Charles Gordon v. Joe Lizarraga
859 Fed. Appx. 177
| 9th Cir. | 2021Background
- Petitioner Molly Gordon was convicted of five counts for physical and sexual violence against two victims (JD1 and JD2).
- Gordon pursued state habeas relief on many claims, then filed a federal habeas petition raising 20 claims; the district court denied relief and granted a COA on 15 issues.
- Central contested evidence included: pretrial/interrogation statements (April 1, 2009), jail letters, and uncharged-acts propensity evidence admitted at trial.
- Key procedural facts: criminal charges were filed April 1, 2009 (the date the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached); Gordon was interrogated that day and signed a Miranda waiver according to state-court findings.
- The prosecution failed to disclose a police interview of JD1 (Brady issue); the state court found the undisclosed interview cumulative and not outcome-determinative.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sixth Amendment / Massiah (pretrial statements) | Statements elicited after charges attached violated Massiah right to counsel | Adversarial proceedings began Apr 1; many statements predate attachment; April 1 statements were waived | Massiah did not apply to pre-charge statements; April 1 statements admissible because Gordon validly waived counsel/Miranda |
| Miranda waiver & intoxication | Gordon was too intoxicated to make a knowing waiver of Miranda | State habeas court found waiver valid and no overborne will; no clear-and-convincing rebuttal | Waiver valid; admission of April 1 statements did not violate Miranda |
| Outrageous government conduct | Interrogation tactics were so shocking as to bar prosecution | Conduct did not meet the extremely high standard for dismissal | Rejected; facts did not satisfy the ‘grossly shocking’ standard |
| Jail letters / Fifth Amendment coercion | Letters were coerced and compelled testimonial statements | State court found no government coercion; letters written competently and knowingly | No Fifth Amendment violation—prosecution met burden; state factual findings stand |
| Admission of uncharged-acts (propensity) / due process | Admission violated due process by showing propensity | State court applied state-law evidentiary rules; federal due-process challenge foreclosed by Ninth Circuit precedent | Rejected—admission of propensity evidence did not violate clearly established federal due process law |
| Ineffective assistance of trial counsel (multiple subclaims) | Counsel failed to object to statements, pursue impeachment evidence, investigate, litigate pretrial motions, or present mistaken-consent defense properly | Many objections/motions would have been futile; no established right to extrinsic impeachment; investigation did not produce evidence undermining verdict; defense presented reasonable-but-mistaken-consent theory | State court reasonably applied Strickland; ineffective-assistance claims denied |
| Brady nondisclosure (undisclosed JD1 interview) | Prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory/impeaching interview with JD1 | Prosecution failed to turn over the interview, but state court found it cumulative and not outcome-determinative | Brady violation in disclosure duty acknowledged, but nondisclosure was not prejudicial under Brady; conviction not vacated |
| Cumulative error / Eighth Amendment sentencing challenge | Multiple errors together and alleged mitigation errors made trial/sentence unfair or cruel and unusual | Individual claims did not produce prejudice; mitigation issues would not have altered sentencing court’s reasoning | No cumulative-error or Eighth Amendment relief; sentencing and related IAC claims denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (onset of Sixth Amendment right to counsel after formal charges)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warnings and waiver standards)
- Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (valid waiver of counsel after Miranda warnings)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance two-part test)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence)
- Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (federal habeas relief not for state-law evidentiary errors)
- Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036 (Ninth Circuit: propensity-admission due-process precedent)
- Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505 (limits on admission of extrinsic impeachment evidence)
- Shelton v. Marshall, 796 F.3d 1075 (Brady prejudice standard on habeas review)
- Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922 (cumulative-error standard for habeas relief)