Charles Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15945
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- In 1991 Gary Bruce and others robbed, shot, and burned the home of mussel-shell buyer Danny Vine, killing Vine and his fiancée Della Thornton; Bruce was convicted in 1996 of federal offenses including two counts of witness-tampering murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) and sentenced to life plus ten years.
- At trial the jury was not instructed that any contemplated communication had to be to a federal officer; Bruce was convicted under a broader standard than later set by the Supreme Court.
- In 2011 the Supreme Court decided Fowler v. United States, holding the Government must prove it was reasonably likely a relevant communication would have been made to a federal officer — a narrower interpretation of § 1512(a)(1)(C).
- Bruce sought collateral relief long after finality: he filed § 2255 motions (including attempts at successive relief) unsuccessfully, then a § 2241 petition invoking § 2255’s saving clause and Fowler to assert actual innocence.
- The district court accepted jurisdiction under § 2241 but denied relief on the merits; the Third Circuit affirms, holding (1) § 2241 jurisdiction via the saving clause was proper and (2) Bruce failed the demanding actual-innocence gateway standard under Fowler.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2255’s saving clause permits Bruce to pursue a § 2241 petition based on a post-conviction change in statutory interpretation (Fowler) | Bruce: Fowler narrowed the statute and applies retroactively; § 2255 was inadequate/ineffective so he may seek § 2241 relief | Government: § 2255 is the exclusive vehicle; saving clause does not apply for statutory-rule claims | Court: Saving clause permits § 2241 here (followed Dorsainvil/Tyler): Bruce may proceed under § 2241 |
| Whether Fowler’s rule is retroactive to cases on collateral review | Bruce: Fowler announced a new substantive statutory rule that applies retroactively | Government: (implicit) Fowler is not available to him on collateral review | Held: Fowler announced a new substantive rule and applies retroactively; thus it can be the basis for a § 2241 claim |
| Standard and evidentiary burden for an actual-innocence claim under § 2241 post-Fowler | Bruce: He is actually innocent because his conviction did not satisfy Fowler’s “reasonable likelihood” element | Government: Actual-innocence gateway is demanding; evidence shows reasonable likelihood of federal communication | Held: Apply Schlup/Bousley gateway: petitioner must show it is more likely than not no reasonable juror would convict; Bruce fails that standard |
| Whether record evidence meets Fowler’s “reasonable likelihood” element (i.e., that a relevant communication to a federal officer was reasonably likely) | Bruce: Two-year gap to federal involvement and lack of direct proof particular to victims undermines reasonable likelihood | Government: Underlying robbery/arson had interstate/federal aspects, extensive witness intimidation delayed federal involvement, and federal agencies ultimately investigated | Held: The total record (crime’s federal aspects, witness intimidation, eventual federal investigation, trial evidence) shows a reasonable juror would conclude federal communication was reasonably likely; Bruce not entitled to relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668 (2011) (interprets § 1512(a)(1)(C) to require a reasonable likelihood that a relevant communication would be made to a federal officer)
- In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997) (saving clause permits § 2241 where an intervening statutory interpretation may render conduct non-criminal)
- United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2013) (applies Dorsainvil framework; actual-innocence gateway under § 2241)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (substantive statutory invalidation can show a defendant convicted of conduct not criminal)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (actual-innocence gateway standard: more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity; new substantive rules apply retroactively)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (distinguishes substantive rules from procedural ones for retroactivity analysis)