212 Conn.App. 263
Conn. App. Ct.2022Background
- Neighbors Chapnick (plaintiff) sued multiple Harbour Landing condominium residents, alleging nuisance (dog urine/feces near plaintiffs’ windows), intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and civil conspiracy.
- Flaherty allegedly allowed her dog to urinate/defecate on the lawn beneath the Chapnicks’ windows; Popolizio allegedly encouraged others to do so. Chapnicks sought damages and injunctive relief for nuisance.
- Defendants Flaherty and Popolizio gave statements to police during an investigation of Randall Chapnick; Chapnick was arrested on charges later dismissed. Defendants then filed separate special motions to dismiss under Connecticut’s anti‑SLAPP statute, § 52‑196a.
- The trial court granted the anti‑SLAPP motions and dismissed all counts against Flaherty and Popolizio. Chapnick appealed the dismissal of the nuisance and related injunctive counts.
- The Appellate Court held that the nuisance claims involve private, noncommunicative conduct not protected by § 52‑196a and that the conduct was not a matter of public concern; it reversed the dismissal of specified nuisance counts and remanded, affirming the judgment in all other respects.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred in granting anti‑SLAPP § 52‑196a motions to dismiss the nuisance counts | The nuisance claims arise from noncommunicative, private conduct (walking a dog and allowing it to relieve itself) and therefore are not based on exercise of free speech, petition, or association | The complaint was brought in retaliation for defendants’ statements to police during a criminal investigation, so the claims are based on protected petition/speech in a matter of public concern | Reversed as to nuisance counts: defendants failed initial § 52‑196a showing because the nuisance conduct is not protected constitutional conduct nor connected to a matter of public concern |
| Whether retaliatory motive or defendants’ assistance in a criminal investigation converts the nuisance claims into protected conduct under § 52‑196a | Motive or related protected conduct does not transform the independent nuisance claims into protected activity | Defendants contend retaliation for their police statements shows complaint is based on protected conduct | Rejected: alleged retaliation or prior threats does not mean the nuisance counts are "based on" protected exercise of speech/petition for purposes of the anti‑SLAPP statute |
Key Cases Cited
- Elder v. Kauffman, 204 Conn. App. 818 (2021) (describing anti‑SLAPP special motion procedure)
- Pestey v. Cushman, 259 Conn. 345 (2002) (defines private nuisance as interference with use and enjoyment of land)
- Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (noting that a mere "kernel" of expression in everyday conduct does not invoke First Amendment protection)
- Lafferty v. Jones, 336 Conn. 332 (2020) (explaining SLAPP characteristics and purpose)
- Gould v. Freedom of Information Commission, 314 Conn. 802 (2014) (principles of statutory construction)
- Dingwell v. Litchfield, 4 Conn. App. 621 (1985) (elements required to establish a nuisance)