Charles Pratt v. New York & New Jersey Port Aut, 563 F. App'x 132

Background

On Oct. 15, 2010, Charles Pratt accompanied his wife to a PATH station; a Port Authority officer, Nicholas Pimienta, asked for IDs and interacted with Pratt after Pratt’s wife left to retrieve hers.
Parties’ accounts sharply conflict: Pimienta says Pratt wandered, consented to a search, began crying, tripped over the officer’s foot, and was handcuffed; Pratt says Pimienta ordered a search, used a racial epithet, slammed and tackled him face-first, and several officers kneeled on his back.
Pratt alleged serious cervical spine injuries and chronic pain; he submitted a chiropractor’s letter attributing permanent cervical injury to the incident.
Pratt sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, asserted Monell municipal-liability and state-law claims; defendants moved for summary judgment and the District Court granted judgment for defendants and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
The Third Circuit reviewed de novo, construed Pratt’s pro se brief liberally, and found (viewing facts in Pratt’s favor) that disputed material facts made summary judgment on the excessive-force claim improper; it vacated the grant as to excessive force and remanded supplemental-jurisdiction issues.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether officer used objectively unreasonable force (Fourth Amendment excessive force)	Pratt contends he was compliant/unarmed and was tackled, slammed, and injured—force was excessive	Pimienta contended Pratt tripped over his foot during handcuffing and was not struck or subjected to excessive force	Reversed as to excessive-force claim: disputed facts precluded summary judgment; jury could find force unreasonable
Whether district court properly credited officer’s version at summary judgment	Pratt argued credibility disputes required denial of summary judgment	Defendants relied on their account to obtain summary judgment and qualified immunity	Court held district court erred by resolving credibility at summary judgment; credibility is for the factfinder
Qualified immunity (whether a constitutional violation occurred)	Pratt argued force violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights	Defendants argued no constitutional violation so immunity attached	Third Circuit addressed only whether a constitutional violation could be found and concluded genuine dispute exists; left qualified-immunity analysis (clearly established prong) to district court on remand
Supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after disposition of federal claims	Pratt sought adjudication of state claims or remand	Defendants argued district court correctly declined supplemental jurisdiction after granting all federal claims	Because federal excessive-force claim was vacated, the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s decision declining supplemental jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings

Key Cases Cited

Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2007) (sets Fourth Amendment objective-reasonableness test for excessive force)
Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 1998) (at summary judgment courts may not weigh evidence or decide credibility)
Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (affirming excessive-force verdict where compliant plaintiff was tackled)
Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing summary judgment where officers tackled a compliant plaintiff)
Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2006) (officer force could be unreasonable when suspect is nonthreatening)
Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussion of nominal damages when causation or compensatory proof is lacking)
Briggs v. Marshall, 93 F.3d 355 (7th Cir. 1996) (nominal damages may be appropriate despite limited proof of injury)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified-immunity two-step framework)
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983)
State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86 (3d Cir. 2009) (standard of plenary review on appeal)
Otero, 502 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2007) (liberal construction of pro se filings)
Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005) (issues not raised in opening brief are waived)
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (pro se failure to raise issues constitutes waiver)