Charles Degnan v. Kathleen Sebelius, 765 F.3d 805

Plaintiffs allege miscalculation of Medicare Part B premiums under 42 U.S.C. § 1395r, resulting in overpayment.
Case follows Degnan v. Sebelius (Degnan I) where district court found SSA’s late-enrollment premium calculations conflicted with the Medicare Act, but limited relief to Degnan personally.
After Degnan I, SSA recalculated Degnan’s 2004–2010 premiums and refunded $759.70; plaintiffs contend 2011–2012 premiums were still miscalculated.
Secretary and Commissioner moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies; district court dismissed.
Appellants contend the district court misapplied Eldridge factors and should have waived exhaustion; they also challenge mandamus denial under 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
Court reviews de novo whether jurisdiction exists and whether exhaustion should be waived, applying Eldridge factors and related policy considerations.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether exhaustion of administrative remedies can be waived	Degnan argues Eldridge factors warrant waiver.	Secretary asserts no waiver because not collateral, no futility, and adequate agency record needed.	Waiver denied; exhaustion not excused.
Whether district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for lack of exhaustion	Degnan contends district court misapplied Eldridge and should have waived exhaustion.	Secretary emphasizes nonwaivable jurisdictional presentment requirement plus need for administrative record.	District court correctly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to nonexhaustion.
Whether mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 was properly denied	Degnan contends mandamus is appropriate to compel relief outside exhaustion.	Agency remedies exist; mandamus not appropriate when administrative channels remain open.	Mandamus relief denied; avenue for administrative relief remains.

Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (Medicare premia program; source for context)
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (premature interference and exhaustion policy basis)
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986) (exhaustion factors and underlying policies)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Eldridge factors for due-process exhaustion waiver)
Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, 529 U.S. 1 (2000) (exhaustion doctrine policies and agency deferential role)
Sipp v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 975 (2011) (Eldridge factors and exhaustion waiver framework)
Schoolcraft v. Sullivan, 971 F.2d 81 (1992) (Eldridge factors application in 8th Cir.)
Clarinda Home Health v. Shalala, 100 F.3d 526 (1996) (Eldridge factors conjunctive use in 8th Cir.)
Midland Psychiatric Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 145 F.3d 1000 (1998) (jurisdiction via § 405(g) adaptation under § 1395ff)