Castillo-Velasquez v. State
305 Ga. 644
Ga.2019Background
- On June 16, 2013, at a public soccer-game championship, Saul Castillo-Velasquez shot and killed Silverio Acosta; multiple eyewitnesses placed Castillo-Velasquez at the scene and reported he said "I shot him, he killed my father."
- Castillo-Velasquez claimed he acted under delusional compulsion and in self-defense, testifying to childhood trauma, schizophrenia, hallucinations, and cessation of medication months before the shooting.
- The State introduced prior-other-act evidence: a 2004 New York incident where Castillo-Velasquez fired at three men; the State admitted this under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) to prove intent.
- Castillo-Velasquez was convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime; he appealed challenging (1) admission of the New York act, (2) admission of the victim’s bloody clothes, and (3) trial counsel’s failure to introduce portions of his New York medical records.
- The trial court had instructed the jury on self-defense and delusional compulsion; the jury rejected the insanity/delusion defense and found intent.
Issues
| Issue | Castillo-Velasquez's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of New York other-act under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) | Evidence was more prejudicial than probative and too remote | Other-act was admissible to rebut delusional-compulsion defense because intent was at issue; prosecutorial need and similarities supported admission | Admission was not an abuse of discretion; probative value outweighed prejudice |
| Rule 403 exclusion of victim’s bloody clothes | Bloody clothes were unduly prejudicial and should have been excluded | Clothes were relevant and probative; any prejudice was harmless given other graphic evidence | No plain error shown; even if error, not harmful given strength of evidence |
| Ineffective assistance for not introducing favorable medical-record excerpts | Counsel performed deficiently by not admitting New York medical-record portions documenting hallucinations/paranoia | Counsel made a reasonable strategic choice to avoid opening adverse portions and risk State rebuttal under rule of completeness | Performance was not objectively unreasonable; claim fails under Strickland |
| Sufficiency of evidence (implicit) | (not contested) | State relied on eyewitnesses, statements, and conduct after shooting | Evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions |
Key Cases Cited
- Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 819 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. 2018) (sets three-part test for admission of other-act evidence and Rule 403 balancing factors)
- Brown v. State, 303 Ga. 158, 810 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. 2018) (other-act evidence improper where defendant asserted self-defense and State’s need was minimal)
- Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 786 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. 2016) (intent is placed at issue when defendant pleads not guilty and asserts mental-state defenses)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
