Charles Mandeville v. Deborah Mandeville
01-15-00119-CV
| Tex. App. | Apr 17, 2015Background
- Divorce filed by Deborah Mandeville in Texas (Jan. 2014); Charles Mandeville counter‑petition demanded a jury; trial Oct. 22, 2014; Final Decree entered Nov. 12, 2014; appellant filed timely motion for new trial.
- The parties executed a written Community Property Declaration and Agreement in New Mexico (June 2001) transmuting community property to separate property; it was recorded in Socorro County, NM, and neither party sought to amend it pre‑divorce.
- Charles pleaded the agreement in his counter‑petition and sought the jury to decide property character; Deborah alleged the agreement was unenforceable (fraud, unconscionability, lack of disclosure).
- On the eve of trial, Deborah’s counsel presented a motion in limine that included an unnoticed discovery sanction request; the trial court granted an order prohibiting Charles from mentioning specific items/bank/retirement accounts or showing the separate‑property agreement to the jury.
- The jury was asked about alleged fraud but was not allowed to see the agreement; the Final Decree (1) awarded Deborah 100% of Charles’s retirement accounts, (2) imposed supervised‑only visitation for Charles (through SAFE program), and (3) otherwise divided personal property; the court did not expressly adjudicate the validity of the 2001 agreement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mandeville) | Defendant's Argument (Deborah) | Held (trial court action) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the 2001 separate‑property agreement via an unnoticed, eve‑of‑trial discovery motion embedded in a motion in limine | The late, un‑noticed discovery complaint waived any sanction; exclusion was an excessive sanction that prevented the jury from deciding property character and effectively defaulted Charles on separate‑property claims | The motion sought to exclude evidence Charles failed to properly identify/produce in response to discovery; exclusion appropriate to prevent unfair surprise | Trial court ordered Charles not to mention or offer specific items, accounts, or retirement accounts as his separate property and precluded related exhibits (Order on Motion in Limine) |
| Whether the court erred by deviating from the Texas standard possession order and imposing supervised‑only visitation without pleading or proof of grounds to deviate | The petition did not allege any grounds to rebut the Family Code presumption that the standard possession order is in the child’s best interest; Deborah only requested supervised visits when Charles had all children together, not blanket supervised visitation | Deborah sought supervised visitation (as alleged in amended petition) and the court found supervised possession necessary (as reflected in Modified Possession Order) | Final Decree names Deborah sole managing conservator; Charles appointed possessory conservator but all possession is to be supervised (SAFE program) regardless of circumstances |
| Whether exclusion of the agreement violated the jury’s role in characterizing property when a jury demand was timely made | Excluding the agreement usurped the jury's exclusive province to determine separate vs. community property and precluded adjudication of issues Deborah herself raised (e.g., fraud) | Court treated the exclusion as a discovery remedy and limited evidence presentation | Trial court prevented the jury from seeing/examining the agreement and then did not explicitly resolve the agreement issue in the decree; court nonetheless divided property (including retirement accounts awarded to Deborah) |
| Whether the discovery sanction complied with TransAmerican standards (less‑stringent sanctions required) | The sanction was harsher than necessary; no order to compel, no lesser sanction, and no finding of flagrant bad faith—hence abusive | Court implicitly exercised discretion to prohibit mention/offer of late or unproduced items | Court imposed an exclusionary sanction by motion in limine without prior discovery order or intermediate sanctions (per the record appended to the brief) |
Key Cases Cited
- Mandell v. Mandell, 214 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 2007) (last‑minute discovery complaints waived absent an order compelling disclosure)
- TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991) (discovery sanctions must be no more severe than necessary; consider lesser sanctions; exclusion/dismissal improper absent flagrant bad faith)
- Boateng v. Trailblazer Health Enters., L.L.C., 171 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005) (preservation of error via motion for new trial where procedural posture converts a preliminary matter into trial ramifications)
- Goetz v. Goetz, 534 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1976) (reversible error where pertinent property facts are excluded from the jury in a divorce with a proper jury demand)
- Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975) (trial court may divide property but may not ignore jury answers on factual issues determining property status)
- Fanning v. Fanning, 828 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.—Waco 1992) (enforcement of written separate‑property agreements and reversal where trial court failed to honor agreement)