Cedric Bernard Carldwell v. State
06-15-00035-CR
Tex. Crim. App.Sep 18, 2015Background
- Appellant Cedric Carldwell pleaded guilty to murder (indictment charged shooting victim April 14, 2013); he admitted shooting but asserted self‑defense; witnesses contradicted that claim.
- Carldwell was an enhanced defendant: prior felony convictions alleged; State amended indictment to drop one prior, leaving one jurisdictional prior.
- At plea and sentencing the judge advised Carldwell of the punishment range (15 years to 99 years or life) and that murder is aggravated for parole‑eligibility purposes.
- The State recommended life; after considering the PSI, criminal history (multiple violent felonies including attempted murder and kidnapping), and facts (multiple shots, several to the back), the judge sentenced Carldwell to life with a deadly‑weapon finding.
- No contemporaneous objection to the sentence was made at sentencing; motion for new trial did not raise disproportionality and no hearing appears in the record.
- Appellant appealed arguing the life sentence was cruel and unusual/disproportionate; State argues error was not preserved and the sentence falls within statutory range and is not grossly disproportionate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Carldwell) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellant preserved complaint that life sentence was cruel and unusual | Carldwell failed to object at sentencing or in new‑trial motion on disproportionality; therefore error not preserved | The sentence is disproportionate/cruel and unusual and should be reviewed on appeal | Court (per State brief): issue not preserved; absent timely objection or specific grounds in new‑trial motion, appellate review is barred |
| Whether life sentence violates Eighth Amendment proportionality | Life sentence is within statutory range, justified by violent facts and extensive priors; Solem/Harmelin framework shows no gross disproportionality | Life sentence is excessive compared to the offense and federal guidelines; federal precedents support review | Court (per State brief): even on merits, no gross disproportionality—sentence constitutional because within statutory limits and offense/past record support severity |
| Whether federal sentencing guidelines/control apply | Federal guidelines do not govern state sentencing; State relied on Texas law and statutory ranges | Appellant cites federal guidelines/analogies to argue disproportionality | Court (per State brief): federal guidelines inapplicable to state sentence; state statutory range controls |
| Whether appellant received plea consideration | State points to amended indictment dropping a second prior, reducing minimum exposure from 25 to 15 years—constitutes consideration | Appellant contends he received no benefit for pleading guilty | Court (per State brief): State granted a benefit by dropping one prior, so plea yielded reduced minimum exposure |
Key Cases Cited
- Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality and concurring opinions govern modern proportionality analysis)
- Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (articulated three‑factor proportionality test)
- McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.) (discussing Harmelin and Solem interplay)
- Fierro v. State, 706 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (general objection/new‑trial practice does not preserve appellate complaint)
- Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (sentence within statutory range is not excessive)
- Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999) (preservation requirements and sentencing review)