Casper, D. v. Halstead, S.
Casper, D. v. Halstead, S. No. 3714 EDA 2015
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Mar 3, 2017Background
- On March 19, 2013 Shannon Halstead rear-ended Donald Casper; Casper felt fine immediately after but developed right-side/knee soreness the next day and sought treatment days later. He treated for several months and alleged ongoing knee pain.
- Casper sued for negligence; an arbitration panel ruled for Casper against Shannon Halstead; the matter proceeded to common pleas, with discovery deadlines set (deadline July 6, 2015).
- Casper first consulted Dr. Frederick Lieberman on July 23, 2015 and disclosed Lieberman’s report on August 6, 2015—after the discovery deadline; the report opined causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
- Halstead moved in limine to preclude Lieberman’s testimony and post-accident imaging as untimely under Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5; the trial court granted the motion and excluded the materials.
- At the close of Casper’s case, Halstead moved for nonsuit arguing Casper lacked expert medical proof of causation; the court granted nonsuit and denied Casper’s post-trial motion for a new trial. Casper appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred by precluding Dr. Lieberman from testifying as a treating physician rather than an expert | Lieberman was a treating physician not subject to expert-disclosure rules; exclusion was disproportionate and prejudicial to Casper | Lieberman’s opinions were developed with an eye to litigation and he was therefore an expert subject to Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5; late disclosure prejudiced Halstead | Court held Lieberman was an expert witness retained for litigation, subject to Rule 4003.5; exclusion was proper because Casper failed to timely disclose and showed no extenuating circumstances |
| Whether nonsuit was improper because causation was obvious and could be established without expert testimony | Casper argued causation was obvious (injury manifested soon after the collision) so lay testimony sufficed | Halstead argued that, absent expert proof of medical causation, Casper failed to meet his burden because the connection was not immediate and direct | Court held causation was not sufficiently obvious (Casper felt fine immediately, delayed treatment several days), so expert medical testimony was required; nonsuit was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- McClain ex rel. Thomas v. Welker, 761 A.2d 155 (Pa. Super. 2000) (trial court has discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony)
- Feingold v. Southeastern Transp. Authority, 517 A.2d 1270 (Pa. 1986) (prejudice and surprise to opposing party govern exclusion of untimely expert testimony)
- Kurian ex rel. Kurian v. Anisman, 851 A.2d 152 (Pa. Super. 2004) (treating physician vs. expert distinction; opinions developed for litigation bring Rule 4003.5 into play)
- Jahanshahi v. Centura Dev. Co., 816 A.2d 1179 (Pa. Super. 2003) (Rule 4003.5 inapplicable where opinions not developed with an eye to litigation)
- Lattanze v. Silverstrini, 448 A.2d 605 (Pa. Super. 1982) (generally expert medical testimony required to prove causation in personal injury cases)
- Smith v. German, 253 A.2d 107 (Pa. 1969) (obvious causal relationships excusing medical expert testimony must be immediate and readily apparent)