Chance v. State, 291 Ga. 241

Appellant Chance and co-indictee Sapp were tried for the murder of Tyrone Cates and related offenses; Chance was convicted of criminal attempt to possess cocaine and weapons, acquitted of malice murder, and a felony-murder conviction remained unresolved after retrial.
At retrial, Chance was convicted of felony murder during the commission of criminal attempt to possess cocaine and sentenced to life for felony murder, plus sequential 5-year drug and 5-year weapons terms.
Sapp, in a separate trial, was convicted of the same offenses; his felony-murder and firearms convictions were affirmed, but the drug conviction was vacated.
Chance filed an untimely motion for new trial, which the trial court granted as an out-of-time motion; amended motion for new trial was denied and timely appeal followed.
The majority affirmed in part and vacated in part; issues include sufficiency, jury instructions, juror contact, evidentiary rulings, newly discovered evidence, and ineffective assistance; concurrence discusses the inherent dangerousness issue in felony murder law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the evidence sufficient for felony murder given the underlying crime?	Chance argues the underlying felony (criminal attempt to possess cocaine) was not inherently dangerous.	State contends the underlying felony was inherently dangerous given drug-trafficking context and risks	Yes; evidence sufficient; separate judgment for criminal attempt to possess cocaine vacated.
Should the court have instructed inherent dangerousness for the underlying felony?	Chance requested an instruction on inherent dangerousness.	State argues no such instruction was required.	No reversible error; instruction not required by current precedent.
Was there reversible error from the juror contact during jury selection?	Chance claims the juror's contact tainted impartiality.	State contends contact was brief, disclosed, and non-prejudicial.	No abuse of discretion; no prejudice shown.
Was the trial court correct to exclude photographic reenactments?	Chance sought to introduce reenactment photographs.	State argues reenactments were speculative and would mislead the jury.	Correct to exclude; no ground for reversal.
Did newly discovered evidence justify a new trial?	Chance relies on Sapp confession testimony.	State argues evidence was impeachment, not outcome-determinative.	No; materiality insufficient to produce different verdict; new trial denied.

Chua v. State, 289 Ga. 220 (2011) (inherently dangerous felonies; factual context matters)
Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757 (2012) (drug trades and weapons context; dangerousness implied)
Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 768 (2012) (inherent dangerousness; evidence sufficiency standard)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (unitary sufficiency standard for criminal verdicts)
Pinkins v. State, 243 Ga. App. 737 (2000) (juror-contact issues; discretion in juror management)
Sapp v. State, 290 Ga. 247 (2011) (relevant to related convictions and vacatur in parallel case)