497 P.3d 1187
Nev.2021Background
- In December 2016, L.L. was sexually assaulted in downtown Reno; security footage and a sexual-assault exam corroborated her account. Chaparro was charged with sexual assault, battery with intent to commit sexual assault (victim 16+), and open/gross lewdness.
- Chaparro conceded presence in the footage and the lewdness act but disputed digital penetration and intent for the more serious counts.
- The State sought and the court admitted evidence of Chaparro’s 2011 conviction for battery with intent to commit sexual assault; that prior victim (P.J.) testified at trial.
- DNA testing of the victim’s tights produced an inconclusive mixture (no exclusion of any contributor). The court admitted that inconclusive DNA evidence.
- Jury convicted Chaparro of all counts on February 14, 2020. Sentencing was held May 20, 2020 by Zoom under district COVID-19 administrative orders; Chaparro objected but participated remotely and was sentenced to life with parole eligibility after 12 years.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Chaparro) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sentencing by Zoom violated Chaparro’s right to be present / due process | Zoom sentencing denied his right to be physically present and to see supporters; remote format was unfair | Alternative procedures were necessary under COVID orders; Chaparro could see/hear, confer with counsel confidentially, and speak on the record | Remote Zoom sentencing did not violate the right to be present given circumstances; hearing remained fair and just; affirmed |
| Whether admission of prior 2011 sexual battery conviction was improper propensity evidence | Prior-conviction evidence was unduly prejudicial and unnecessary | Prior bad-act conviction was relevant to intent/propensity under NRS 48.045(3) and Franks analysis; probative value outweighed prejudice | Admission proper: court reasonably found relevance, preponderance proof, and probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice; affirmed |
| Whether district court erred by limiting voir dire about the prior conviction | Bar on specific questions prevented meaningful inquiry into juror bias about his prior conviction | Specific, case-focused voir dire would pre-try the case and risk prejudging jurors; general questions about views on prior convictions remained available | Limitation was proper here because asking about that specific prior would have pre-tried the facts; courts should not, however, categorically bar general questions about prior convictions |
| Whether admitting inconclusive DNA results was an abuse of discretion | Inconclusive DNA had no probative value as to penetration and was unduly confusing/prejudicial | Inconclusive DNA is relevant to show thoroughness of investigation and to complete the evidentiary story; risk of prejudice was low here | Admissible: inconclusive DNA was relevant to investigation completeness and did not create unfair prejudice in light of other evidence; affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Collins v. State, 133 Nev. 717, 405 P.3d 657 (Nev. 2017) (defendant’s presence at critical stages; due process right to be present)
- United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 (U.S. 1985) (right to be present only to the extent absence would thwart a fair and just hearing)
- Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (U.S. 1970) (defendant’s presence and confrontation principles)
- Franks v. State, 135 Nev. 1, 432 P.3d 752 (Nev. 2019) (standards for admitting prior sexual-offense evidence under NRS 48.045(3))
- Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (U.S. 1997) (prosecutor’s need to present particular evidence to satisfy juror expectations; "complete story" considerations)
- Thomas v. State, 122 Nev. 1361, 148 P.3d 727 (Nev. 2006) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)