Chambers v. Crown Asset Management CA4/1
D079074
| Cal. Ct. App. | Oct 21, 2021Background
- Pamela Chambers sued Crown Asset Management under the California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act alleging a debt-collection communication failed to meet statutory formatting requirements. The underlying debt was a Synchrony Bank credit card account later sold to Crown.
- Crown moved to compel arbitration, asserting Chambers had been mailed Synchrony’s account agreement containing an arbitration clause and failed to timely opt out.
- Crown relied principally on an affidavit by Synchrony litigation analyst Jodi Anderson stating (based on “Synchrony’s records”) that the card and account agreements were mailed and that there was no opt-out record; Anderson attached copies of the agreements but no mailing records.
- Chambers objected to Anderson’s affidavit on hearsay, lack of foundation, lack of personal knowledge, and the secondary-evidence rule; she argued Crown failed to prove mailing/assent.
- The superior court excluded Anderson’s statements about mailing and denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the affidavit lacked foundation, did not establish the business-records exception, and violated the secondary-evidence rule.
- Crown appealed; the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding Crown failed to carry its burden to prove an arbitration agreement by admissible evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Anderson’s testimony that "Synchrony’s records" show mailing of the account agreement | Anderson lacks personal knowledge; the statement is hearsay and unqualified | Anderson reviewed Synchrony business records and thus may testify about their contents | Court: Exclusion proper — Anderson did not establish personal knowledge or lay foundation for business-records exception, so statement inadmissible |
| Applicability of secondary-evidence rule to prove contents of missing records | Secondary evidence cannot supply contents where underlying records are themselves inadmissible hearsay | Section 1521 permits proving writings by secondary evidence where records are otherwise admissible | Court: Secondary-evidence rule does not rescue Anderson’s testimony; underlying records were not shown admissible, so secondary evidence excluded |
| Whether evidentiary rules are relaxed for motions to compel arbitration (i.e., whether court could consider hearsay declarations without full foundation) | Trial on arbitration is summary but requires trier-of-fact role; regular evidence rules apply | Arbitration motions allow consideration of declarations and documentary evidence; lower foundation requirements asserted | Court: No relaxed standard; motion to compel requires factual findings and admissible evidence; court properly required foundation and business-record proof |
| Whether Crown proved existence of a binding arbitration agreement | Chambers provided no contrary proof, so mailing and assent may be inferred | Crown proved mailing and lack of opt-out via Synchrony records reviewed by Anderson | Court: Crown failed to meet its burden because it did not present admissible evidence of mailing or assent; denial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 15 Cal.4th 951 (court must determine factual existence/validity of arbitration agreement)
- Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Dev. (US), 55 Cal.4th 223 (arbitration clauses governed by ordinary contract rules; assent may be implied)
- Toal v. Tardif, 178 Cal.App.4th 1208 (no policy compelling arbitration absent consent)
- Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp., 14 Cal.4th 394 (motions to compel heard summarily with court acting as trier of fact)
- Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency v. McGrath, 128 Cal.App.4th 1093 (secondary-evidence and business-records interplay; secondary evidence cannot substitute for inadmissible underlying hearsay)
- Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 28 Cal.4th 1059 (secondary-evidence rule background and lost-document principles)
- Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co., 6 Cal.5th 931 (anti-SLAPP context; summary-like review differs from arbitration motions)
- Jazayeri v. Mao, 174 Cal.App.4th 301 (business-records exception satisfied where witnesses established routine recording and preparation)
- People v. Dorsey, 43 Cal.App.3d 953 (bank officer testimony admitted where officer produced records and testified as custodian)