Catherine Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015

Evon incurred a debt assigned to Mickell for collection; Mickell sent a debt-collection letter to Evon at her employer address marked Personal and Confidential; the letter was opened by others at Evon’s workplace; Evon sued alleging FDCPA §1692c(b) and false/misleading content under §1692e; district court granted Mickell summary judgment on some issues but denied on the care-of issue; Evon accepted a Rule 68 offer of judgment, then appealed; the district court’s class certification and fee orders are on appeal, and sanctions against Mickell’s attorney were imposed for confidentiality-order violations; the panel reverses some rulings and remands for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether sending a debt-collection letter addressed to the debtor care-of the employer violates FDCPA §1692c(b).	Evon argues care-of letters are prohibited as third-party communications.	Mickell argues the letter is not a third-party communication and may be permissible.	Yes; per se violation; care-of letters violate §1692c(b).
Whether the letter contents violate FDCPA §1692e by false, deceptive, or misleading statements.	Evon contends the letter misstates outcomes (unavoidable judgments, wage garnishment).	Mickell contends the language is not false or misleading.	No; contents not materially false/deceptive under §1692e.
Whether class certification was proper for the FDCPA claim.	Evon asserts common questions predominate and the class is numerous.	Mickell argues individualized issues defeat commonality and typicality.	District court abused discretion; remand for Rule 23(b) analysis.
Whether attorney’s fees and costs (Rule 68 offer) were properly awarded; lodestar calculation remand.	Evon seeks substantial fees given successful enforcement; fee should reflect lodestar.	Defendant challenges hours and value of recovery.	Remand for proper lodestar calculation; fee award to be reconsidered.
Whether sanctions against Mickell’s attorney were proper.	sanctions needed for violation of protective order.	sanctions were unwarranted or excessive.	Sanctions affirmed; proper under inherent authority for willful/defiant conduct.

Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2010) (FDCPA interpretation; least sophisticated debtor standard)
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011) (commonality and class-wide impact requirement)
City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (U.S. 1986) (fee-shifting principles; proportionality not required in fee awards)
Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (inherent authority to sanction for willful violation of court orders or bad faith)
Narouz v. Charter Communications, 591 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 2010) (jurisdiction after settlement depends on personal stake in class litigation)
Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979) (reassignment factors for appearance of justice)