Cedric Detavius Sandidge v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 67 Va. App. 150

Sandidge sold cocaine on two occasions to a confidential informant; he had two prior cocaine distribution convictions and pled guilty (Alford pleas) to two counts of distribution, third or subsequent offense.
Third-or-subsequent convictions under Va. Code § 18.2-248(C) carry a ten-year mandatory minimum for each count, unless five statutory exceptions are satisfied.
At sentencing the Commonwealth conceded four of the five exceptions were met; the dispute centered on exception (e) requiring that, "not later than the time of the sentencing hearing," the defendant has truthfully provided all information and evidence concerning related offenses.
Defense sought a continuance so Sandidge could provide information; the court denied the continuance, Sandidge testified at the sentencing hearing that he had no additional information, and the court imposed two consecutive ten-year mandatory minimums (twenty years total).
On appeal Sandidge argued (1) the phrase "not later than the time of the sentencing hearing" permits disclosures made during the hearing, and (2) his in-court statement satisfied exception (e). The Court of Appeals reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Sandidge)	Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth)	Held
1. Meaning of "not later than the time of the sentencing hearing"	It includes the entire sentencing hearing (disclosures can be made during the hearing).	It requires disclosure before the sentencing hearing begins (i.e., prior to commencement).	Court held phrase means prior to commencement of the sentencing hearing.
2. Whether Sandidge’s testimony at sentencing satisfied exception (e)	His in-court statement that he had no additional information sufficed; statute does not prescribe a mechanism to show lack of information.	Post-commencement statements are untimely; the Commonwealth must have time to investigate and test disclosures.	Court held his post-commencement testimony was too late, so exception (e) was not satisfied.
3. Application of lenity to resolve timing ambiguity	Apply lenity to adopt the more defendant-favorable interpretation (allow in-hearing disclosures).	No ambiguity exists; plain language controls, so lenity is inapplicable.	Court found no ambiguity and did not apply lenity.
4. Whether denying continuance was error	Continuance was justified to permit compliance with exception (e).	No good cause; last-minute request; permitting disclosures then would frustrate statute’s purpose.	Denial of continuance and imposition of mandatory minimums was not erroneous.

Jackson v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 630 (standard for de novo review of statutory interpretation and related precedent relied upon)
Blake v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 375 (viewing facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth)
Commonwealth v. Greer, 63 Va. App. 561 (abuse-of-discretion and review principles for sentencing)
Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836 (statute should not be construed to produce absurd results)
United States v. Galvon-Manzo, 642 F.3d 1260 (holding disclosures for safety-valve purposes are timely only if made prior to the commencement of sentencing)
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (cross-examination as important method to test trustworthiness of testimony)