Chaffin v. Braden
696 F. App'x 1001
| Fed. Cir. | 2017Background
- Chaffin sued LBC for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,932,912, which claims a septic wastewater system that uses a venturi to draw liquid chlorine from a canister to disinfect recirculating effluent.
- The disputed claim language centered on “continuously draw/ drawn/ drawing” chlorine into the venturi while wastewater flows.
- LBC moved for summary judgment, arguing the accused products only supplied chlorine intermittently (with breaks when air was drawn) and thus did not meet the claim element requiring continuous draw.
- The district court granted summary judgment for LBC, adopting the view that “continuously draw” requires an uninterrupted stream of chlorine, and later awarded LBC attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 as an exceptional case.
- On reconsideration Chaffin argued the court should construe “continuously draw” (which neither party had requested at Markman) to mean continuously move by suction; the district court found waiver but nonetheless construed the term as “pull without interruption.”
- The Federal Circuit reversed summary judgment, held the intrinsic record shows “continuously draw” means to dispense in an ongoing fashion while sewage flows through the venturi (but not necessarily a uniform or uninterrupted flow), vacated the fee award, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Chaffin) | Defendant's Argument (LBC) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper construction of “continuously draw” | Means “continuously move by suction” — focus on continuous suction force; does not require an uninterrupted stream | Requires a continuous, unbroken flow/stream of chlorine; intermittent air-only drawing breaks continuity | The term means “[dispense; dispensed; dispensing] in an ongoing fashion, as long as sewage effluent flows through the venturi chamber.” No requirement of uniform or uninterrupted flow. |
| Waiver of claim-construction position | Not waived — district court decided the issue on the merits, so Chaffin may appeal construction raised late | Argued Chaffin waived construction by not raising it at Markman | Court: No waiver for appeal because district court addressed the argument; Chaffin may raise it on appeal. |
| Appropriateness of summary judgment of non-infringement | There is disputed fact whether chlorine is supplied in an ongoing fashion; summary judgment inappropriate given correct construction | Undisputed evidence shows periods where only air is drawn, so no continuous chlorine draw under their construction | Summary judgment reversed because district court applied an erroneous construction requiring uninterrupted flow. |
| Award of attorneys’ fees under § 285 | Case not exceptional; fees inappropriate if LBC no longer prevailing after reversal | District court found the case exceptional and awarded fees to prevailing LBC | Fee award vacated because LBC is no longer the prevailing party after reversal; court did not reach abuse-of-discretion question. |
Key Cases Cited
- Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (review standard for claim construction; legal question reviewed de novo when based on intrinsic evidence)
- Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (prosecution history as intrinsic evidence to inform claim meaning)
- Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014) (abuse-of-discretion standard and scope for appellate review of § 285 determinations)
- Shum v. Intel Corp., 629 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (requiring prevailing party status for fee awards under § 285)
- Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (argument raised first in reconsideration is ordinarily waived)
- Lifestyle Enter., Inc. v. United States, 751 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (appellate review of issues actually decided below)
- Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (district court abuses discretion if based on erroneous view of law or clearly erroneous assessment of evidence)
- United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (principle that parties may raise on appeal issues that were actually decided below)