Cayuga Nation v. Howard Tanner
6 F.4th 361
| 2d Cir. | 2021Background
- Parcel at 271 Cayuga Street sits within the Village of Union Springs and within the historic Cayuga Reservation; Nation purchased the Parcel in 2003.
- Nation opened Lakeside (a class II electronic bingo facility) in 2004; site regulated by the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC).
- Initial 2003 litigation: Nation sued Village claiming tribal immunity from local zoning; district court ruled for Nation, but after City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation the case was remanded and the judgment for Nation was vacated; Lakeside closed.
- Lakeside reopened in 2013; Village sought enforcement under a 1958 local games-of-chance ordinance. Nation sued seeking declaration that IGRA preempts the Village ordinance and injunctive relief.
- District court granted summary judgment to the Nation in 2020, holding the Parcel is "Indian lands" under IGRA and the 1958 Ordinance is preempted; Village appealed.
- Second Circuit affirmed: rejected issue- and claim-preclusion defenses and held the Parcel qualifies as IGRA "Indian lands," so IGRA preempts local regulation of gaming there.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether issue (collateral) preclusion bars relitigation of IGRA preemption | Union Springs I did not decide IGRA preemption; no prior adjudication of that specific issue | A passage in Union Springs I and the remand judgment (Union Springs II) resolved IGRA preemption against Nation | No—issue preclusion does not apply; earlier opinions did not actually decide IGRA preemption and the relevant prior judgment was vacated or did not address IGRA |
| Whether claim preclusion bars Nation's IGRA challenge | Nation’s 2013–2014 facts (reopening, active gaming, Village enforcement under 1958 Ordinance) postdate 2003 suit, so this is a new claim | Nation should have raised IGRA in 2003 (same transaction) and is barred from raising it later | No—claims arise from new operative facts after the 2003 complaint, so claim preclusion inapplicable |
| Whether the Parcel is "Indian lands" under IGRA (25 U.S.C. §2703(4)) | IGRA’s text covers "all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation;" the Cayuga Reservation was never disestablished, so the Parcel is Indian lands | Sherrill and the practical absence of tribal jurisdiction over reacquired lands mean IGRA should not cover this Parcel | Held: Parcel qualifies as "Indian lands" under IGRA; IGRA preempts the Village’s 1958 Ordinance and state/local regulation of gaming there |
| Need to decide tribal sovereign immunity and criminal-jurisdiction overlap | Nation asserted IGRA preemption, IGRA criminal-enforcement provisions, and sovereign immunity as alternative grounds | Village contested immunity and asserted local enforcement authority | Court affirmed based on IGRA preemption; it did not rely on or resolve Nation’s alternate immunity theories (district court had also addressed them but appellate affirmance rested on IGRA) |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) (equitable doctrines limited tribal reassertion of sovereignty over reacquired lands)
- McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (reservation status endures absent explicit congressional disestablishment)
- Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (reservation disestablishment requires clear congressional intent)
- Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (recognizing tribe’s wrongful-dispossession remedies while noting possible equitable limits)
- Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (states generally lack authority to regulate tribal activity on reservations)
- Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013) (IGRA preempts state/local regulation of gaming on Indian lands)
- Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 1996) (IGRA’s preemption of state regulation of gaming on Indian lands)