Chadwick v. Duxbury Public Schools, 475 Mass. 645

Background

Nancy Chadwick, a Duxbury High School English teacher and former local union president, sued her employer alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation after being placed on a directed growth plan.
Chadwick withheld about 92 e-mails and other communications with her union, claiming a "union member–union" privilege and resisting defendants’ discovery requests.
The Superior Court judge granted the defendants’ motion to compel disclosure, refusing to recognize a broad union-member privilege.
Chadwick sought interlocutory appellate review under G. L. c. 231, § 118; the matter was reported for review and transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court.
Chadwick asked the court to read G. L. c. 150E (public‑sector collective bargaining statute) to imply a privilege protecting confidential communications between union members and union representatives in civil litigation, or alternatively to recognize such a privilege under common law.
The court concluded § 10(a)(1)–(2) of c. 150E protects collective‑bargaining interests in labor disputes but does not implicitly create a privilege shielding union communications in private civil suits, and declined to create a new common‑law privilege.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether G. L. c. 150E implies a union member–union privilege protecting communications from disclosure in a civil suit by the employee	Chadwick: c.150E’s protections for collective bargaining imply confidentiality that should bar employer discovery of union communications in this civil suit	Defendants: c.150E protects collective‑bargaining contexts only and does not bar discovery in private civil litigation	No. The court held c.150E does not implicitly create such a privilege for civil actions; its protections are confined to collective‑bargaining/labor dispute settings
Whether courts should recognize a common‑law union member–union privilege outside statute	Chadwick: courts should create the privilege to protect union effectiveness and confidentiality even if statute is silent	Defendants: privilege creation is for the Legislature; courts should not judicially create broad new privileges	No. Court declined to create a new common‑law privilege, noting judicial reluctance to add privileges, policy balancing is legislative, and the record lacked necessary specifics
Whether labor‑law administrative decisions recognizing confidentiality in grievance/labor contexts control discovery in civil suits	Chadwick: analogies to labor‑board/MLRC protections support broader privilege	Defendants: administrative protections address labor disputes and do not extend to private civil litigation	Court: administrative precedents protect communications in labor contexts but do not require privilege in civil litigation; distinctions control
Whether a protective order might nevertheless be appropriate under procedural rules	Chadwick: sought protective order under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(c)	Defendants: discovery is proper absent a recognized privilege	Court: did not decide the Rule 26(c) protective‑order question here but acknowledged courts may issue protective orders in appropriate circumstances

Key Cases Cited

Babets v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230 (court exercises restraint in creating new privileges)
Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357 (privilege creation requires careful balancing)
Matter of the Enforcement of a Subpoena, 463 Mass. 162 (recognition of a judicial deliberative privilege; discussion of privileges)
CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y v. Attorney Gen., 380 Mass. 539 (procedure for interlocutory review under G. L. c. 231, § 118)
Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653 (statutory interpretation: look first to statute's language)
Peterson v. State, 280 P.3d 559 (Alaska Supreme Court recognizing a broad union‑member privilege; discussed but distinguished)