaintiffs filed an original mandamus action
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the HRCA permits the use of a single detachment petition to transfer land to multiple townships is a matter of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law that is reviewed by this Court de novo.24 The constitutionality of the HRCA‘s detachment procedure is also a question of law that is subject to review de novo.25 This Court reviews a lower court‘s decision regarding a request for mandamus relief for an abuse of discretion.26
A. THE HRCA AND THE SINGLE DETACHMENT PROCEDURE
1. HISTORY OF THE HRCA
The HRCA, enacted in 1909, is an intricate statute that has been amended in piecemeal fashion numerous times over the past century. Before the enactment of the HRCA, the Legislature directly enacted municipal boundary changes on a case-by-case basis through special legislation. Delegates to the 1907-1908 constitutional convention recognized the substantial burden this process imposed, as well as the confusion that resulted from hundreds of pieces of such special legislation. The convention‘s Address to the People stated:
One of the greatest evils brought to the attention of the Convention was the abuse practiced under local and special legislation. The number of local and special bills passed by the last legislature was four hundred fourteen, not including joint and concurrеnt resolutions. The time devoted to the consideration of these measures and the time required in their passage through the two houses imposed a serious burden upon the state. This section [prohibiting the enactment of special acts when a general act can be made applicable], taken in connection with the increased powers of local self-government granted to cities and villages in the revision, seeks to effectively remedy such condition. . . . The evils of local and special legislation have grown to be almost intolerable, introducing uncertainty and confusion into the laws, and consuming the time and energy of the legislature which should be devoted to the consideration of measures of a general character. By eliminating this mass of legislation, the work of the legislature will be greatly simplified and improved.27
The legislature shall pass no local or special act in any case where a general act can be made applicable, and whether a general act can be made applicable shall be a judicial question. No local or special act, excepting acts repealing local or special acts in effect January 1, 1909 and receiving a 2/3 vote of the legislature shall take effect until approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon in the district to be affected.
Based on this overwhelming dissatisfaction with special legislation as a means to adjust municipal boundaries, delegates to the 1907-1908 constitutional convention debated whether to direct the Legislature to enact a general municipal boundary statute that would provide a framework for all future municipal boundary changes. The delegates proposed, and the people of Michigan eventually ratified,
Thе legislature shall provide by a general law for the incorporation of cities, and by a general law for the incorporation of villages. . . .
With
2. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE HRCA
As the majority correctly notes, three provisions of the HRCA are directly relevant in the present case. The detachment process is specifically authorized by
Cities may be incorporated or territory detached therefrom or added thereto, or consolidation made of 2 or more cities or villages into 1 city, or of a city and 1 or more villages into 1 city, or of 1 or more cities or villages together with additional territory not included within any incorporated city or village into 1 city, by proceedings originating by petition therefor signed by qualified electors who are freeholders residing within the cities, villages, or townships to be affected thereby. . . .29
However, because both the city of Richmond and the city of Holland are located in more than one county, rather than filing their detachment petitions with the county under
When the territory to be affected by any proposed incorporation, consolidation, or change is situated in more than 1 county the petition hereinbefore provided shall be addressed and presented to the secretary of state, with 1 or more affidavits attached thereto sworn to by 1 or more of the signers of said petition, showing that the statements contained in said petition are true, that each signature affixed thereto is the genuine signature of a qualified elector rеsiding in a city, village, or township to be affected by the carrying out of the purposes of the petition and that not less than 25 of such signers reside in each city, village or township to be affected thereby. The secretary of state shall examine such petition and the affidavit or affidavits annexed, and if he shall find that the same conforms to the provisions of this act he shall so certify, and transmit a certified copy of said petition and the accompanying affidavit or affidavits to the clerk of each city, village or township to be affected by the carrying out of the purposes of such petition, together with his certificate as above provided, and a notice directing that at the next general election occurring not less than 40
days thereafter the question of making the incorporation, consolidation or change of boundaries petitioned for shall be submitted to the electors of the district to be affected, and if no general election is to be held within 90 days the resolution may fix a date preceding the next general election for a special election on the question. If he shall find that said petition and the affidavit or affidavits annexed thereto do not conform to the provisions of this act he shall certify to that fact, and return said petition and affidavits to the person from whom they were received, together with such certificate. The several city, village and township clerks who shall receive from the secretary of state the copies and certificates above provided for shall give notice of the election to be held on the question of making the proposed incorporation, consolidation or change of boundaries as provided for in section 10 of this act.30
Lastly, the phrase “district to be affected,” as used in
The district to be affected by the proposed incorporation, consolidation, or chаnge of boundaries is considered to include the whole of each city, village, or township from which territory is to be taken or to which territory is to be annexed.31
3. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
When interpreting a statute, a court‘s duty is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature based on the actual words used in the statute.32 If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, no further con-
In Lansing Mayor v Pub Service Comm, this Court repudiated prior case law that held that a statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one meaning or if “reasonable minds can differ” regarding the statute‘s meaning.36 Instead, as this Court stated in Lansing Mayor, a statutory provision is ambiguous only if it “irreconcilably conflict[s]” with another provision, or when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning.37 In ascertaining whether an ambiguity exists, therefore, a court must employ conventional rules of construction and “give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute.”38
4. THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE HRCA PERMITS THE USE OF A SINGLE DETACHMENT PETITION TO TRANSFER LAND TO MULTIPLE TOWNSHIPS
At its core, the Court of Appeals opinion in Casco Twp represents a deliberate decision to subordinate the actual text of the HRCA in favor of the Court of Appeals’ own abstract notions of fairness and justice. By choosing to give meaning to only some of the words
A close analysis of the text of the HRCA demonstrates that the statute is not ambiguous and that a single detachment petition may be used to detach land from a city and add it to multiple townships. Although the majority focuses extensively on
The word “each” is not defined in the HRCA. Pursuant to
Although the HRCA has been amended frequently over the past century, the relevant provisions of
Defendants argue that the Legislature‘s use of the word “each” is not determinative because, by using “each,” the Legislature was simply referring to the two municipal entities that necessarily must be involved in any detachment proceeding: the city that will lose the land and the township that will gain the land.52 Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive. Had the Legislature intended “each” to refer only to the two sides involved in a typical detachment proceeding—the donor city and the recipient township—and not to multiple recipient townships, the Legislature would have used the word “both,” not “each.”53 The Legislature, however, did not
Counsel: Yes.
This construction of the HRCA is bolstered by the fact that, throughout
This Court addressed
The same is true in the present case. In
Taken together, all of these textual clues demonstrate that the HRCA permits the use of a single detachment petition and election when transferring land to more than one township. Unlike the majority,
The majority casually dismisses this Court‘s decision in Walsh v Secretary of State,61 which explicitly recognized and permitted a single petition for a multiple-municipality annexation under the HRCA. In Walsh, we examined
The plaintiffs in Walsh argued that the annexation attempt was divisible and that we should approve the annexation of the parcels in Lansing Township, given that the Lansing Township voters approved the annexation. This Court disagreed. We held that the annexation was a “package proposition” and that, under the vote tabulation provisions of
5. THE MAJORITY‘S RELIANCE ON THE HRCA‘S “QUALIFIED ELECTOR” REQUIREMENT AND THE ELECTION CODE IS MISPLACED
The majority bases its holding primarily on the “qualified elector” requirement in
proceedings originating by petition therefor signed by qualified electors who are freeholders residing within the cities, villages, or townships to be affected thereby. . . .64
each signature affixed [to the petition] is the genuine signature of a qualified elector residing in a city, village or township to be affected by the carrying out of the purposes of the petition and that not less than 25 of such signers reside in each city, village or township to be affected thereby.65
The majority‘s analysis is flawed. The “qualified elector” provision of
The majority‘s reliance on
In fact, the precise case that the majority cites for its
I question the majority‘s reliance on Vander Laan when the Vander Laan Court itself noted that there was no statutory basis for the “separate subjects” electoral rule that it recognized. Rather than rely on a judicially created rule that was premised on policy concerns in an unrelated area, I prefer to base my analysis of the
6. DEFENDANTS’ REMAINING ARGUMENTS
Defendants argue that to construe the HRCA so as to permit a single, multiple-township petition would lead to “absurd results.” However, in People v McIntire,73 this Court rejected the absurd results “rule” of construction, noting that its invocation is usually “‘an invitation to judicial lawmaking.‘”74 It is not the role of this Court to rewrite the law so that its resulting policy is more “logical,” or perhaps palatable, to a particular party or the Court. It is our constitutional role to give effect to the intent of the Legislature by enforcing the statute as written.75 What defendants in these cases (or any other case) may view as “absurd” reflects an actual policy choice adopted by a majority of the Legislature and approved by the Governor. If defendants prefer an alternative policy choice, the proper forum is the Legislature, not this Court. After all, the Legislature has shown little reluctance in amending the HRCA over the past century.
The defendants in Fillmore Twp also argue that if the detachment of 1.27 acres from the city of Holland
“So, as to territorial extent, the idea of a city is one of unity, not of plurality; of compactness or contiguity, not separation or segregation. Contiguity is generally required even in the absence of statutory requirement to that effect, and where the annexation is left in the discretion of a judicial tribunal, contiguity will be required as a matter of law.”77
Recognizing that the requirement of contiguity was not “covered by any specific provision of the [HRCA],” the Court in Genesee Twp instead based its holding on non-textual policy grounds: “the purpose sought to be served [by the HRCA] and the practical aspects of annexation. . . .”78
However, this Court revisited the contiguity rule eight years later in Owosso Twp v City of Owosso.79 We specifically stated in Owosso that “the judicial requirement of ‘contiguity‘” articulated in Genesee Twp had been “superseded” when the Legislature amended
7. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HRCA
Because I believe that the HRCA permits the use of a single detachment petition involving multiple townships, it is necessary to determine whether the HRCA‘s authorization of such a procedure is constitutional. Defendants, particularly those in Fillmore Twp, contend that bundling numerous townships into a single petition and referendum unconstitutionally dilutes the vote of city residents.82 Defendants argue that such vote dilution is prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause of
The idea of “vote dilution”85 as a cognizable constitutional harm originated in the context of congressional
The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the amplе powers of Congress. . . . The Constitution has left the performance of many duties in our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and legislative action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising their political rights.89
However, approximately fifteen years after Colegrove, the Supreme Court reversed course in the landmark case of Baker v. Carr.90 In Baker, the Court was
The Court rejected the “political question” rationale used in Colegrove and held that the issue presented by the voters was justiciable. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated that “the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political question.”91 The Court went on to hold that the Equal Protection Clause provided a proper vehicle by which to challenge the Tennessee apportionment system.92 In its sweeping holding, the Court did not
With Baker creating the opening, courts soon began to wade head-high into the thicket of vote dilution claims. Two yеars after Baker, the Supreme Court decided Wesberry v. Sanders94 and Reynolds v. Sims,95 which established, as a fundamental tenet of equal protection jurisprudence, the “one-person, one-vote” standard for congressional districts and state legislative districts, respectively. In Reynolds, the Court stated that “the overriding objective must be substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State.”96
The Court later made the one-person, one-vote standard applicable to local governments in Avery v. Midland Co.97 In Avery, the Court invalidated the apportionment system for the Commissioners Court of Midland County, Texas, because it consisted of “single-member districts of substantially unequal population,” which favored rural voters over city voters.98 The Court reasoned that, because the Commissioners Court exercised “general governmental powers”99 and its actions
As Wesberry, Reynolds, Avery, and their progeny demonstrate, the one-person, one-vote standard has become a well-established principle in equal protection jurisprudence. At the same time, two notable exceptions to the one-person, one-vote rule are just as firmly entrenched in equal protection analysis. The first involves so-called “special purpose districts.” Under this exception, electoral districts that serve a specialized purpose, such as a water storage district, are exempt from strict scrutiny and the rigid one-person, one-vote standard because they perform functions that ” ‘so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular election’ ” is not warranted.102
The State, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the State is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. Although the inhabitants and property owners may by such changes suffer inconvenience, and their property may be lessened in value by the burden of increased taxation, or for any other reason, they have no right by contract or otherwise in the unaltered or continued existence of the corporation or its powers, and there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which protects them from these injurious consequences. The power is in the
State and those who legislate for the State are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive exercise of it.104
This Court fully embraced the rationale of Hunter in Midland Twp. v. State Boundary Comm.105 The case involved an equal protection challenge to provisions of the HRCA that provided for a referendum if the area to be affected included more than one hundred persons, but excluded the possibility of a referendum when one hundred or fewer persons were affected. In rejecting the equal protection argument, Justice LEVIN, writing for the Court, directly relied on Hunter and held, “No city, village, township or person has any vested right or legally protected interest in the boundaries of such governmental units.”106
Although Hunter preceded the establishment of the one-person, one-vote standard by half a century, its holding has endured throughout modern equal protection jurisprudence.107 Indeed, municipal boundary changes have traditionally been exempted from the one-person, one-vote rule and strict scrutiny review.108
In Lockport, Niagara County, New York, sought to amend its charter in order to provide for a strong form of county government headed by a county executive. New York law provided that such an amendment could only become effective upon approval by separate majorities of the voters who lived in the cities within the county and of the voters who lived outside the cities. The amendment to the charter failed both times that it was put to a vote. Although a majority of the city voters and a majority of the overall votes cast were in favor of the amendment, a separate majority of non-city voters in favor of the amendment was never achieved in either election. Residents of the cities filed suit, claiming that the concurrent-majority voting scheme unconstitutionally diluted their voting strength because it gave a small number of rural voters disproportionate voting strength.
Lockport is particularly instructive in resolving defendants’ equal protection claims. Similar to the Niagara County referendum in Lockport, the detachment elections in the present cases are also “single-shot” referenda, thus marginalizing much of the rationale surrounding the Reynolds line of cases pertaining to legislative representation. The expressed will of the voters in the detachment elections will be direct and unfiltered.
Given these differing electoral interests, I believe it is rational for the Legislature to permit the use of a single detachment petition to transfer land to multiple townships and that such a procedure does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. As the parties noted in their briefs and at oral argument, boundary disputes between townships and cities are nothing new. Indeed, such gamesmanship is not only commonplace, but to be expected given the inherently valuable nature of land in our society. For example, cities often craft annexation proposals with surgical precision so that the territory to be acquired from a township contains one hundred or fewer inhabitants and is thus exempt from a public referendum.117 By repeating this process numerous
In light of such tactical territorial disputes between cities and townships, it is not irrational for the Legislature to permit several townships to amplify their voting strength by combining several different parcels into a single detachment petition. In fact, with the significant population disparities that exist between large cities and small townships, such a bundled petition may be the only way that certain detachments could ever be effectuated. By permitting several townships to combine efforts in a single petition, the Legislature has simply recognized that differing electoral interests exist and that, occasionally, similar entities will need to combine forces in order to have any meaningful opportunity at advancing their interests and achieving the various boundary changes authorized under the HRCA.118 I believe that such a view by the Legislature is entirely reasonable.119
While the wisdom of such a policy choice by the Legislature might be debated, this Court is not the proper forum for such an undertaking. Our role is limited to determining whether the HRCA conforms to the Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, I believe that it does.
B. MANDAMUS RELIEF
1. NATURE OF THE REMEDY
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to enforce duties mandated by law.122 It is entirely discretionary in nature.123 Before seeking mandamus
2. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO MANDAMUS RELIEF
While I agree with the majority that plaintiffs are not entitled to mandamus relief, I disagree with the majority‘s rationale. The majority concludes that mandamus relief is improper because the HRCA does not permit the use of a single detachment petition involving multiple townships and, therefore, plaintiffs have no “clear
As already discussed, before a writ of mandamus will be issued, a plaintiff must complete all conditions precedent to the act that the plaintiff seeks to compel.129 While it is possible that plaintiffs may have already satisfied all requirements imposed by the HRCA, the Secretary of State has yet to make such a determination. The Secretary of State deferred her examination of the petitions until the antecedent question of whether the HRCA permits the use of a single petition involving multiple townships was resolved. The Secretary of State has not yet examined the petitions to determine whether they comply with all the other requirements of the HRCA. Therefore, plaintiffs’ requests for mandamus relief are premature.
IV. CONCLUSION
The HRCA is not ambiguous. A plain reading of §§ 9 and 11 demonstrates that the use of a single detachment petition is permitted when seeking to transfer land to multiple townships. Moreover, such a procedure comports with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs are not entitled to mandamus relief, however, because the Secretary of State has yet to еxamine the petitions to determine whether all the conditions mandated by the HRCA have been satisfied. Accordingly, in Casco Twp, I would reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
Notes
Pursuant toEvery citizen of the United States who has attained the age of 21 years, who has resided in this state six months, and who meets the requirements of local residence provided by law, shall be an elector and qualified to vote in any election except as otherwise provided in this constitution. The legislature shall define residence for voting purposes.
Because the city of Richmond is located in both St. Clair County and Macomb County, the plaintiffs filed the detachment petition with the Secretary of State pursuant to § 11.When the territory to be affected by any proposed incorporation, consolidation or change is situated in more than 1 county the petition hereinbefore provided shall be addressed and presented to the secretary of state.... [
MCL 117.11 .]
See also Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp Managers, 467 Mich 1, 18; 651 NW2d 356 (2002); Koontz, supra at 312; Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 248-249; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.
At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that the word “several,” as used in the HRCA, means “more than a couple.”
Justice YOUNG: I‘m asking you to look at section 11 that refers near the end: “The several city, village and township clerks who shall receive from the Secretary of State copies of the certificates.” I‘m looking at the term “several” there. Does that not indicate at least the potential for multiple—
Counsel: Well again we go to kind of the dictionary look at the definition and “several” can mean one individual.
Justice YOUNG: Really?
Counsel: I‘m sorry, you‘re talking about a city, village or —
The secretary of state shall examine such petition and the affidavit or affidavits annexed. . . . If he shall find that said petition and the affidavit or affidavits annexed thereto do not conform to the provisions of this act he shall certify to that fact, and return said petition and affidavits to the person from whom they were received . . . . [
Id. (emphasis added).]
Except as otherwise provided in this section, and without regard to the discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each officer and employee of a governmental agency . . . is immune from tort liability for an injury to a person or damage to property caused by the officer, employee, or member while in the course of employment or service . . . if all of the following are met:
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(c) The officer‘s, employee‘s, membеr‘s, or volunteer‘s conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. [Emphasis added.]
It is important to note that the text оf our state Equal Protection Clause is not entirely the same as its federal counterpart:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. [Emphasis added.]
Voter dilution cases fall into two broad categories. First, there are those in which dilution occurs because (1) some persons are given votes weighted more heavily than others similarly situated merely on the basis of residence, (2) votes are weighted according to a factor which the state determines is reflective of “interest,” or (3) persons are excluded altogether from voting because the state deems them to be “uninterested.” Second, there are those in which dilution occurs because equal franchise is granted to persons allegedly without interest, or with significantly less interest than other voters. [Durchslag, Salyer, Ball, and Holt: Reappraising the right to vote in terms of political “interest” and vote dilution, 33 Case W Res L R 1, 38-39 (1982) (emphasis in original).]
Id. at 237. Commentators have questioned the Supreme Court‘s reliance on the Equal Protection Clause in Baker, suggesting, instead, that the Republican Form of Government Clause,
A districting scheme so malapportioned that a minority faction is in complete control, without regard to democratic sentiment, violates the basic norms of republican government. It would thus appear to raise a constitutional question under Article IV, Section 4, which states that “the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” Constitutional standards under the Republican Form of Government Clause are ill-developed, but surely a government is not “republican” if a minority faction maintains control, and the majority has no means of overturning it. [McConnell, The redistricting cases: Original mistakes and current consequences, 24 Harv J L & Pub Policy 103, 105-106 (2000).]
Professor Pamela S. Karlan has noted:
[T]he doctrinal move to one person, one vote was in no sense compelled, either by precedent or by the absence of any alternative avenues to judicial oversight. The decision to rely on the Equal Protection Clause, rather than on the Guaranty Clause, has always puzzled me. Justice William Brennan‘s explanation—that there was precedent suggesting the general nonjusticiability of the Guaranty Clause—would make more sense if not for the fact that there was also absolutely square precedent refusing to entertain malapportionment claims under the Fourteenth Amendment [citing Colegrove]. If the Court had to overrule some precedent to review apportionment and the refusal to reapportion, then why was overruling Fourteenth Amendment precedent and developing a unique set of equal protection principles that apply nowhere else in constitutional law—the superior alternative? [Karlan, Politics by other means, 85 Va L R 1697, 1717-1718 (1999).]
Baker, supra at 226. In dissent, Justice Frankfurter sharply criticized the Court for casting aside the “political question” rationale of Colegrove. He challenged the majority‘s cоnclusion that courts were equipped to handle such voting rights cases. Justice Frankfurter stated:
The Framers carefully and with deliberate forethought refused . . . to enthrone the judiciary. In this situation, as in others of like nature, appeal for relief does not belong here. Appeal must be to an informed, civically militant electorate. . . .
* * *
Unless judges, the judges of this Court, are to make their private views of political wisdom the measure of the Constitution—views which in all honesty cannot but give the appearance, if not
reflect the reality, of involvement with the business of partisan politics so inescapably a part of apportionment controversies—the Fourteenth Amendment, “itself a historical product,” provides no guide for judicial oversight of the representation problem. [Id. at 270, 301-302 (citation omitted).]
In addition to minimizing the effects of population disparities between cities and townships, there are numerous other reasons why the Legislature may have permitted the use of a single petition to transfer land to multiple townships. For example, it is possible that the Legislature recognized the substantial financial expense that townships and cities face when holding elections and that, by combining numerous detachments in one election, it would be less expensive for the taxpayers to have a single election than to have several separate detachment elections.
Justice LEVIN recognized the gamesmanship that occurs between cities and townships in Midland Twp., supra at 679, stating that “[c]ity and township strategies based on [the one hundred-resident referendum threshold] are unavoidable. In general, the city will seek to limit the area proposed for annexation so that there are insufficient residents for a referendum and the township will seek to extend the area to require a referendum. The motive or purpose of the city or township in drawing the proposed boundaries or in requesting a revision of boundaries is not material.”
To apply strict scrutiny to the distribution of the vote concerning boundary changes would inevitably entail a constitutional review of the states’ municipal formation and boundary change policies. But there are no generally accepted principles for determining whether a particular local government ought to exist, what that unit‘s geographic dimensions ought to be, or whether a particular territory ought to be in that or another local unit. Thus, deference to the states is consistent with both the lack of a constitutional vantage point for examining state municipal formation and boundary change policies and the traditional jurisprudence of federalism that treats local governments as state instrumentalities and leaves the creation and structure of local governments to the states. [Briffault, supra, 60 U Chi L R at 395-396.]