635 F.Supp.3d 627
N.D. Ill.2022Background
- Illinois enacted two judicial-election–specific campaign-finance rules: (1) a Nov. 15, 2021 ban on judicial candidate committees accepting contributions from any out‑of‑state person; and (2) a May 27, 2022 rule capping contributions to Independent Expenditure Committees (IECs) supporting/opposing judicial candidates at $500,000 per donor per election cycle.
- Plaintiffs: John Matthew Chancey (an Illinois native now living in Texas) challenges the out‑of‑state ban as preventing him from donating directly to judicial candidate committees; Fair Courts America and Restoration PAC (IECs) challenge the $500,000 cap and seek to transfer >$500,000 between IECs.
- Defendants: Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul (the State Board of Elections was dismissed by agreement); AG moved to dismiss and opposed a preliminary injunction.
- Plaintiffs brought a pre‑enforcement First Amendment challenge asserting chill on political speech/association and sought a preliminary injunction before the Nov. 8, 2022 election.
- The court found plaintiffs had standing, concluded both provisions likely violate the First Amendment (failure of tailoring/underinclusiveness and ineffectiveness given alternative channels), granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of both provisions, and denied the AG’s motion to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ban on out‑of‑state contributions to judicial candidate committees | Chancey: geographic ban unlawfully burdens First Amendment rights to contribute/associate and discriminates by origin | Raoul: state has a compelling interest in preserving public confidence in a fair, disinterested judiciary; geographic ban helps prevent outside domination | Court: applied the closely‑drawn standard and held plaintiffs showed some likelihood of success — the ban is underinclusive and not narrowly/closely drawn (geographic distinction unsupported); enjoined enforcement |
| $500,000 cap on contributions to IECs in judicial races | FCA & Restoration PAC: cap burdens fundraising for independent speech and association by IECs | Raoul: cap protects judicial integrity/appearance of impartiality and improves transparency (prevents large IEC donations that could dominate) | Court: even under closely‑drawn review plaintiffs showed likelihood of success — cap is poorly tailored/ineffective given alternative means (direct independent expenditures, waivers, direct contributions after waiver) and thus enjoined |
Key Cases Cited
- FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (U.S. 2001) (treats contributions and expenditures as protected political speech/association)
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1976) (distinguishes contribution limits from expenditure limits; foundations of review)
- Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (U.S. 2010) (independent expenditures protected; anticorruption rationale limited to quid‑pro‑quo)
- Williams‑Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (U.S. 2015) (state interest in preserving judicial integrity can justify some speech restrictions in judicial context)
- McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (U.S. 2014) (closely drawn/rigorous review of contribution limits and viewpoint of marginal restriction)
- McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (U.S. 2003) (campaign‑finance doctrine and application of closely drawn standard)
- Barland v. U.S. TVA (Backed in opinion as precedent), 664 F.3d 139 (7th Cir. 2011) (limits on IEC fundraising undermine First Amendment; anticorruption rationale inadequate for independent expenditures)
- SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (independent‑expenditure groups cannot be subject to contribution limits justified by anticorruption interest)
- Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (U.S. 2011) (use of closely‑drawn standard in campaign finance review)
- Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (U.S. 2006) (underinclusiveness and lower bounds for contribution limits)
- Thompson v. Hebdon, 7 F.4th 811 (9th Cir. 2021) (struck limits on out‑of‑state aggregate contributions; geography not shown to affect corruption risk)