*1 COUNTY OF ONEIDA, NEW YORK, et al. v. ONEIDA
INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK STATE et al. No. 83-1066. Argued October 198 4 Decided March 1985* *Together with No. 83-1240, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation Newof York al., State et also certiorari to the same court. *2 Powell, J., the opinion delivered Court, in which Blackmun and O’Connor, JJ., joined, in all but Part V of which Brennan Marshall, JJ., joined, in Part V of which Burger, J., C. and White and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., opinion filed an concurring in part and dissenting part, in in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 254. Stevens, J., filed a separate statement in concurring the judgment
part, post, p. 254, and opinion an dissenting part, in which Burger, J., C. and White and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 255. Allan van argued Gestel petitioners cause for No. 83-1065. With him on the briefs Jeffrey was C. Bates. Messrs, van Gestel and Bates also filed a respond- brief for County ents of Oneida et al. in No. 83-1240. Peter H. Deputy Schiff, Solicitor General of New argued York, petitioner cause for in No. 83-1240. With him on the briefs were Robert Attorney Abrams, General, Robert Hermann, Solicitor General, and Lew A. Millenbach, Assistant Attor- *3 ney General. Arlinda argued Locklear the respondents cause for Oneida
Indian Nation al. et in both cases. With her on the brief for respondents Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin et al. were Dauphinais, Richard Francis Skenandore, Norman Dorsen, and Bertram Hirsch. Robert T. Coulter filed a brief for respondent Oneida of the Thames Band Council.
Edwin S. argued Kneedler the cause for the United States as amicus support curiae in judgment below. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attor ney General Habicht, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, Jacques B. Gelin, and Arthur E. † Gowran.
† Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for C. H. Albright et al. by Todd, J. Jr., D. Dan M. Byrd, Jr., John C. Christie, Jr., J. William Hayton, Stephen J. Landes, and Lucinda 0. McConathy; for the City of Escondido et al. by R. Schell, John Kent Foster, H. Paul D. Engstrand, and Donald Lincoln; R. and for the County Seneca, of New York, et al. by James D. Clair, St. William Lee, F. Millón, David аnd Quarles James L. III.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Land Title Association William T. Finley, Jr.; for and the Association opinion the Court.* of the delivered Powell
Justice of Tribes three question whether present the These cases damages occu- the for bring may for a suit Indians Oneida the unlawfully conveyed allegedly land tribal pation use of and 1795. I Indian the Oneida York, Newof Nation Indian The Oneida Band Thames the of Oneida the and Wisconsin, Nation against the Oneidas) in 1970 suit (the instituted Council The Oneidas York. New Madison, and of Oneida Counties the conveyed acres 100,000 ancestors alleged violated agreement that a 1795 under York of New State Act), 1 (Nonintercourse ofAct Intercourse and Trade Onei- The void. was transaction thus 329, and Stat. rental representing fair damages sought complaint das’ occupied presently owned part land value by period Madison, for Oneida Counties through December January District Northern for Court District States United The ground that initially the action dismissed York Newof arising laws under a claim to state complaint failed Appeals United States. Nation Indian Oneida affirmed. Circuit the Second for granted thenWe 2d 916 464 F. County Oneida, County Nation Oneida reversed. certiorari I). unani- (Oneida (1974) held We S. Oneida, Oneidas purposes, the jurisdictional mously least that, *4 Id., law. possession under for a claim stated trial. for remanded ease was The Jr., Jerry Lazarus, Arthur Inc., Affairs, et al. American Straus. C. York, Franklin, New County of for a brief Hughes filed K. Richard curiae. amici al. as
et Rehnquist join White, and Justice Justice, Justice *The Chief opinion. V of only Part
On remand, the District Court trifurcated trial of the
issues.
In
phase,
the first
the court found the counties liable
to the Oneidas for wrongful possession of their lands. 434
Supp.
F.
phase,
the second
it awarded the
damages
Oneidas
in the amount оf
plus
$16,694,
interest,
representing the fair rental value of
question
the land in
for
2-year
period specified
complaint.
Finally, the
District Court held that the State of New York, a third-party
brought
defendant
into
the case
the counties, must indem-
nify the counties
damages
for the
owed to the Oneidas. The
Appeals
Court of
affirmed the trial
rulings
court’s
respect
liability
and indemnification.
The in these cases are the direct descendants of members of the Oneida Indian Nation, one of the six nations Iroquois, powerful the most Indian Tribe in the Northeast at the time of the American Revolution. See Graymont, B. Iroquois in the American Revolution (1972) (hereinafter Graymont). From time immemorial to shortly after the Revolution, the Oneidas inhabited what is now central New York State. aboriginal Their land was approximately six million extending acres, from Pennsyl- vania border to the St. Lawrence River, from the shores of Lake Ontario to the western foothills of the Adirondack Mountains. See Supp., 434 F. at 533.
231 the British, Iroquois the with sided the Although of most Revolution. in the actively supported colonists the Oneidas prevented supra. Graymont, This assistance also Ibid,.; see colo- the asserting effort united Iroquois a from the aid. support considerable was of the Oneidas’ thus and nists, importance recognized thе States United theWar, the After 7 Treaty Stanwix, Fort the and role, Oneidas’ of the promised 1784), (Oct. Government the National 22, Stat. possession the “in the secure would the Oneidas period of they a short Within settled.” are on which lands promise, in the this reaffirmed twice States United time, (Jan. 1789), and 9, 7 Stat. Harmar, Fort Treaties 1794).1 (Nov. 11, Canandaigua, 7 Stat. under came York of New period, During the State land open the Oneidas’ heavy pressure to increasingly into entered Consequently, State 1788, settlement. vast purchased the it in which “treaty” Indians, retained The Oneidas land. Oneidas’ majority of the parties .the that, an area acres, 300,000 about reservation suit. in this involved land included stipulated below, Washington and Secre- urging President Trade passed Indian Congress the first tary Knox, of War 4 American 137. Stat. ch. Act, Intercourse and (1832); p. Prucha, F. Vol. Papers, Affairs, Indian State Policy Years Formative in the American except conveyance land of Indian prohibited the The Act Tuscaroras and Oneidas that the stated Harmar Treaty of Fort The respective their possession and confirmed “again secured were “The provided: Canandaigua of Treaty of 34. 7 Stat. lands.” Onondaga Oneida, to the reserved the lands acknowledge States United New- state treaties with respective Nations, in their Cayuga and the United property; reservations, to be York, called their free use ... them same, disturb nor claim never will theirs, until remain shall reservations said but the thereof: enjoyment States, who have people to the sell same choose to 7 Stat. purchase.” right *6 conveyances
where pursuant such treaty were entered to the power of the Congress passed United States.2 In 1793, a stronger, more providing detailed version of the Act, that purchase grant “no any or of lands, or of title or claim any thereto, from or Indians nation or tribe of Indians, within the bounds any of the validity United States, shall be of equity, law or by treaty unless the same be made a or con- pursuant vention entered into to the [and] constitution . . . presence, approbation and with the of the commissioner or commissioners of appointed super- the United States” to §8. vise such transactions. Stat. Unlike the 1790 version, the new penalties statute included criminal for violation of its terms. Ibid.
Despite Congress’ policy person clear entity that no or purchase should acquiescence Indian land without the of the Federal Government, in 1795 began the State of New York negotiations buy to the remainder of the Oneidas’ land. When this Secretary fact came to attention of of War Pickering, he warned Clinton, Governor and later Governor Jay, required that York New was the Nonintercourse Act request appointment of federal commissioners to supervise any land transaction with Oneidas. See 434 Supp., F. at ignored 534-535. warnings, The State these agreement summer of 1795 entered into an with whereby they conveyed Oneidas virtually all of their remain- ing land to payments. the State for annual cash It Ibid. is this that transaction is the basis complaint of the Oneidas’ this case.
The District conveyance found that the did comply requirements not of the Nonintercourse Section of the 1790 Act declared that “no sale by any of lands made Indians, any or nation or tribe Indians within the United States, shall be any valid person persons, or any state, or having right whether pre-emption to not, such lands or unless the same duly shall made and public executed at treaty, some held under the authority of the United States.” Stat. 138. that particular, stated the court at 538-541. Id.,
Act. no .... that finding permitted record only “[t]he federal official of or other Commissioner at Id., . . present the . transaction.” government was appeal. finding dispute petitioners did not not have argued did they the Oneidas Rather, if such Even this violation. of action cause common-law Noninter- that the they contended existed, once action an could the Oneidas pre-empted it, Act course Act. for violations private of action cause maintain any action cause such Additionally, maintained any action cause nonjusticiable, that time-barred was *7 the abated, and Act had under Appeals, with conveyance. Court The ratified the had arguments. Petitioners rejected dissenting, these judge one reject affirm the them also here; we these claims renew liability. finding of court’s
Ill
con-
petitioner counties’
faced with
we are
outset,
theAt
right
the viola-
action
no
Oneidas
that the
tention
Court
District
Court
Both
Act.
tion of
finding
had
the Oneidas
rejected
claim,
Appeals
right
common-law
first, theories:
right
sue on two
implied
an
second,
possession; and
for unlawful
action
of
statutory
ofAct
Nonintercourse
under
of action
cause
question
think
we
the latter
reach
need
1793. We
firmly
right
established.
sue
common-law
Indians’
A
Law
Federal Common
Revolutionary
well-defined
War, several
By
time of
aof
nature
governing
established
principles had been
could
interests
property
how those
in its
interest
tribe’s
held
nations
accepted that Indian
conveyed.
It was
be
“aboriginal title”
to lands
had inhabited from time
Original
immemorial. See Cohen,
Title, Minn. L.
(1947).
Rev.
discovery” provided,
“doctrine of
discovering
however, that
nations held fee title to these
subject
right
lands,
occupancy
the Indians’
and use. As
consequence,
purchase
no one could
Indian land or other-
aboriginal
wise terminate
title without the consent of the
sovereign.3
I,
Oneida
S.,U.
at 667. See Clinton &
Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on
Alienation
Origins
of Indian Land: The
of the Eastern Land
Claims, 31 Me. L. Rev. 17, 19-49
adoption
With the
of the Constitution, Indian relations
province
became the exclusive
of federal law. Oneida I,
supra,
(citing
at 670
Georgia,
Worcester v.
3This explained the doctrine of discovery as follows: “[Discovery gave title government to the subjects, whose byor whose authority, it made, was against all European other governments, which might title by possession. consummated
“The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making discovery right the sole acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing upon settlements it. . . . rights “The thus acquired being exclusive, power no other could inter- pose [the between discoverer and the natives]. *8 “In the establishment of relations, these rights the of original the inhab- were, itants instance, no entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a extent, considerable impaired. They were admitted to be rightful the occupants soil, of the legal with a just as well as claim to possession retain it,of to and use it according to their own discretion; but rights their to com- plete sovereignty, independent as nations, were necessarily diminished, power and their dispose to of the soil at will, their own to whomsoever pleased, was denied the original fundamental principle, discovery that gave exclusive title to those who made it.” McIntosh, Johnson v. 8 543, (1823). Wheat. 573-574 4 Madison cited the National inability Government’s to control trade with the Indians as of key one the deficiencies of the Articles of Confed eration, urged and adoption of the Indian Clause, Commerce 1, 8,§ Art.
235
lands.
to their
rights
aboriginal
the Indians
of
recognized the
to
right”
Indians
theof
“unquestioned
spoke
of
Court
The
v.
Nation
lands, Cherokee
possession
their
exclusive
right
Indians’
(1831),
that
stated
and
Georgia,
1,17
Pet.
5
simple
whites.”
of the
fee
as
occupancy
“as sacred
is
(1835).
princi
This
746
711,
9 Pet.
States,
v. United
Mitchel
v.
Fletcher
consistently.
also
See
reaffirmed
ple
been
has
8
McIntosh,
(1810);
v.
Johnson
6 Cranch
Peck,
(1839);
201
Pet.
13
(1823);
Smith,
v.
Clark
543
Wheat.
Molony, 16
(1840);
v.
Chouteau
Pet.
Poteet,
v.
Lattimer
(1872). Thus,
Joy,
(1854);
Wall.
v.
Holden
How.
right claimed
possessory
“the
I,
in Oneida
concluded
we
in this
a,
issue
right
at
to the lands
Oneidas] is
[by the
original).
(emphasis in
S., at
case.”
recog
I
prior to Oneida
Court
of this
decisions
Numerous
common-
have a federal
implicitly
Indians
that
least
nized
rights.5 In
aboriginal land
right
to enforce
to sue
law
two
invalid
supra,
declared
Court
McIntosh,
v.
Johnson
and
in 1773
occurred
land
purchases
Indian
private
Subsequently in Marsh
consent.
the Crown’s
1775without
an
(1850),
“That
held:
it was
Brooks, 8 How.
v.
right
an Indian
on
maintained
ejectment
could
action
is
question. This
open to
is
occupancy
use,
to
More
McIntosh.”
Johnson
decision
result
common-law
Indians
recently,
held
Court
issues
accounting
rents,
“all
for an
right of action
Indians.
with the
trade
regulate
power
Congress the
granted
3, that
el.
1961).
Clinton
also
(J.
Cooke, ed.
42, p. 284
No.
Federalist
The
Alienation
Restraints
Federal
of the
Enforcement
Hotopp, Judicial
&
Rev.
L.
Claims, 31 Me.
Land
Eastern
Origins
Land:
17, 23-29
(1892),
States, 27 Ct.
Cl.
Jaeger
United
argue that
5 Petitioners
do so
authorized
specifically
only when
sue
can
tribes
holds
only
applied
It
case.
to this
inapposite
clearly
Jaeger Congress.
to claims
of Claims
jurisdiction
special
States.
*9
profits” against trespassers on their land. United States v.
Santa Fe
R.
(1941).6
Co.,
B
Pre-emption
argue
Petitioners
pre-
Nonintercourse Acts
empted
right
whatever
of action
may
the Oneidas
have had
relying
common law,
on our decisions in Milwaukee v.
(1981) (Milwaukee
Illinois,
237 question” directly [the] otherwise “[speaks] to the statute swpra, II, by law. Milwaukee common federal answered added). II, in Milwaukee (emphasis As we stated 315 at “necessary expedient” when as a is used law common S., “spoken particular issue.” Congress to a has not added). ofAct (emphasis The Nonintercourse at 313-314 question for directly of remedies speak to the 1793 does comparison of the A conveyances land. of Indian unlawful II in Milwaukee at issue statute and 1793 Act instructive. question a common-law whether II raised the
Milwaukee pollution caused nuisance of a action for abatement passage waterways of the survived of interstate Act, Control Pollution Water the Federal to amendments (FWPCA).7 estab- FWPCA 86 Stat. 92-500, Pub. L. problem dealing system with the for elaborate lished an of its providing enforcement pollution, for water interstate Milwaukee suits. See by agency citizens action terms penalties civil available also made supra, It at 325-327. II, 1319(d), §§ C. 33 U. S. Act. of the for violations Congress history intended FWPCA legislative indicated problem inter- comprehensive to provide solution a supra, II, in Milwaukee pollution, noted as we state water 317-319. at estab- did not of 1793 Act Nonintercourse contrast, plan dealing violations comprehensive for remedial a
lish legis- rights. no indication property There is of Indian pre-empt common- Congress history intended lative §§5 Only Act, two sections law remedies.8 (1972), the Milwaukee, S.U. City in Illinois Previously, of action provided a cause law common that federal held Court had pollution. water interstate abatement contrary. President to the evidence contemporaneous is some There Corn- passed, met with were first Acts urging the at whose Washington, Nation, shortly after enactment planter, Chief of the Seneca transactions, and complaints about land They Senecas’ Act. discussed involve Indian §8 lands all.9 The relevant clause of provides simply purchase grant “no or of lands, or of any title any or claim thereto, from Indians or nation tribe within Indians, the bounds of the United States, shall be any validity equity, in law or unless the same be made treaty or pursuant convention entered into to the constitution . . . 1 Stat. 330. provision.10 It contains no remedial subjects Section 5 individuals who settle on Indian lands imprisonment, gives fine and authority discretionary the President *11 illegal
to remove settlers from the Indians’ land.11 Washington assured them that the new protect statute would their inter- ests. Washington told Cornplanter: “Here, then, is security the for the your remainder of State, lands. No person, nor purchase your can lands, unless at public some treaty, held under authority the of the United . . . States. you “If. . . any just have complaint cause of purchaser] [a and can make satisfactory proof thereof, the federal open courts will you to redress, for as to all persons.” other 4 American State Papers, Indian Affairs, 1, p. (1832). Vol. 9The Act contained 15 A sections. number of these set out licensing requirements for those who wished (§§ to trade with the 1,2,3). Indians Several others special established requirements for purchasing from horses (§§6,7). Indians gave Others the jurisdiction United States courts over (§§ offenses under 10,11) the Act provided and for the division of fines and (§ 12). forfeitures 1 Stat. 329-333. 10 The §8 second clause of makes it a criminal offense negotiate to treaty or convention for conveyance the land, Indian except under the authority in the presence of United States commissioners. Stat. 330. It likewise provision no makes to restore illegally purchased land to the Indians. Petitioners make much the fact that the Act contained criminal penalties in arguing that the Act pre-empted common-law actions. property law, however, it is common to have criminal and civil sanctions available for infringement property rights, government and for officials to police power use to trespassers remove privately from owned land. See 5 R. Powell, Real Property ¶ 758 11 TheAct authorizes President take measures, “to such may as he judge necessary, to remove from lands belonging any tribe, Indian any citizens or inhabitants of the States, who made, or shall directly the address not does Act Nonintercourse Thus, Indians, unlawfully conveyed to the restoring land problem of provisions contained specific remedial in contrast 313-315. atS., II, U. See Milwaukee FWPCA. subsequent enact- to the Congress’ action Significantly, Non- of the versions later statute of the ment pre-empt Acts did Act demonstrate intercourse the 1802 Congress amended In 1822 remedies. common-law right about provide “in trials all toAct version party side on one shall be property, Indians in which proof rest shall burden other, the persons white shall every the Indian in which person, case upon the white fact from in himself presumption of title aout make see ownership.” 683; 3 Stat. §4, possession and previous contemplated apparently Congress § Thus, 25 U. S. C. rights. property asserting their by Indians suits argu- petitioners’ contradict also this Court Decisions recently, Omaha Wilson pre-emption. Most for ment (1979), Tribe Indian Omaha S. Tribe, years as over had surfaced quiet on land title sued based changed The Omahas its course. River Missouri The Court aboriginal title. possession on claim *12 brought apply suits to to amendment the 1822 construed Citing Indians. as individual by as well tribes Indian pre-empt petitioners contend Act that very of the sections interpreted by the Court Indians, action common-law “design” the Non- part overall to be amendment rights to their Indians protect “to Acts intercourse Blacksmith, v. Fellows also See at 664. properties.” Id., (1857).12 366 How. 19 1 Stat. thereon.” make a settlement attempt to make, or
hereafter action, and remedial take Executive to obligation no imposes It authority discretionary give the President to only intended was apparently peace. preserve 12 the avail contention that petitioners’ support for no Similarly, we find precludes tribes on behalf by the United ability of suits 240 recognized in
We
Oneida I that the Nonintercourse Acts
“put
simply
statutory
form what
orwas
cаme to be the ac-
cepted
extinguishment
rule—that .the
required
Indian title
the consent of the United States.”
Í—I > Having determined that the Oneidas a cause of action under federal common question law, we address the whether there are defenses available to the counties. We conclude that none has merit.
A Statute Limitations There is no federal statute governing of limitations federal common-law actions property Indians to rights. enforce In the controlling absence of a period, federal limitations general rule is that a period state analogous limitations for an cause of applied action is borrowed and to the federal claim, provided application that the of the state statute would not underlying inconsistent with policies.13 common-law actions the tribes themselves. See Poafpybitty Skelly v. Co., Oil 390 U. S. (1968); Creek Nation v. United States, (1943) U. S. (citing Cherokee Nation v. Southern Co., Kansas R. (1890); U. S. 641 Cherokee v. Hitchcock, Nation (1902); S. 294 and Lone Hitchcock, (1903)). S.U. Wolf See also Moe Salish & Tribes, Kootenai Confederated (1976) (“[I]t S. U. appear Congress would contemplated that a tribe’s access to federal court litigate arising matter ‘under the Constitution, laws, or treaties’ would be at respects least some as broad as that of the United States suing trustee”). as the tribe’s *13 13 Under Supremacy Clause, state-law g., e. bars, time pos adverse laches, session and apply do not of their own force to Indian land title Bluejacket, Ewert v. claims. See 259 129, U. S. (1922);
241 Agency, 454, Railway Express Inc., 421 U. S. v. Johnson (1975). EEOC, 432 Ins. Co. also Occidеntal 465 Life (1977). borrowing a state of think the We 355, U. S. with inconsistent period would be in these cases limitations Congress of policy. a number occasions Indeed, on federal respect claims. land to Indian with this clear has made gave jurisdiction over civil adopting the statute Congress involving courts, New York to the Indians actions “[N]othing be shall proviso: herein contained this included conferring jurisdiction courts of the State on the construed making applicable the laws State York of New involving or claims Indian lands in actions civil New York or events respect to transactions which relate thereto §233. September 25 U. S. C. prior 1952.” transpiring specifically New ensure that the proviso was This added apply pre-1952 land not would of limitations York statute history legislative on I, we relied In Oneida claims.14 §233 were concluding land claims that Indian in C. 25 U. S. atS., 680-682. exclusively U. law. a matter against policy congressional history reflects also This in the context limitations application state statutes of claims. land addressing policy recently Congress reaffirmed for certain limitations appropriate question statute of Indians. brought on behalf States the United claims special provided a Originally this statute enacted days years for contract period and 90 6 limitations damages brought the United States tort suits (CA9 1956), cert. District, 236 F. 2d Irrigation Ahtanum (1957). denied, U. S. proviso, stated: Morris, sponsor of the Representative and, know, the Government Indians, are wards of as we now, it “As as it does run them limitations does therefore, statute of rights so preserve [proviso] will ordinary This case. concerning those claims running against them will not statute Cong. Rec. act.” of this passage before might arisen *14 behalf of Indians. (b). §§ S. C. 2415(a), The statute that stipulated claims accrued prior to its date of enact- ment, July 18, 1966, were deemed to have accrued on that § date. 2415(g). 2415(c) Section excluded from the limita- tions all period actions “to establish the title-to, or right of possession of, real or personal property.”
In 1972 and again in 1977, 1980, and 1982, as the statute of limitations was about to expire for pre-1966 claims, Congress extended the time within which the United States could suits bring behalf on of the Indians. The legislative history of the 1972, 1977, and 1980 amendments demonstrates Congress did not § intend 2415 to apply to suits brought by the Indians themselves, and that it assumed that the Indians’ right to sue was not subject otherwise to any statute of limi- tations. Both proponents and opponents of the amendments shared these views. See 123 Cong. Rec. (1977) (remarks of Rep. Dicks, arguing that extension is unnec- essary because the Indians can suit bring even if the statute expires limitations for the United States); id., at 22166 and (remarks of Rep. Cohen, arguing the basic prob- lem with bill is its failure to limit suits brought by Indi- ans); 126 (1980) Cong. (remarks Rec. 3289 of Sen. Melcher, reiterating with respect to the 1980 extension Rep. Dicks’ argument against the 1977 id., at 3290 (remarks extension); of Sen. Cohen, same); Statute of Limitations Extension: Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 312-314 (1979); Statute of Limitations Extension for Indian Claims: on Hearings S. 1377 before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 76-77 (1977); Time Extension for Commenc- ing Actions on Behalf of Indians: Hearing S. 3377 and H. R. 13825 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 23
With the enactment of the 1982 amendments, Congress for the first imposed time a statute of limitations on certain tort brought by damages Indi- individual claims and contract as the amendments, enacted tribes. These ans 97-394, Pub. L. Limitation Act Indian Claims following established §2415, C. U. S. 1976, note Stat. cognizable pre-1966 system claims final resolution for the 2415(a) (b). Secretary §§ Act directed under Register publish compile in the Federal Interior to *15 pro- of limitations to which the statute all claims list of Indian §2415 applied. directed The Act also vided in 28 U. S. C. may Secretary notify have an Indians who that the those given any were then claims. The Indians in such interest to be opportunity claims; were additional these to submit an published for claims compiled list. Actions on a second and appeared §2415 periods subject of limitations to the days within unless commenced barred neither list were any If the Secre- publication at time the second list. the tary “any pursue lists, a on one not to claim decides complaint is filed right unless the be barred action shall publication [of year the notice after the date one within Register.” decision] L. Secretary’s Pub. Federal 5(c) added). § 5(c) § (emphasis Thus, 1978, 96 Stat. 97-394, 1-year which imposed limitations within implicitly a statute bring that are tort claims contract and the Indians must 2415(a) (b) Secretary. by by §§ listed covered formally upon long nor acted a listed claim is neither as So Secretary, by rejected live.15 it remains 31, Register on March Federal published in the two were The lists Reg. 48 Fed. respectively. 1983, and November Id., Secretary. by the compiled are on the first list claims The Oneidas’ however, they if were not barred, even not be would 13920. These claims limita statute of suit in 1970 when no commenced The listed. Oneidas Additionally, brought by Indians themselves. applied to claims tions e., litigating the i. involve Oneidas’, damages actions that if like the claims “to title, to be establish aboriginal are construed suits vitality of continued of, property,” would personal or to, possession real right the title Limitations of the Indian Claims of limitations exempt from the statute legislative history of the successive amendments to § replete Congress’ with evidence of concern that the United States up responsibilities had failed to live to its trustee for the Dеpartment Indians, and that Interior had not appropriate acted dispatch with meeting provided §2415. g., deadlines Authorizing E. Bring Tribes to Certain Actions on Behalf of their Members Respect Legal to Certain Claims, and for Other Pur- poses, Rep. p. H. R. By No. providing 97-954, 1-year period limitations Secretary for claims that the de- pursue, Congress cides not to give intended to the Indians opportunity 2415(a) (b) § one last to file suits covered on their own behalf. statutory Thus, we think the frame- adopted presumes work in 1982 the existence of an Indian right subject of action any not otherwise statute of limita- tions. It Congress’ would be a violation of will were we hold period state statute of limitations should be borrowed these circumstances.
B *16 Laches argues The dissent that apply we equitable should doctrine of laches to that hold the Oneidas’ claim is barred. Although it is far from clear that this defense is available in suits such as this one,16 we do today. not reach this issue Act of 1982. The agrees Government with this view. Brief for United States Amicus Curiae 24-25. as 16 note, We as Justice Stevens properly recognizes, application that of equitable defense laches in an action at law be would novel indeed. Moreover, logic of the Court’s holding in Ewert v. Bluejacket, U. S. (1922), applicable seems here: equitable “the doctrine laches, developed protect and designed good-faith to transactions those slept who have on rights, with knowledge ample opportunity to them, assert cannot properly application give vitality to a void deed and to rights bar the of Indian in subject wards lands statutory restric Id., tions.” at Additionally, 138. this Court has indicated extin- that guishment of requires Indian title g., I, e. Oneida a sovereign See, act. 661, Candelaria, (1974); United States S. 432, 271 U. S. guilty argued petitioners were at trial that the Oneidas While against them and did the District Court ruled laches, appeal. result, a the Court on As defense reassert this not Appeals likewise decline claim, rule on this we not did to do so.
C Abatement any argue violation of of action for that cause Petitioners the statute abated when Act of 1793 Nonintercourse specificallyprovided They Congress that expired. note years, and “for the term of two force Act would the 1793 Congress, the then next session end of thence to the from § They longer.” that the contend Stat. no repealed the 1793 Act of the Nonintercourse version entirely and that under statute, new an and enacted version any time, at the effect abatement doctrine common-law finally abated on of the statute for violation of action cause disagree. expiration of the statute.17 We § pre- pertinent provision 8, like its Act, merely §4 codified 1 Stat. Act, the 1790 decessor, extinguish required sovereign principle act was conveyance the sover- aboriginal without title and thus supra, 233-234, eign’s void ab initio. See consent was Sandoval, 231 U. S. (1926), quoting properly could be circumstances, questionable whether laches it is these of Indian Furthermore, statutory restraint alienation applied. the law. 1793 still Act of adopted by the Nonintercourse land tribal upon by relied only distinguishes the cases not § This fact C. 177. 25 U. S. borrowing state that, statutes with dissent, suggests but also appear to be inconsistent would application of laches limitations, laches is before Although the issue of policy. established federal response to the dissent. us, we add these observations *17 is of abatement doctrine whether common-law questionable is It The doctrine in this case. statutory provision at issue even relevant prosecutions law, provides all applies criminal principally that has been judgment under statute to final proceeded have repealing legislature abated, unless expired has repealed' or (1974). Marrero, 653, 417 U. S. See Warden provides otherwise. and n. 3. All of the subsequent versions of the Noninter- course Act, including force, now 25 U. § S. C. 177, contain the same substantially restraint on the alienation of lands. these circumstances, the precedents of this Court compel the conclusion that the Oneidas’ cause of action has not abated.18
D Ratification We are similarly unpersuaded by petitioners’ contention that the United States has ratified the unlawful 1795 convey- ances. Petitioners this argument base on federally approved treaties in 1798 and 1802 in which the Oneidas ceded addi- tional to the land State of York.19 New There is a question reasoning
18 The
of Bear Lake and River Water Works and Irrigation
Garland,
1,
Co. v.
(1896),
directly
S.
point:
“Although there is a
repeal
formal
of the old
statute,
the new
still there
never has been a moment of time
passage
since the
of the [old] act . . .
when
provisions
these similar
have not been in force. Notwithstanding,
therefore, this formal repeal, it is . . . entirely
say
correct to
that the new
act should be construed
aas
continuation
. .
old
. .”
Accord, Steamship
Joliffe,
Co.
450,
(1865);
Wall.
Great Northern
R.
States,
(CA8
Co. v.
155 F.
1907), aff’d,
“All that certain tract of land beginning at the southwest comer of the lying land along Road,. Gennesee . . running along thence the last easterly mentioned tract to the thereof; southeast corner southerly, thence direction the continuation of the east bounds said last men- tract, tioned to other lands ceded said Oneida nation of heretofore People Indians to the of the State of New York.” Treaty 4, 1802, of June
247 Assuming treaty effective.20 became ever the 1802 whether treaty qualifies the 1802 nor 1798 neither the did, it conveyance. 1795 of the ratification are applicable law in Indian of construction canons The relationship United between unique trust in the rooted that established is well it Thus, Indians. and the States Indians, liberally in favor of construed be should treaties 431-432 423, U. S. 318 States, v. United Nation Choctaw (1912), am- with 675 Trapp, 665, 224 S. (1943); U. v. Choate benefit, McClanahan interpreted to their provisions biguous (1973); 174 164, U. S. Comm’n, 411 Tax State v. Arizona (1930); v. Winters 367 363, U. Carpenter Shaw, 280 S. v. (1908). ex- “Absent 576-577 564, S. States, United Washington Washington State statutory language,” plicit 658, S. Fishing Assn., 443 U. Passenger Vessel Commercial that find accordingly refused has (1979), this Court 690 rights. treaty Menominee abrogated Indian Congress has (1968). generally See 404 391 U. S. States, Tribe United (1982 Law Indian Federal Cohen, Handbook F. Cohen). (hereinafter ed.) F. construction applied canons similar has
The Court held has importantly, the Court nontreaty Most matters. be must extinguish title Indian congressional intent 664 Affairs, p. Vol. Papers, Indian State 4in American reproduced added). (1832) (emphasis 20 Senate, 1 Journal see by the approved treaties were Although both (1828); Proceedings of the Senate Executive . . with . of “all Treaties compilation contained id., at 428, neither is 10, 5 Stat. Res. J. Congress’ direction. compiled tribes” Indian Treaty in signed the 1798 Adams President (1845). is evidence There actions, March of executive entry in Journal his February nation”), reproduced treaty the Oneidа with (“Signed a 1797-March 194). (Lib. No. Cong. Reel Adams, Mise. John Family Papers, Adams treaties compilation in an Treaty was included Moreover, Doc. H. R. York. title New extinguished Indians that evidence similar is no Sess., There Cong., 1st 74, 17th No. by the President. signed Treaty was the 1802 “plain unambiguous,” United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., U. S., at 346, “lightly and will implied,” Relying id., at 354. strong policy on the of the United beginning States “from respect right the Indian occupancy,” (citing id., at 345 *19 Cramer v. United States, 261 (1923)), U. S. 219, 227 the Court concluded that it “[c]ertainly” require “plain would unambiguous action deprive [Indians] policy,” the benefits of that U. S., at 346. See F. Cohen. principles, view these upon by the treaties relied
petitioners are not sufficient to show that the United States ratified New purchase York’s unlawful of the Oneidas’ land. language The petitioners, cited reference the 1798 treaty purchase” to “the last treaty and one in the 1802 “land heretofore far ceded,” plain from demonstrates a unambiguous extinguish intent to Indian title. See n. 19, supra. There is no indication that either the Senate or the President conveyance. intended these ratify references to the 1795 1See Journal of the Proceedings Executive (1828).21 the Senate 273, 312, 408, 428
E
Nonjusticiability
The claim also is made
presented
that the issue
by nonjusticiable
Oneidas’ action is a
political question. §
counties contend first that Art. 1, 8,
3,
cl.
of the Constitu-
explicitly
tion
responsibility
commits
for Indian affairs Congress.22
they argue
Moreover,
Congress
given
has
civil
authority
exclusive
remedial
to the Executive for cases
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”
v. of ratification here. Rosebud Sioux Tribe (1937),
Kneip, case.
expressly
[22]
“Thg Congress shall have Power ...
21The
U. S. 99
do
Petitioners’ other
cases relied
reaffirmed the
so implicitly.
(1960),
upon
and v.
Shoshone Tribe principles
cases,
by petitioners likewise do
е.
g.,
which
of construction FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,
To
regulate
United
States,
not
Commerce
support
U. S. 584
we
299 U.
apply
a finding
(1977),
in this
S.
for-
Acts
citing
Nonintereourse
one,
this
such
say
falls
case
Canandaigua.23 Thus,
Treaty of
textually
“aof
question
because
doctrine
political
within
to a
the issue
commitment
constitutional
demonstrable
S.
369 U.
Carr,
department.” Baker v.
political
coordinate
argue
(1962). Additionally, the counties
186,
need
unusual
“an
nonjusticiable
there
because
question is
already
political decision
ato
adherence
unquestioning
is meritorious.
claims
of these
None
Ibid.
made.”
plenary
Congress’
specifically that
has held
This
mean
not
does
3,
el.
§8,
Art.
affairs under
power
necessarily entails
involving
matters
litigation
such
Business
Tribal
questions.
political
Delaware
nonjusticiable
(1977). Accord,
430 U.
Weeks,
S.
Committee
S.
Nation,
v. Sioux
Congress’ con-
If
supra,
215-217.
Carr,
Baker
also
render
authority
does
affairs
over Indian
stitutional
*20
delegation
Congress’
nonjusticiable,
fortiori,
a
claim
Oneidas’
either.24
do so
not
authority
does
President
to the
shown
petitioners have
unpersuaded that
are also
We
political
ato
unquestioning adherence
need for
“an unusual
supra,
217.
at
Carr,
already
v.
Baker
made.”
decision
“com
that
providing
Treaty
in the
language
rely
on
The counties
Presi
them, to the
any of
Six Nations
by . . . the
be made
plaint shall
. and
.
appointed.
by him
Superintendant
States, or the
the United
dent
necessary to
as shall
pursued
then be
shall
measures
prudent
such
... of
legislature
unbroken;
until
friendship
peace
our
preserve
purpose.”
for
provision
equitable
make other
shall
the United
7 Stat.
Nov.
Treaty
Canandaigua,
VII,
Art.
“textually
is not
President
to the
delegation
24 Moreover, Congress’
Carr,
S.,
369 U.
commitment,” Baker v.
constitutional
demonstrable
authority.
statutory commitment
added), but rathеr
(emphasis
pre-empt
do
Acts
the Nonintercourse
today that
held
We
property
to enforce
tribes
action
causes
common-law
23, supra, n.
Canandaigua, see
Treaty of
language
The
rights.
the Oneidas’
to find
which
basis
an insufficient
likewise
predicate
Thus, the
pre-empted.
been
has
of action
right
common-law
remedial
delegated exclusive civil
has
Congress
argument,
petitioners’
President, must fail.
authority to the
argument
basis for their
is the fact that in 1968, the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs
bring
declined to
an action
on behalf respect
the Oneidas with
to the claims asserted
in these cases. The counties cite no
analogous
cases which
provided
decisions
the basis
nonjusticiability.
Cf.
INS
Chadha, 462
(1983);
U. S. 919
United States v.
(1974);
Nixon,
We conclude, therefore, the Oneidas’ claim is not political barred question doctrine.
V Finally, question we face the whether the Appeals Court of correctly held that the federal courts could ancillary exercise jurisdiction over the counties’ cross-claim the State of New York for indemnification. The counties assert that claim arises under both state and federal law. The Court of Appeals did not decide whether it was based on state or fed- eral law. See 719F. 2d, at 542-544. It held, however, that the 1790and 1793 “placed Nonintercourse Acts New York on Congress notice that *21 had power exercised its regulate to commerce with the Indians. anything Thus, New York
25 We note that the Commissioner’s decision was based on the fact that the same claims were then pending before the Indian Claims Commission. The Oneidas have since withdrawn their claims from the Indian Claims Commission.
251 aitwith carried lands respect did thereafter immunity.” Id., amendment eleventh the State’s waiver (1974), 672 415 U. S. Jordan, (citing v. Edelman at and Health Dept. Public Missouri Employees v. (1973)). essence, the In 279, 283-284 U. S. Welfare, statute, the violating by a federal Appeals that held Court any any party by on court in federal to suit consented State nucleus same growing the out of federal, state claim, proposition This statutory violation. as the operative facts in law. no basis has a clas- raises for indemnification cross-claim counties’ The Equipment Owen ancillary jurisdiction. See example of sic (1978). The Kroger, U. S. Co. Erection & application the however, forecloses, Amendment Eleventh jurisdiction pendent ancillary and principles of of normal State Pennhurst State. pressed the are claims where (1984). As U. S. Halderman, 465 Hospital v. School nor jurisdiction “[Njeither pendent Pennhurst: held we Eleventh may override jurisdiction basis, any other ain claim each examine must court A federal Amendment. is barred claim jurisdiction over if court’s see the case indemni- The Id., Amendment.” Eleventh York question Newof aas cast here, whether claim fication for against the State claim is a law, common law or federal State’s absence monetary relief. retroactive U. S. Barnard, (citing Clark at 99 id., consent, Amendment. Eleventh (1883)), is barred the suit the State recognized, whether Appeals Court as the Thus, immunity crit- is the its constitutional to waive has consented exercised properly courts federal in whеther factor ical indemnifica- for claim counties’ jurisdiction ancillary over supra. Pennhurst, tion. counties Appeals only ground the suit consented has State believing offer violated it fact claim court land. by purchasing the Oneidas’ Act Nonintercourse *22 The counties assert that because the specifically Constitution Congress authorizes regulate “[t]o Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes,” the necessarily consented to suit in federal respect court with to enactments under this Clause. County Monroe v. (CA2 Florida, 1982) 678 F. 2d (making analogous an argument respect with Congress’ power), extradition cert. denied, 459 (1983); U. S. 1104 Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, (CA9 591 F. 2d 1979) 1278, 1285 (making argument such an respect Congress’ power copyright over patents). Thus, Congress contend, abrogate can the States’ Eleventh immunity Amendment has done so enacting the By Nonintercourse Acts. violat ing the 1793Act, the State thus waived immunity its to suit in federal respect court with to such violations. Assuming, deciding, without that this reasoning is correct, it does not address the Eleventh problem Amendment here, for the counties’ against indemnification claim the State does not arise under the 1793Act. The counties authority cite no contrary They urge view. simply that the State unjustly would be if enriched the counties pay were forced to the Oneidas indemnity without from the State, and thus that the Court should “fashion remedy” for the counties under the 1793Act. argument This is an on the merits; it is not an argument that the indemnification claim arises under Act. As we said in “[a] Pennhurst, State’s constitutional in immunity interest encompasses merely not whether it may be sued, but may where it be sued.” 465 U. S., at 99 (emphasis original). The Eleventh Amendment bar does vary with the merits pressed claims State.
We conclude, therefore, that the counties’ cross-claim for indemnity by the State question raises a of state law. We are referred to no evidence that thе State has waived its con- stitutional immunity to suit in federal question.26 court on this
26Three eases establish our approach to the test of waiver of the Elev enth Amendment. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. (1974); Employees v. Missouri Dept. Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. (1973); erred courts hold we Pennhurst, under
Thus, claim. jurisdiction ancillary over exercising *23 ¡> H-1 unique “Congress emphasize Court this of decisions The Mancari, Morton the Indians.” obligation toward curiae amicus Government, an The U. S. Appeals. Brief of Court the to urged affirm the Court brief, The Government Amicus Curiae as States for United consequences affirm- potential do, recognized, we as “Congress en- has that however, observed, was It ance. related claims extinguish title Indian legislation to acted expected it could . . and . States, eastern in other thereto Id., arise.” occasion should York in New same to do Act, Settlement Claims Indian Island Rhode 29-30. Settlement Claims seq.; Indian §1701 Maine et C.S. 25 U. litiga- agree this that seq. §1721 We et C. 25 U. S. Act, congressional necessity for abundantly clear makes tion action. dating more for back thought claims have One..would ago. long barred been have century half would than nor petitioners however, neither indicates, opinion As our other or limitations any statute applicable found have we are claims holding the Oneidas’ legal for basis relevant judgment of The satisfied. been or otherwise barred finding respect with affirmed Appeals Court and reversed law,27 common liability under over ancillary jurisdiction exercise respect to the oí these each (1964). Although Co., U. S. R. Terminal Parden statute, indicated we a federal under suit purposes for waiver involved a state context apply standards same in Pennhurst S., at 99-100. statute. relief limit should considerations equitable whether question addressed was Indians day Oneida present to the available Accordingly, petitioners. Court presented Appeals relevant may be considerations other to whether opinion no express we author its exercise Congress not should case of this disposition final to the claims. far-reaching these ity to resolve counties’ cross-claim for indemnification. The cases are remanded to the Appeals Court of proceedings further consistent with our decision.
It is so ordered. Justice Stevens concurs in the judgment with respect No. 83-1240. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring in part and dissenting part. join I opinion Court’s except for Part V. I dissent from Part V I because my adhere to view that the Eleventh Amendment “bars federal court suits only by citizens of other States,” Yeomans v. Kentucky, 423 U. S. *24 (1975) 983, 984 dissenting). J., (Brennan, Thus, would I hold that the State of New York is not entitled to invoke protections the of that Amendment in this federal-court suit by counties of New York. Employees Dept. Missouri Public Health and Welfare, of (1973) S. 279, 298 dissenting); J., (Brennan, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. (1974) 651, 687 J., dissenting). (Brennan, my In view, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 (1890), U. S. 1 erects a limited con stitutional barrier prohibiting against suits by States citizens of another State; the decision, however, “accords to non- consenting only States a nonconstitutional immunity from suit its own citizens.” Employees v. Dept. Missouri Public Health and of supra, Welfare, at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). scholarly For sup discussion porting this view, Shapiro, see Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 61, (1984); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889, (1983); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Other Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 538-540, and n. 88 Justice, whom The Chief with Stevens, Justice dissenting join, Rehnquist Justice White,
Justice 83-1065. in No. Corn- notified President would law federal that Senecas, Chief
planter, State any acquisition from lands Seneca securely protect person: or complaint cause any just . . you “If . thereof, satisfactory рroof make can purchaser] [a redress, as for you open bewill courts
the federal Indian Papers, State 4 American persons.” other all (1832).1 1, p. Affairs, Vol. comparable received Nation Oneida elders
The claim federal to maintain capacity their notice assert attempt no made They litigation.2 issue years waited in interest successors claim, Tribe conveyance to avoid suit bringing before absence consideration. a valuable made, freely with interference concealment, deception, evidence any societal claim, together assert right to the Tribe’s repose particu- statutes always underlie — interests courts, lower upon conferred “Congress when Before federal- history, general century-old nearly in their time second for but (1974); 452, 464 U. S. Thompson, jurisdiction,” question Steffel only could Indian tribe an 1875, 18 Stat. March Judiciary ofAct *25 a state-court by appealing claims land its federal raise Congress Until 25, 1 20, § Stat. 1789, ch. Judiciary Act judgment, 233, 43 1924, ch. Act of June in the citizens States Indians made purposes for “citizens” considered generally were Stat. the tribes were Nor courts. federal lower diversity jurisdiction Court. in this jurisdiction original apply to entitled “foreign states” (1831). Pet. 1 Georgia, 5 Nation Cherokee York, a New treaty with leading to negotiations During validly transfer treaty could no local Tribe agent informed federal a United presence without lands interest 37, p. 122. No. Doc. Commissioner, Record larly when title to property real is at stake—convince me that this claim is by barred the extraordinary passage of time. It worthy is emphasis that this claim arose George when Washington was the President of the United States. The Court apply refuses any to time bar to this claim, be- lieving that to do so would be inconsistent with federal Indian policy. This Court, always however, applied has equita- ble doctrine of laches when Indians or others sought, equity, to set conveyances aside made under statutory incapacity common-law convey. Although this action is brought at ejectment, law, in there are sound reasons for recognizing that it is barred principles. similar In reaching contrary conclusion, the Court relies on the legislative histories of a series of recent my enactments. view, however, the Oneida were barred from avoiding their conveyance long before 1952, Congress when enacted the first statute that the Court today. relies on Neither that any statute, nor subsequent federal legislation, revived the Oneida’s dormant claim.
I Today’s unprecedented decision is an departure from the wisdom of the common law: “The best society interests require that causes of ac-
tion should not be deferred an unreasonable time. This peculiarly remark is applicable to land titles. Nothing so much growth retards the and prosperity country of a insecurity of titles to real estate. paralysed Labor enjoyment where the of its fruits is uncertain; and liti- gation produces without limit consequences ruinous individuals.” Lewis v. Marshall, 5 Pet. 470, Of course, as the Court notes, there “is no federal statute governing limitations common-lawactions Indians property rights.” enforce Ante, at 240. However, Congress “where spoken has not but left judicial matters for determination general within the framework of legal familiar
257 392, 395 U. S. Armbrecht, 327 Holmberg v. principles,” of law adopt the state to practice has been (1946), settled the law. federal as limitations not legislatures do recognized “State has The Court in interests national periods with limitations their devise assure to courts duty federal the of the it mind, or frustrate will law importation of state the policies.” national implementation the with interfere (1977). 367 S. EEOC, 432 U. v. Ins. Co. Occidental Life apply laws state to example, has refused for Court, limita analogous statute federal more a when limitations the between appropriate balance the reflects better tions historic policies substantive federal enforcement unique interest federal repose,3 or when principles of uniformity in national interest paramount subject matter order bar time fashioning a federal require the functions.4 policies or conflict serious avoid always has however, Court principles, applying these In applies to federal principle of limitation some presumed that Co., the Ins. in Occidental Thus, action.6 Life causes rigid time no Congress intended had concluded v. McAllister (1983); cf. 151 Teamsters, U. S. 462 v. 3 DelCostello (1958). Co., S. 357 U. Petroleum Magnolia (1946) (“We have 392, 395 Armbrecht, U. S. Holmberg v. country, throughout courts as national sitting courts, duty of federal right created equitable an enforcing principles own apply Congress”). traditionally applied has admiralty, the Court arising in cases In S.S. v. Waterman g., Gutierrez e. See, of laches. doctrine equitable our arising under disputes (1963). territorial 206, 215 Corp., U. S. which acquiescence doctrine applied we jurisdiction original a considerable accepted boundary line validity of a legal confirms States, two boundary between actual parties by all of time length v. origin. legal California its irregularities any notwithstanding Kentucky, S. (1980); Ohio 125, 130-132 Nevada, S.U. time,” under doctrine, “lapse of grant (1973). the lost Under secure or failure neglect “may circumstances, cure limited carefully United States. title,” even muniments proper 256, 270 Fullard-Leo, U. S. *27 limit for EEOC enforcement actions, but the Court also recognized that federal courts adequate have power to bar an action if the defendant was “signifiсantly handicapped in making his defense because of an inordinate delay.” EEOC Id., at 373.
Before 1966 there
no
was
federal statute of limitations
arguably
even
could
supplanted
a state limitation.
longest
Even the
possibly applicable state statute of limita-
tions
surely
would
have barred this cause of action—which
arose in
many years before 1966.6
“[a]
1795—
Moreover,
state statute cannot be considered ‘inconsistent’with federal
merely
law
because the statute
plaintiff
causes the
to lose
litigation.”
Wegmann,
Robertson v.
436 U.
S.
(1978). Nor
rejection
is the
generally
of a
applicable state
inappropriate
law
merely because
party
one
is an Indian tribe
subject
and the
matter of
litigation
involves
prop-
tribal
erty. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,
For conveyed under recovery gain estate of the real seeking to his begin ward until to run did disabilities *28 such to be faithful Thus, unique overcome.8 had been disabilities application state of a principles, the these common-law to claims Indian ancient of in the context of limitations statute development of of the require consideration flexible would govern capacity affairs. its own to particular tribe’s their of judiciary or intervention authority without real —made disability legal persons under are considered Indians legal protectors. Op. 2 Spring, Treaty .”) (citation omitted); Georgia the& . . have a Indians (1828) law (Although under Atty. 133 Gen. capacity lands, limited “[a] of their for the sale to capacity contract limited capacity limited have Infants anomaly in the law. is no to contract Yet it was . . . are void. limit, their contracts ; beyond this . . . contract was not competency independence or that, imagined because their never within contracts limited, therefore their universal, but absolute from those differently to be construed competency their were sphere Court); thé ante, (opinion 14 241, n. at see also persons”); of other (1886); Nation Chеrokee S. Kagama, U. Pet., Georgia, Kent, *292; 2 Com J. Blackstone, Commentaries 2 W. See *291— (8th Thompson, Real 1854); 5 G. ed. Law 248-249 on American mentaries (1962); §2947 Property Thompson, Real (1979); §2556 6 G. Property (1902) (“Conceding, but Stockton, 183 U. S. Schrimpscher v. cf. tribal relations maintain their long as Indians deciding, so without within claims to assert or failure chargeable with laches they are immunity when they would lose this statutes, . . . by prescribed the time accepting by allotments were dissolved their tribe their relations severalty”). in lands
Moreover, the developed common law prescription doc- trines conveyance power terminated the vendor’s to avoid a void ejectment. in an in action These doctrines could deny the ward, claiming or those him, under a cause of action ejectment even running before the applicable statute Although limitations. these doctrines were often based on implied theories of ratification, were most often enforced indicating circumstances prejudicial undue or delay.9 9In Schofield, Brazee v. (1888), U. S. 495 rejected ejectment claim in person of a seeking to a conveyance avoid by made minor during infancy: his “For years eleven after [the minor] age became of he made objection no the proceedings, byor any act indicated his intention to disaffirm the sale ; . . . [only deed gave then] he grantors of the [plaintiffs] a deed of his interest the . . . claim. In the meantime, the property greatly had increased in value the improvements put upon it purchaser'. . . . Under these circumstances,. . . long acquiescence of minor, after he became of age, in the proceedings had for the sale of his property, was equivalent to express an them, affirmance even were they affected with irregularities such as, upon prompt his application after becoming age, would justified the court in setting them aside.” Id.,- at 504-505. See Irvine, also Irvine v. (1870); Wall. 617 Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Pet. 58 generally Jones, L. Real Property §§24-26 (1896); Kent, 1 J. *29 Commentaries on (8th American Law 252-255 ed. 1854); 1 Powell, R. Real Property 125, ¶ p. 483 (1984); 6 G. Thompson, Real Property §2946, pp. 30-31; §2951, pp. 63-64 (1962); cf. 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 965
Similar doctrines have been applied in the Indian area. For example, in United States v. Santa Fe Co., R. 314 U. S. (1941), Pacific the Court held that the acceptance by the Walapais Indians of reservation lands “must regarded in law as the equivalent of a any release of rights tribal which may have had in lands outside the reservation. They were in substance acquiescing in penetration the of white settlers on condition that permanent provision was made for them too. In view of this historical setting, it cannot fairly now be implied that rights tribal of Walapais the in lands outside the preserved. reservation were . . . Hence, acquiescence in that arrangement must be deemed have been a relinquishment of tribal rights in lands the outside reservation and notoriously claimed others.” Id., at 358. See also Mitchel States, v. United (1835) Pet. its with laches,10 equitable of doctrine the
I believe
delay,
re-
best
inexcusable
legitimate
and
reliance
focus
governed this
have
principles that would
limitation
the
flects
requiring historian’s
law—without
at common
claim
ancient
that would
limitation doctrines
inquiry
archaic
into the
preceding two
any specific
in the
time
governed
the claims
equita-
application of a traditional
the
course,
Of
centuries.
to their
was considered
(“Indian
occupation
or
possession
reference
in their
as much
hunting-grounds were
their
life;
habits and modes of
rights to its
whites; and their
of the
fields
as the cleared
possession
actual
were
purposes
their own
way, and for
own
in their
enjoyment
exclusive
govern-
them,
the
cession to
made a
they abandoned
until
respected,
much
right
case
either
sale to individuals.
ment,
an authorized
or
Chicago,
City
.”)
added);
Williams
(emphasis
.
extinct.
became
of
held
ever
Nation]
(1917) (“If
any
[the Pottawatomie
in
view
434, 437
U. S.
historically that
we know
question,
here in
property
possession
tribe]
century [the
than a half
for more
ago and that
long
was abandoned
of Lake
shores
waters
either
occupy
pretended
even
has not
added).
R.
Illinois”)
Cf. H.
(emphasis
confines
Michigan within
(The
most of
(1915)
sold
Sess.,
Oneida
3d
Cong.,
63d
Doc. No.
severalty; “as a
remaining lands
State,
divided
to the
their lands
State”).
more in
no
known
are
Indians
tribe these
question
general
counties raised
certiorari, the
for
petition
In their
asking the
litigation
to this
apply
should
time bar
of what
it
because
is barred
claim
case, respondent’s
any
“Whether, in
decide
Cert, of
for
conveyance.” Pet.
years after
brought until
was not
apply to
claim
might
laches
possibility that
2. The
Counties, Question
fully
was
question
laches
question.
within
fairly included
witnesses
the six
testimony
of four
trial court —the
in the
litigated
was
trial
liability phase
in the
behalf
on the Oneida’s
appearing
Doe.
Record
laches.
defense
avoid
obvious
solely to
presented
delay-based
rejection
Appeals’
The Court
37, pp. 196-276.
No.
the Circuit
law of
(CA2
1983),
remain
will
525, 538
F. 2d
defenses, 719
to the numerous
apply
doubt
Court,
will no
by this
is reversed
until it
for
in Brief
courts,
cited
see cases
lower
pending
claims
Discussion
n. 8.
83-1240,
p.
in No.
Counties
Respondent
briefs, Reply
appears
or laches
limitations
equitable
applicability
19-20;
for United
Brief
83-1065, pp.
in No.
Counties
Petitioner
Brief for
as Amici
al.
et
City of
Escondido
33-40; Brief
Curiae
as Amicus
*30
Arg. 61-65.
Tr. of Oral
argument.
at oral
21-29, and occurred
Curiae
ble defense in an action at
something
law is
novelty.
of a
But this
development
novel
litigation
involving Indian
claims arose in
special
order to benefit a
litigants,
class of
it remains
equitable
true that an
defense to the instant claim
is less
straightforward
harsh than a
application of the lim-
itations rule dictated
practice.
our usual
equal
At least
to the maxim
equity
follows the law is the truth that
property
common-law
principles
real
tempered
were often
by equitable considerations—as the
limiting
rules
a ward’s
power to avoid
conveyance
an unlawful
demonstrate.11
As the
recognizes,
the instant action arises under
the federal common
any
law,
congressional
not under
enact-
ment, and in this context the Court would not
frustrating
risk
Legislature12
will of
applying this familiar doctrine
equity.
merger
equity
of law and
in one federal
court13is, of
primarily procedural.
course,
Considering the
hybrid nature of these claims and
evolving
character of
the common law,
I
however,
application
believe that the
laches as a
principle
limitation
governing ancient Indian
promote
claims will
uniformity of result in law
equity,
and at
proper
maintain the
measure
flexibility
protect
legitimate interests of the tribes, while at the same time
honoring the historic wisdom in
repose.
the value of
11 fact,
the idea that the
protect
State should
persons suffering from
disabilities who had no other
protector
lawful
probably arose at equity
where the Chancery Courts exercised the prerogatives of
King
parens patriae, 3 J. Story, Equity Jurisprudence
(14th
§ 1748
ed. 1918),
and applied theories of
fraud,
constructive
2 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurispru
(1886).
§
dence 943
12In deference to the doctrine of
separation
powers,
the Court
has been circumspect
in adopting principles
equity
in the context of
enforcing federal statutеs.
See generally Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U. S.
(1982);
Hill,
TVA (1978);
S. 153
Hecht Co. Bowles,
263 HH application of the illustrate Court of this Three decisions seeking con- aside set actions of laches doctrine the v. Ewert In law. federal of veyances in violation made (1922), that “the stated Court the Bluejacket, S.U. applica- properly have .. . cannot of laches equitable doctrine rights of the to bar vitality and give void deed to a tion to statutory Id., subject restrictions.” in lands wards Indian however, case, Ewert the of examination close A at 138. but laches, of applied the doctrine Court that the indicates the circumstances defendant rejected the relief for the case. convey- agent, obtained a federal Ewert, In violation an Indian heirs of the from lands ance of allotted engaging in officers prohibition statutory of a brought action, an the heirs In Indians. with trade conveyance. Court The seeking aside equity, to set disproving burden had the heirs Appeals held that brought outside they their action had laches because that concluded limitations, applicable state statute plaintiffs “The adult burden. this they satisfied had though conveyance land, make even free to were had been relations [since] tribal their Indians, were diligence chargeable the same [they] were severed, legal reme- pursuing discovering people in white [Schrimpscher (1892)]; 145U. S. [Felix Patrick, v. dies. (1902)].” Ewert, Bluejacket v. U. S. Stockton, 183 1920). (CA8 F. plaintiffs’ was action that held appeal, this Court On “[Ewert] noting laches, doctrine the legal not barred S., at land.” to the title holds still [un- “an doctrine principally relied on Court wrong- right upon no confers lawful] void and . . is act. (1912)(empha- 85, 94 Waskey Hammer, 223 U. S. doer.” that the found added). Ewert, facts On the sis plaintiffs’ disproving burden of easily laches was met, but might the Court well have reached a different conclusion in if conveyance Ewert had not been so recent, if defendant had not been as blameworthy, or if the character property changed had dramatically in the interim. My interpretation of Ewert is illustrated this Court’s prior decision in Felix v. Patrick, 145 S.U. applied case, the Court the doctrine of laches to bar an *32 by action the heirs of an Indian to establish a constructive trust over lands conveyed that had by been her violation of a statutory federal restriction. The action to set aside the unlawful brought transfer years was after the transaction, and in intervening the “[t]hat time, which was wild land years thirty ago is by now intersected streets, subdivided into blocks and largely lots, occupied by persons who bought upon strength the of Patrick’s title, and have buildings permanent erected of a upon pur-' character Id., chases.” at 334. recognized
The Court long that the passage of time, the change in the property, character of the the transfer of some property the parties, to third any the absence of obvious inadequacy in the consideration original received in the transaction, and Patrick’s lack of participation direct original supported transfer all charge a of laches the plaintiffs. In addition, the Court “[t]he noted that decree prayed for in this granted, if case, would offer a distinct encouragement purchase to the of similar claims, which doubtless exist in through abundance the Western Territo- ries, . . . and would result in the large unsettlement upon numbers of titles which the owners have rested in security assured nearly for generation.” a Id., at 335. Nor is only Felix application the principles these in a similar context. In Wetzel Railway Minnesota Transfer Co., 169 (1898), U. S. 237 the children of a deceased Mexican War veteran received a warrant for 160acres of land under a prohibited statute any alienation property of the approval without the proper of the probate'court. state The without in the warrant guardian share sold their children’s years Forty-four proper approval seeking court. of the brought action, conveyance, an children after trust over seeking equity, establish constructive well-developed Paul, of St. area in a located 160 acres—now barred action was held that The Court Minnesota. prop- noting that the relying Patrick, and Felix v. laches greatly developed completely increased had erty been had passed to title had observed also The value. Court ignorant in title. the defect persons no doubt who were length the relevance noted The also delay: ignorant complainants were fact that the
“While prose- means without title and were defect in may properly be investigation the facts into an cute mitigate the hard- not does court, it considered ship unsettling titles. these the defendants If delay may put these excuses complainant forward may why years, thirty no reason there after allege sixty. lapse excuse as an the same after *33 unthin which time limit must some is, be truth there might be available, titles be shall excuses these forever tranquillity public order and interests insecure. their acquaint parties themselves shall that demand although time rights time, a reasonable within ignorance, by or want may their actual extended S.,U. by illimitable.” no means it is means, added). (emphasis beyond it is doubt establish Felix, Wetzel
Ewert, apply policy the doctrine to quite with federal consistent conveyance power a to avoid a vendor’s to limit laches alienation. violating restriction a federal h—1 J—Í by conveyed the Oneida land Wetzel, the Felix and As in towns, cities, to wilderness from converted in has been villages, and farms. The 872 acres of land involved in the instant principal action transportation include the arteries region, in the public and other vital by facilities owned Counties of Oneida and Madison.14 The counties private property owners litigation, affected without proven notice of the defect in title caused the State of comply New York’s failure to with the federal statute, have costly improvements erected property on the in reliance on validity of their title. Even if the counties are con purposes sidered for some ego to be the alter of the State, it surely argue they fiction a any way are responsi in predicament,15 ble taxpayers, or that their who will ultimately bear judgment the burden of the in this case, are any way culpable for New York’s violation of federal law
As the Court holds, ante, at
legal
233-236, there was no
impediment to the maintenance of this cause of action at
any time
Although
after 1795.
passage
the mere
of time,
inequity
without
prosecution
other
in the
of the claim, does
support
finding
of laches in
ordinary
g.,
case, e.
Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
267 upon by sub- the law presumptions raised are “[G]eneral instrument, written or no record jects there is of which disbelief, but or of the means belief there are not because antiquity from judging of of matters mankind, because must, for necessity situation infirmity of their and rights, property have and preservation their of place principle, take the general to some recourse only hold specific can belief, which and individual of upon a conclu- which time, our within own to matters particular knowl- individual from formed can be sion edge.” Id., at 504-505. nearly of explaining centuries two of their burden
Given
considering the
claim, and
prosecution
delay
in the
(1843)
delay);
(38-year
Wathen, 1 How.
189,195
v.
Bowman
delay);
(46-year
3
(1835)
delay);
also
see
(30-year
Vattier,
405,
Pet.
416-417
Piatt v.
9
(“Courts
(1918)
Jurisprudence
Equity
Story, Commentaries
J.
upon
act
law,
sometimes
analogy to the
Equity act sometimes
antiquated
society
peace
discouraging
doctrine
own inherent
laches
gross
has been
there
where
refusing
to interfere
demands
assertion
acquiescence
long and unreasonable
rights, or
prosecuting
Lehman,
F. 2d
v.
Vichy Spring Co.
Saratoga
cf.
rights”);
of adverse
Anheuser-Busch,
Bois
v. Du
Inc.
1980)
(CA2
delay);
(69-year
1037, 1041
1949) (in
(CA3
lapse of
hypothetical
Co.,
Brewing
F. 2d
denied, 339
cert.
plaintiff
prevail),
could
whether
“highly
years
dubious”
(1950).
U. S.
original
this Court’s
arising under
disputes
deciding
territorial
applied:
frequently
been
principles
jurisdiction, similar
seen on
is
Its influence
by time.
are unaffected
transactions
“No human
regard
the case
peculiarly
is
And this
change.
subject to
things
all
lapse
fade
consequently
memory, аnd which
which rest
matters
security
rights,
For
individuals.
time,
with the lives
and fall
a claim of title
under
individuals,
possession
long
of states
whether
(1846).
Massachusetts,
4 How.
Island
v.
Rhode
protected.”
(“If
felt that those
Nevada,
S.,
Nevada
at 132
447 U.
v.
also
California
lawfully
territory
within
it
deprive
operated inaccurate
lines were
conducted,
surveys
were
when
object was
time to
jurisdiction
its
Indiana
648-651;
Kentucky, S., at
Ohio
later”);
century
anot
Kentucky,
S.U.
*35
legitimate reliance interests of the counties and the other
property owners whose title is derived from the 1795 convey-
ance,
Oneida have not adequately justified their delay.
Of course,
the traditional
rule was “that ‘the conduct of
Indians is not to be measured
same standard which
’
we
apply
the conduct of other people. But their very anal-
ogy to persons under guardianship suggests a limitation to
their pupilage, since the utmost term of
disability
an infant
that,
is but 21 years, and it is very rare
the relations of guard-
ian and ward under any circumstances, even those of lunacy,
are maintained for a longer period than this.” Felix Patrick,
19 Id., at 264. In 1948, the Secretary of the Wisconsin Oneida testi fied before a Senate Subcommittee that nearly all of the mеmbers of the Tribe could speak English fluently, although a few of the older members of the Tribe could not read and write. Hearings on S. 1683 before a Sub committee of the Senate Committee on Interior and Affairs, Insular 80th Cong., Sess., 2d At least into the 1950’s, however, translators were required at general meetings to explain complicated actions of the Federal Government. Record Doc. 37, p. No. 20 The Wisconsin Oneida, for example, have incorporated been since 1937, id., at 211-212, with a Constitution, bylaws, and a governing “Business Committee” which is elected the tribal Id., members. id., 211-212. See also at 37-41. 21 1874, for example, party of Wisconsin Oneida traveled to Albany, York, New private confer with a law firm and members of the New York years conveyance years after
In all —until litigation few efforts made leading up Oneida to this —the York of New grievance specific State raise Claims holding title.22 the State’s under the landowners only in con- made most often were York in New to lands concerning grievances Tribe’s *36 generalized nection with States Government.23 the United hands of at the treatment known that plainly have or should Although knew the Oneida in York New conveyed the of they lands to State their had might they some cause have and that law, violation filing delayed their inexplicably they a lawsuit redress, for conveyance made. years was after the claim until any plaintiffs or of the Finally, “[t]here evidence is no any pay- returned or predecessors ever refused their pursuant to the purported of land sale for the received ments Treaty of 1795.”24 Federal Government. against the protest alternatives viable about
Tribe from and letters petitions numerous Id., contains The record at 237-238. century seeking the Government’s in members this and tribal the Tribe treaty rights, concerning problems resolving miscellaneous in assistance programs. See entitlement ownership, and Government property real 54, 55. Ex. Nos. Record (1909 correspondence). No. 54 g., e. 22 See, Record Ex. among resentment, and bitterness anger, was much 23 Althoughthere by the United concerning their century treatment in the 19th the Oneida specification no there was protested, but being States, were “conditions No p. 248. No. Record Doc. treaty protest.” in the particular this until in court of law this claim a to enforce was taken action specific the before petition United filed a when Oneida States, against the United judgment seeking Commission Indian Claims lands sold to State Oneida value trustee, the fair market for App. century. 43a. the 18th since of New York ques is also serious Law, App. 152a. There Partial Conclusions aboriginal lands claim to did not abandon the Oneida tion whether Treaty Buffalo Creek accepted when in New York in to the United States in Wisconsin the Tribe’s lands most of which ceded Treaty pro Territory. The a new reservation exchange for home permanent provide “a were to lands new reservation vided York, or in of New Indians, residing in the now State York all the for New permanent no States, who Wisconsin, elsewhere or The Oneida have not met their formidable burden of dis- proving unjustifiable delay to the prejudice of others. my opinion their cause of action is barred by doctrine of laches. The remedy for the ancient wrong established at trial should be provided by Congress, not by judges seeking to rewrite history late date.
1—I > The Oneida argue that the legislative histories of a series of congressional enactments, beginning 1952, persuasively establish that their claims have never been barred. This argument has serious flaws, not the least being what- ever Congress said in 1952 or 1966 is extremely weak author- ity status the common law 1795, or for a consider- able period thereafter. Ias Believing, do, that the Oneida’s claim was barred the doctrine of laches by a related common-law doctrine25 long before it is quite clear that the statutes discussed Court did not revive it.
First, and most obviously, principal statute relied on by the Court, by its very terms, only by applies to claims brought the United States on behalf of Indians or Indian tribes.26 This homes.” 551, 7 Stat. Art. 2. “These proceedings, by which these tribes divested of their themselves title to lands in York, New an indicate inten- tion on part, of the both Government Indians, and the should take possession immediate of the apart tracts set for them in Kansas.” New York Indians States, v. United (1898). 170 1, U. S. 21 Cf. States Co., Santa Fe R. 314 S.,U. 358; 9, supra. n. 25 supra. 9, n. 26For example, portion the relevant 2415(b) of 28 U. § S. provides: C. “That an action to recover damages resulting from trespass on lands of States;. the United may . . brought years within six after right of accrues, action except that such actions or on a recognized behalf of tribe, band, or group American Indians,. . . [prior which accrued of to the date of enactment of this Act but under (g) subsection are deemed to have accrued on date of enactment of this may Act] be brought on or before sixty days after the publication date of the required by list . . . the Indian Claims Act Provided, of 1982: That, for those claims that are on either of the two published pursuant lists to the Indian Claims 1982, Act of
271 brought by on its own is an Indian Tribe course, of action, behalf. legis- Secondly, themselves,27 neither the statutes nor provide preceded enactment,28 their lative discussions (1) complaint within unless the is filed any right of action shall be barred Federal year Secretary published the Interior has one after the of added). (emphasis rejecting claim ...” Register a notice such “any" word in the final clause of the statute The Court rеlies on the limitations for implicitly providing a federal statute of construes this as behalf, on their own notwith- brought causes of action Indian tribes legis- throughout references the statute and its standing the unmistakable Indians. history brought the United lative to claims behalf of 92-1267, 96-807, p. (1980); Rep. No. See, g., Rep. R. No. H. R. e. H. Sess., (1966); (1972); Cong., pp. Rep. No. 89th 2d 8-9 S. (remarks (1980) (remarks Melcher); id., at 3290 of Cong. Rec. 3289 of Sen. (remarks id., Clausen); Cong. Cohen); Rep. of Rec. at 5745 Sen. (remarks (remarks id., (1977) id., Dicks); Cohen); Rep. Rep. at 22507 (remarks (remarks id., Udall); Studds); Rep. Rep. at 22510 at 22509 ibid, Yates). (remarks Rep. if the construction were Even Court’s Congress previously to revive correct, it intended does establish causes of action. barred pre indicating an intention to phrased a form Each of the statutes See, passage. g., e. 25 U. S. C. law as it existed on the date of serve the conferring juris shall be construed as {“[NJothing § herein contained making applicable York or the courts of the State New diction on or involving Indian lands of New York civil actions laws of the State transpir to transactions or events respect thereto which relate claims with 2415(c) 1952”) added); § (emphasis C. ing prior September S. bringing an action {“[NJothing shall be deemed to limit the time for herein of, personal prop to, right possession real or the title establish added). erty”) (emphasis meaning of Representative concerning the Morris The comments “preserve § reflect an intent to proviso contained in 25 U. S. C. designed proviso was rights,” Cong. Rec. 12460 *38 resolving pre-existing Indian “impartial” federal forum for preserve an deciding applied in that federal law would be claims and to ensure land Oneida, 661, County Nation U. S. them. See Oneida (1974). of limitation application of laches as a federal doctrine entirely with this view. in forum is consistent a federal 1966, since the record bar- § 2415 and its various amendments As for most, that Congress was of the view any revival. At ren of reference to any already indication of an intent to revive barred claims.29 they contrary, merely Quite the congressional indicate a in- preserve quo tent respect the status to ancient claims might already procedure be barred, and to establish a making for sure eternally. that the claims would not survive Congress, part, quite for the most has been clear when it decides might to revive causes of action that be barred or to deny any private time limitation for a cause of action.30 Congress lacking When the clarity will of is as it is in as wary attributing case, we be should to it the intention reviving upset long-settled ancient claims that will ex- pectations. divining In Congress concerning intent of applicable limitation on a cause of action, Chief Justice Marshall once noted “it deserves some consideration,” applicable that in the absence of an limitation, “those actions might, many brought any cases, be at distance of time. utterly.repugnant This genius would to the of our laws.” (1805). Adams v. Woods, Cranch 336, 341 The Court nothing §in “preclude” would actions See, tribes themselves. g., (1977) (remarks e. Cong. Cohen). Rec. 22499 of Rep. may very It well be that in hospitable view the treatment that these ancient claims courts, received the lower federal some Congress Members of may have assumed there nowas time bar to such In actions. the absence of legislation, however, assumptions Congressmen individual about the status common law are not positive enacted into law. enacting the Indian Claims Limitation Act 97-394, Pub. L. 96 Stat. note following § U. Congress C. simply provided S. a 'procedure for exhausting the Federal Government’s responsibility, trustee, for prosecuting meritorious leaving this ultimately to decide claims— brought by whether claims the tribes themselves were still alive. 29Indeed, if effect, the statutes had that the Court would have to resolve question of their constitutionality. Cf. Keyes, Stewart 295 U. S. 403, 417 30 g., 640d-17(b) (“Neither E. § 25 U. S. C. laches nor the of limi statute tations shall any constitute a defense action authorized this sub- chapter existing if years claims commenced within December, two from (“If 22, 1974”); § any claim or claims be courts, submitted to said equitable shall rights therein, settle notwithstanding lapse time limitation”); statutes of see also York New States, Indians v. United S.,U. *39 rewarding Congress impute the intent of today prefers [as scorn described with once Lincoln “Abraham those whom combing property sitting] courthouses the basements in California, Arizona v. upset established titles.” records to presump- appropriate more The 460 U. S. legitimate Congress to honor intended in this case is tion property ownership not to of real expectations in the them. disturb
V ought recognized be condemned no one Framers The is a most the crime when misdeeds—even for his forefathers’ today ig- Republic.31 The Court against the grave offense remedy for fashioning principle a common-law nores that its 1795 Tribe to avoid that allows Nation the Oneida decision years This it was made. conveyance after ownership of real expectations in long-settled upsets York, Madison, New of Oneida property in the Counties confirm disruption will to cause it is sure and the left best are ancient claims wisdom common-law undoing a that it is believes doubt, repose. Court, no doing it has caused so injustice, but grave historical rectify. may Congress only now which another, respectfully dissent. I shall work (“no of Treason Attainder Ill, § cl. Art. 31 U.S. Const. person Life of the except during the Blood, Forfeiture Corruption (“In Woods, 2 Cranch (1805) country Cf. Adams attainted”). years, it lapse of after a three prosecuted can be treason even
where ever liable remain for would that an individual supposed scarcely be could forfeiture”). pecuniary ato