Center for Community Action & Environmental Justice v. BNSF Railway Co., 764 F.3d 1019

Background

Defendants (Union Pacific and BNSF) operate multiple California railyards that emit diesel exhaust containing diesel particulate matter (DPM), which state and federal agencies classify as toxic/likely carcinogenic.
Plaintiffs (CCAEJ, EYCEJ, NRDC) are environmental organizations with members near the railyards; they allege DPM from railyards falls onto land/water and is re-entrained or inhaled, posing health risks.
Plaintiffs sued under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B)’s citizen-suit provision, alleging DPM is "solid or hazardous waste" and that Defendants are contributing to its "disposal."
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing (1) RCRA’s definition of "disposal" requires placement into or on land/water (not direct emission into air), and (2) air-emission regulation is the Clean Air Act’s domain (and RCRA § 6924(n) does not create a private cause of action).
The district court dismissed with prejudice; the Ninth Circuit reviews de novo and affirms, holding emissions of DPM are not "disposal" under RCRA.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B) reach diesel particulate emissions from railyards as "disposal" of solid waste?	Emitting DPM into the air that then deposits on land/water constitutes "disposal" and is actionable under RCRA.	"Disposal" requires discharge/deposit/etc. into or on land or water; direct emission into air is not listed and thus not "disposal."	Emitting DPM directly into the air is not "disposal" under RCRA § 6903(3); claim fails.
Does RCRA’s definition include "emitting" or is omission dispositive?	§ 6924(n) (air-emissions provision) shows Congress intended RCRA to cover air emissions; omission of "emitting" from § 6903(3) is not dispositive.	Congress knew how to include "emitting" in other RCRA provisions; its omission in the "disposal" definition signals exclusion.	Court treats omission as meaningful; "emitting" is excluded from the definition of "disposal."
Can § 6924(n) be enforced through a citizen suit under § 6972(a)(1)(B)?	RCRA’s air-emissions provision and the citizen-suit provision should be harmonized to fill a regulatory gap.	§ 6924(n) gives EPA regulatory authority only; § 6972(a)(1)(B) does not create a private right to enforce § 6924(n).	§ 6924(n) does not create a private right of action; citizen suits cannot be used to enforce it.
Should the court "harmonize" RCRA and the Clean Air Act to cover indirect sources (railyards) and fill any federal regulatory gap?	Harmonization is required to avoid a regulatory gap leaving railyard emissions unregulated federally.	Congress intentionally left indirect sources (like railyards) to state regulation; courts should not rewrite statutes to eliminate that gap.	Court declines to bridge the gap—Congress intentionally limited federal reach; harmonization cannot override text and history.

Key Cases Cited

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (contextual statutory interpretation principles)
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002) (presumption about inclusion/exclusion of statutory language across sections)
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001) (use of legislative history when text appears unambiguous)
Power Eng’g Co. v. United States, 191 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing disposal that resulted from material placed on land versus disposal assertedly through air)
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (rule disfavoring repeal by implication when harmonizing statutes)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for pleading)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Hinds Invs., L.P. v. Angioli, 654 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)
Ravell v. United States, 22 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to consider arguments raised first at oral argument)