Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid
594 U.S. 139
| SCOTUS | 2021

Background

  • California regulation (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §20900(e)) allows union organizers onto agricultural employers’ property: up to three hours per day (one hour before, one during lunch, one after), up to 120 days/year, with notice procedures and limits on disruptive conduct.
  • Petitioners Cedar Point Nursery and Fowler Packing challenged enforcement as an uncompensated per se physical taking of their property (right to exclude), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court.
  • District Court dismissed and denied preliminary relief, treating the rule as a regulatory restriction (Penn Central) because access was not permanent/continuous; Ninth Circuit panel affirmed and rehearing en banc was denied.
  • Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the regulation appropriates a right to invade (abrogates the right to exclude) and therefore is a per se physical taking under the Takings Clause.
  • The Court reasoned that physical appropriations—permanent or temporary—require compensation; duration affects only compensation amount. The decision distinguishes prior cases (e.g., PruneYard) and rejects relying solely on state-law easement labels.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether CA access regulation is a per se physical taking Regulation appropriates owners’ right to exclude; grants organizers a right to enter — per se taking requiring compensation Access is limited, intermittent, for narrow purpose; thus a use restriction assessed under Penn Central Yes — Court: appropriation of right to invade/right to exclude is a per se physical taking
Whether temporariness limits per se treatment Temporary nature should not change that government appropriated an invasory right Because access is not permanent/continuous (not 24/7/365), it is not a per se taking; only Penn Central applies Temporariness does not avoid per se rule; duration affects compensation, not takings characterization
Whether state property-law form (no formal easement) controls analysis Court should treat the access as an easement-like servitude and protect right to exclude irrespective of label Board: right is not an easement under California law (non-transferable, unrecordable), so no protected property interest taken State-law labels don’t defeat Takings Clause; courts look to whether government appropriated an exclusion right, not formal easement labels
Whether holding threatens ordinary government inspections/entries Petitioners limited to this regulatory appropriation; traditional exceptions narrow Board and dissent warn many regulatory inspections and entries would become takings Court preserves distinctions: isolated trespass, background limitations, and valid conditions on benefits remain; holding limited to the facts here

Key Cases Cited

  • Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (distinguishes physical appropriations from regulatory takings; per se rule for physical occupations)
  • Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (flexible, multi-factor test for regulatory takings)
  • Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (permanent physical occupation is a per se taking)
  • United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (government overflights can impose a servitude and constitute a taking)
  • Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (appropriation of an easement/servitude requires compensation)
  • Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (compelled easement is a taking; emphasized permanent/continuous public right of passage)
  • Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 576 U.S. 351 (2015) (physical appropriation of raisins held a per se taking; means matter as well as ends)
  • PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (limited access to a shopping center held not a taking after Penn Central analysis)
  • United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (physical government appropriation/condemnation treated as taking)
  • United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (government seizure/operation of private property can be a taking)
  • United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958) (temporary government occupation can be a taking; duration affects compensation)
  • Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012) (temporary flooding may be a taking; requires balancing factors like duration and character of invasion)
  • Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (background principles may negate a compensable property interest)
  • NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (statutory access under NLRA interpreted narrowly to avoid infringing Fifth Amendment property rights)
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