Charles O. "Chuck" Grigson, Gerald Hooks, and Leslie Hooks v. State, 03-15-00436-CV

Appellees seek leave to file a reply to undermine Grigson’s and Hookses’ appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction over a district court Preliminary Approval Order in a long-running class-action settlement.
The 2003 certification of Settlement Classes and its affirmation by Texas courts are central, and Intervenors argue the 2015 Preliminary Approval Order effectively re-certified or altered class status.
Intervenors contend the order certifies or alters the Settlement Classes; Appellees argue the order merely preliminarily approves the Settlement Agreement and approves a revised class notice, not a new certification.
The district court’s Preliminary Approval Order is challenged as an interlocutory appealable order under Tex. R. App. P. 51.014(a)(3) or as a change in the nature of the certified class, which would create jurisdiction to review now rather than after final judgment.
Texas precedent (Bally, De Los Santos, Phillips, Garza, Lubin) is invoked to limit interlocutory appeals from non-certification actions and to emphasize that preliminary approval of settlement terms is generally reviewable only after final judgment.
The parties seek expedited consideration and dismissal of the intervenors’ appeals, arguing that continuing delay harms absent class members and that no substantial change to certification has occurred.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Preliminary Approval Order is an appealable class-certification order	Grigson/Hookses claim it certifies or alters the class.	State/Settling Parties contend it does not certify or alter the certified class; no jurisdiction under 51.014(a)(3).	No interlocutory jurisdiction; order does not certify or refuse to certify a class.
Whether the 2003 certification governs as law of the case and precludes dissolution of appellate jurisdiction	Intervenors argue the prior certification terminated or abandoned, creating new appellate hooks.	Settling Parties maintain the 2003 certification governs and remains intact; termination not occurring.	2003 certification remains controlling; there was no termination or abandonment warranting immediate review.
Whether the Preliminary Approval Order fundamentally changed the nature of the settlement classes	Intervenors claim the Order alters class definitions or the class’s fundamental nature.	Changes are minor and pertain to settlement terms, not the certified class’s fundamental nature.	Order did not fundamentally change the class certification; no appealable alteration.
Whether a stay of class notice or other relief is warranted pending appeal	Intervenors seek stays to halt class notice pending review.	Stays are unwarranted; class notice proceeds consistent with settlement terms and law.	Stay not warranted; no irreparable harm in delaying final resolution.

Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. 2001) (strict construction of 51.014(a)(3); cannot appeal orders merely enlarging or modifying a class)
De Los Santos v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 933 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1996) (interlocutory appealable when an order fundamentally alters the class)
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Yarbrough, 405 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2013) (narrow ruling: only when order alters the fundamental nature of the class)
Garza v. Garza, 94 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2002) (modification of class or its definition generally not appealable)
Lubin v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 222 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. 2007) (affirmation of prior certification and its applicability to settlement approval)
Estate of Jones, 388 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. 2012) (interlocutory appeals from decertification-related orders; strict limits)
McAllen Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2001) (preliminary approval of settlements reviewed as premature)
Philadelphia American Life Ins. Co. v. Turner, 131 S.W.3d 576 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004) (trial court's continuing power to alter or amend a class; review limits)