63 F.4th 211
3rd Cir.2023Background
- Charles Mack, a Muslim federal inmate, worked in the prison commissary; supervisors Douglas Roberts and Samuel Venslosky repeatedly harassed him and, according to Mack's testimony, followed him to a commissary corner and deliberately disrupted his daily prayers (making noises, talking loudly, kicking boxes).
- Mack stopped praying at work (on his imam’s advice, to avoid retaliation) and was later fired from the commissary; he sued asserting, among other claims, a RFRA claim against the two guards.
- The case has a lengthy procedural history: earlier appeals revived a RFRA claim (Third Circuit, Mack II), dismissed other claims (Mack III), and returned the RFRA claim to the district court.
- At summary judgment the guards first lost (district court found a jury could find a substantial burden), later obtained summary judgment after asserting for the first time that they were entitled to qualified immunity.
- The Third Circuit holds (1) qualified immunity is available as a defense to individual-capacity RFRA damages claims and (2) on the present summary-judgment record the guards have not carried their burden to show the right was not clearly established; the grant of qualified immunity is vacated and the case remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Availability of qualified immunity under RFRA | RFRA’s text lacks immunities; doctrine should not limit RFRA remedies | Qualified immunity is a background common-law defense, analogous to § 1983/Bivens practice | Qualified immunity is available against RFRA individual-capacity damages claims (Tanzin/§1983 analogy) |
| Whether defendants’ conduct violated RFRA (substantial burden) | Roberts & Venslosky deliberately and repeatedly disrupted Mack’s prayer, causing him to cease praying at required times | Conduct was mostly verbal/harassing and did not impose a substantial religious burden | Viewing facts in plaintiff’s favor, a RFRA violation (substantial, deliberate, repeated interference with prayer) was adequately shown for summary-judgment purposes |
| Whether the right was clearly established in 2009 (qualified-immunity second prong) | Right to pray free from substantial, deliberate, repeated, unjustified disruption was clearly established by broad Free Exercise/RFRA principles | No closely analogous precedent; cases on mere verbal harassment show unsettled law | Reasonable officers would have fair warning that deliberate interference with prayer (absent justification) is unlawful; qualified immunity inappropriate at this stage |
| Scope of relief and further proceedings | District-court grant should be vacated and case proceed to trial | Defendants may reassert qualified immunity later if trial evidence differs | Vacated grant of qualified immunity; defendants may renew the defense at trial based on the evidence presented there |
Key Cases Cited
- Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020) (RFRA authorizes money damages against federal officials and invites analogies to § 1983 remedies)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (recognizing background common-law immunities inform interpretation of civil-rights remedies)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (formulation and policy basis for modern qualified immunity)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (two-step qualified immunity framework)
- Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (discussion of “obvious” cases where general standards can clearly establish law)
- Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (government may not target or suppress religious exercise)
- O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (prisoners retain free-exercise rights subject to legitimate penological interests)
- Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2016) (Third Circuit decision reviving RFRA-related theory at pleading stage)
- Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020) (Third Circuit decision relevant to other claims and procedural posture)