974 F. Supp. 2d 240
S.D.N.Y.2013Background
- Plaintiff J. Claudel Cayemittes, a long‑time HPD employee, was reassigned in late 2007 from Director of Third‑Party Transfer/Tax Lien Sale (TPT/TLS) to Director of Special Projects as part of a broader DNP reorganization; he kept the same supervisor and pay.
- From late 2007 through September 2008 HPD managers searched for other placements for Plaintiff; multiple positions were offered/discussed (Queens office, Preservation Finance, Development, DAMP), some declined by Plaintiff.
- Plaintiff lodged internal complaints and emails alleging race/national origin discrimination and retaliation (Donovan email Dec. 3, 2007; Lieber email Mar. 10, 2008) and filed an internal EEO complaint on April 10, 2008; EEOC charge filed Nov. 24, 2008.
- In September 2008 Plaintiff was transferred to the Division of Alternative Management Program (DAMP), where he alleges he had little or no substantive work and reported to lower‑level managers; he contends this was a demotion and retaliatory for his protected complaints.
- HPD investigated Plaintiff’s internal EEO complaint and found the allegations unsupported; HPD moved for summary judgment on the sole remaining retaliation claim (transfer to DAMP in Sept. 2008).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Plaintiff suffered a materially adverse employment action | Transfer to DAMP (loss of prestige, lack of work) was a demotion that would deter a reasonable employee from complaining | Transfer was part of an agency effort to find appropriate placement; some diminution but not materially adverse or merely part of reorganization | Transfer to DAMP could be objectively adverse (court finds this prong satisfied) |
| Causation between protected activity and transfer | The timing and context of Plaintiff’s complaints (Dec 2007–Apr 2008) show retaliation leading to Sept 2008 transfer | The placement process began before Plaintiff’s protected acts and the five‑month gap precludes an inference of causation | No causal connection: process predated complaints and temporal gap (over five months) defeats inference |
| Prima facie retaliation claim overall | Protected activity, employer knowledge, adverse action, and causation established | Lack of causation; adverse action predated or was part of legitimate process | Plaintiff fails to meet prima facie case due to lack of causation; summary judgment for HPD granted |
| Consideration of pro se procedural irregularities | Plaintiff’s unsworn 56.1 submissions should be liberally construed and considered where admissible | Local rules require sworn affidavits and proper citations; many pro se statements are conclusory/speculative and disregarded | Court considered pro se submissions to the extent admissible but disregarded unsupported assertions; liberal construction did not save the claim |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (sets forth burden‑shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation cases)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (defines materially adverse action in retaliation context)
- Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2011) (petty slights/ minor annoyances are not materially adverse)
- Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2013) (articulates McDonnell Douglas four‑part prima facie test for retaliation)
- Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2001) (employer conduct set in motion before protected activity negates causation)