904 N.W.2d 469
N.D.2017Background
- Neighbors in a Bismarck subdivision: David and Virginia Ceynar (neighbors/homeowners) sued Lonnie Barth and The Ridge at Hawktree Homeowners’ Association after Barth built a connected “pool house” addition.
- Barth’s plans were approved by the Association’s Architectural Committee (after proposing a breezeway to avoid a detached-building restriction) and by the City of Bismarck, which issued a building permit.
- The Ceynars purchased their home after plan approval but before construction; they complained that the pool house blocked their view and reduced enjoyment and value of their property.
- The Ceynars sued for breach of restrictive covenants (and breach of the Association’s enforcement duty) and for statutory private nuisance; Barth remedied a setback violation during litigation.
- The district court initially denied defendants’ first summary-judgment motion; on reconsideration the court granted summary judgment dismissing all claims, holding no covenant was violated and Barth’s construction was not an unlawful act for nuisance purposes.
- On appeal the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding covenants were not breached and a lawful structure that obstructs a view is not a nuisance as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Association’s restrictive covenants prohibited Barth’s pool house | Covenants (or the Association’s established interpretations) implicitly prohibit outbuildings/structures that destroy the subdivision’s "open prairie look" | Covenants regulate construction activity; Committee approved plans and the covenants do not expressly prohibit the pool house | Court: Covenant language addressed construction nuisances and gave Committee sole discretion; no covenant violation as a matter of law |
| Whether implied restrictive covenants (preserving "open prairie look") should be recognized/enforced | The Association historically barred fences/outbuildings/trees to preserve theme; those practices create implied covenants enforceable against Barth | Implied covenants are disfavored; no evidence of a common grantor plan or that Barth knew of any such restriction | Court: Refused to imply ambiguous restrictive covenants absent clear foundation; no genuine issue of fact to create an implied covenant |
| Whether Barth’s construction constituted a statutory private nuisance under N.D.C.C. § 42-01-01 | The pool house unreasonably interfered with use/enjoyment by obstructing views, reducing enjoyment and market value; Rassier balancing should apply | Barth obtained Association approval and a municipal permit; a lawful structure that merely blocks a view is not an unlawful act or nuisance | Court: Adopted general rule that lawful construction that obstructs a view is not a private nuisance; no cognizable right to unobstructed view, so summary judgment proper |
| Whether the district court improperly reconsidered its prior denial of summary judgment | Earlier denial was interlocutory and thus not protected from reconsideration; later motion was impermissible collateral attack | (Implicit) Defendants argued court could revisit interlocutory rulings and move for summary judgment again | Court: Rule 60(b) inapplicable to interlocutory orders; district court properly reconsidered and resolved the second motion |
Key Cases Cited
- Thompson v. Goetz, 455 N.W.2d 580 (N.D. 1990) (Rule 60(b) does not apply to interlocutory orders)
- Cumber v. Cumber, 326 N.W.2d 194 (N.D. 1982) (interlocutory orders are ordinarily subject to reconsideration)
- Hokanson v. Zeigler, 900 N.W.2d 48 (N.D. 2017) (summary judgment standard and review)
- Hill v. Lindner, 769 N.W.2d 427 (N.D. 2009) (restrictive covenants interpreted like contracts; strict construction but given effect when clearly established)
- Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1992) (statutory nuisance test requires assessing unreasonable interference and balancing factors, including coming-to-the-nuisance)
- Filler v. City of Minot, 281 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1979) (recognition that loss of view has been compensated in eminent domain but does not establish a general private-right-to-view under nuisance principles)