Chad Richardson v. Omaha School District, 957 F.3d 869

The Richardsons challenged Omaha School District's special-education practices after an IDEA administrative hearing: the hearing officer ruled for the Richardsons on failures to evaluate and to develop/implement an IEP, but for the district on bullying and least-restrictive-environment claims.
The Richardsons sued in federal court: Count One sought attorneys' fees as the prevailing parties at the administrative level; Counts Two and Three alleged discrimination under §504 and Title II (primarily alleging bullying by peers/teachers and, in passing, failures to reevaluate/provide an IEP).
The district court dismissed Count One as time-barred and granted summary judgment to the school district on Counts Two and Three; the Richardsons appealed.
Central legal issues on appeal: which statute of limitations governs an IDEA prevailing-party attorneys'-fees claim, whether the §504/ADA claims were adequately pleaded, and whether evidence raised a genuine dispute that the district acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment regarding alleged bullying.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed: it adopted Arkansas’s 90-day limitations period (treating the fee claim as ancillary), found the alternative §504/ADA theories insufficiently pleaded, and held no genuine dispute of material fact on bad faith/gross misjudgment for the bullying claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Applicable statute of limitations for a prevailing-party IDEA attorneys' fees action	Richardsons: borrow a longer federal (28 U.S.C. §1658 four-year) or Arkansas three-year statute for fee claims	Omaha Sch. Dist.: borrow Arkansas's 90-day post-administrative merits period as the most analogous state limit	Eighth Circuit: fee claim is ancillary; borrow Arkansas 90-day period; Count One time-barred and dismissed
Were §504/ADA theories based on failure to reevaluate/provide an IEP adequately pleaded?	Richardsons: Counts Two/Three include claims about failure to reevaluate and to provide an IEP	Omaha Sch. Dist.: those theories were not properly pled as the basis of Counts Two/Three	Held: those theories were not adequately pleaded; court need not address them on summary judgment
Did evidence create a genuine dispute that the district acted with bad faith or gross misjudgment regarding alleged peer/teacher bullying?	Richardsons: facts presented at hearing and other evidence show bullying and misconduct raising bad-faith/gross-misjudgment claims	Omaha Sch. Dist.: hearing officer found compliance with IDEA; record lacks evidence of substantial departure from accepted professional standards	Held: no genuine dispute of material fact; summary judgment for the district on Counts Two and Three (no bad faith/gross misjudgment)

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading must state a plausible claim)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (moving party's initial burden on summary judgment)
Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850 (Eighth Circuit on analogous-state limitations for IDEA merits actions)
Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. D.A., 792 F.3d 1054 (Ninth Circuit treating fee claims as independent and borrowing longer state limitations)
Zipperer ex rel. Zipperer v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 111 F.3d 847 (Eleventh Circuit analyzing fee-claim analogy and applying longer limitations)
Powers v. Ind. Dep’t of Educ., 61 F.3d 552 (Seventh Circuit treating fee claims as ancillary and applying short administrative-review period)
King ex rel. King v. Floyd Cty. Bd. of Educ., 228 F.3d 622 (Sixth Circuit treating fee claims as ancillary; adopting short appeal period)
Kaseman v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. viewing a prevailing-party fee request as part of the same action)
B.M. ex rel. Miller v. S. Callaway R-II Sch. Dist., 732 F.3d 882 (Eighth Circuit defining bad faith/gross misjudgment standard for educational discrimination claims)
Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standards for alleging claims)