Center for Individual Freedom v. Van Hollen
402 U.S. App. D.C. 345
| D.C. Cir. | 2012Background
- Appellee Van Hollen challenged 11 C.F.R. §104.20(c)(9), promulgated by the FEC to implement 2 U.S.C. §434(f)(2)(F) of BCRA §201. (f)(2)(F) requires disclosure of contributors to electioneering communications.
- BCRA §201(f) mandates disclosure of information for disbursements exceeding $10,000 in a year, including contributor identities under certain conditions.
- §104.20(c)(9) requires the name and address of each person who donated $1,000+ to a corporation or labor organization for purposes of electioneering communications under the agency’s rule.
- District Court granted summary judgment for Appellee, holding the statute text plainly supports Appellee’s view.
- Intervenors Center for Individual Freedom and Hispanic Leadership Fund appealed; the court reverses the District Court, remands for primary jurisdiction to the FEC, and keeps jurisdiction with expedited review.
- The FEC did not appeal; intervenors have Article III standing to pursue the appeal; the case involves Chevron and statutory interpretation in light of Citizens United and WRTL II.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §434(f)(2)(F) can be read to include a purpose element. | Van Hollen argues plain text requires all contributors’ names for $1,000+, regardless of purpose. | Van Hollen; the agency may construe the statute to include a purpose requirement. | Remanded for primary jurisdiction; district court erred in foreclosing agency construction. |
| Whether the FEC regulation is reasonable under Chevron Step Two. | Statute clearly favors Appellee; regulation narrows disclosure beyond text. | Regulation may be reasonable; agency has expertise to fill gaps. | Court remands to FEC for rulemaking or further proceedings to resolve Chevron Step Two arguments. |
| Whether the district court properly handled standing and scope of review. | Appellee satisfied Article III standing; intervenors have standing to appeal. | Standing is lacking; not here, but intervenors’ standing supports appeal. | Intervenors have standing; court addresses primary jurisdiction remand rather than direct Chevron ruling. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (standing requires concrete injury)
- Akins v. FEC, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (injury from lack of required information disclosure)
- Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (campaign finance and disclosure; regulatory interpretation)
- Wis. Right to Life v. FEC (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (regulation of electioneering communications; First Amendment)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (delegated agency deference in statutory interpretation)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary and capricious review; scope of agency action)
- In re Starnet, Inc., 355 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2004) (primary jurisdiction doctrine reference for agency referral)
- Allnet Commc’n Serv., Inc. v. Nat’l Exch. Carrier Ass’n, Inc., 965 F.2d 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (primary jurisdiction and agency expertise considerations)