Catherine Cright v. Tijuan Overly, M.D.
E2015-01215-COA-R3-CV
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Oct 17, 2016Background
- Decedent underwent stent placement on July 28, 2008; post‑procedure complications (retroperitoneal hemorrhage, femoral artery puncture) led to death on August 4, 2008.
- Plaintiff Catherine Cright filed a medical malpractice suit in 2009; the parties entered an agreed RAS records order and records were exchanged and used in discovery and the 2013 trial.
- Cright voluntarily nonsuited the 2013 case three days into trial and refiled a new complaint on January 3, 2014, after serving pre‑suit notice on May 30, 2013 that did not include a HIPAA‑compliant medical authorization.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29‑26‑121(a) for failure to include a HIPAA authorization and required certificate of mailing; trial court dismissed the malpractice claims but initially preserved, then dismissed, a negligence claim against UHS.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal: it found the agreed RAS order expired when the original suit was nonsuited, Cright failed to substantially comply with the statute by not providing a HIPAA authorization, and she did not show "extraordinary cause" to excuse noncompliance; all asserted claims sounded in medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether pre‑suit notice satisfied Tenn. Code Ann. § 29‑26‑121(a)(2)(E) (HIPAA authorization requirement) | Cright argued referencing the prior agreed RAS order and prior record production rendered a new HIPAA authorization unnecessary and defendants suffered no prejudice | Defendants argued no HIPAA‑compliant authorization was provided with the refiled notice and records from the prior case could not be used in the new case without proper authorization | Held: Cright failed to substantially comply; prior RAS order expired at nonsuit and absent a valid HIPAA authorization defendants were prejudiced; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether extraordinary cause warranted waiver of the HIPAA authorization requirement | Cright urged various grounds (prior record exchange, state of the law, reliance on RAS order, defendants' failure to plead the defense) | Defendants contended no extraordinary circumstances existed to excuse statutory noncompliance | Held: No extraordinary cause shown under Myers; waiver denied |
| Whether claims could proceed as ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice | Cright argued some allegations implicated system failures and ordinary negligence against UHS | Defendants argued claims arise from medical diagnosis/treatment and require expert proof under malpractice framework | Held: All asserted claims involve medical science/medical treatment and sound in medical malpractice; ordinary negligence theory rejected |
| Whether motions in limine were ripe for review | Cright sought pretrial rulings on comparative fault and certain procedure testimony | Defendants noted procedural posture; court noted mootness | Held: Moot due to dismissal; Court declined to reach these motions |
Key Cases Cited
- Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 547 (Tenn. 2013) (pre‑suit HIPAA authorization requirement and substantial‑compliance standard)
- Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300 (Tenn. 2012) (definition and examples of "extraordinary cause" for excuse/waiver)
- Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546 (Tenn. 2011) (distinguishing ordinary negligence from medical malpractice)
- Draper v. Westerfield, 181 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2005) (medical malpractice vs ordinary negligence framework)
- Foster v. Chiles, 467 S.W.3d 911 (Tenn. 2015) (context on pre‑suit procedures and related jurisprudence)