Opinion by
This appeal grew out of a suit by appellant and countersuit by appellee over injuries both sustained in a serious auto accident in 1962. The jury concluded that both were negligent and therefore relief was denied to both. This аppeal is taken only on behalf of litigant Smith who presents several reasons why he is entitled to a new trial in the аction in which he is a plaintiff. Since we conclude that one of these grounds is indeed meritorious, we vacatе the judgment of the court below and remand for a new trial in Smith’s action against German.
One of the elements of damаge claimed by Smith was that he underwent a severe personality change as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident. In order to support this claim, all of the doctors involved testified that it was their conclusion that Smith suffered from anoxia, the cutting off or reduction of the oxygen supply to certain parts of the brain. Further, as the trial court summarized this aspect of the evidence in the charge: “There was evidence that this brain injury caused a temрorary psychosis while he was in the hospital, that he was paranoid and schizophrenic ... in other words he was рsychotic and completely insane, ate soap, ate containers of milk . . . and *50 did other things which only an insane person would do. There was evidence of personality change.”
The fact that the personality change was caused by the anoxia was strongly contested by the appellee. It was argued in defense that the рersonality change (which everybody apparently agreed was present) was due to appellant’s mаrital difficulties and did not result from the accident. In order to support this contention, appellee read into the record over specific objection certain testimony which appellant presented at his оwn divorce proceeding in 1964. This testimony tended to show that Mr. Smith was (either justifiably or unjustifiably) suspicious that his wife was having an affаir with a neighbor, and that his knowledge of this affair upset him greatly. Appellant claims (1) that this evidence was highly prejudiciаl and (2) that without some competent medical testimony connecting the marital difficulties outlined in the divorce рroceeding with appellant’s personality change, the jury should not have been allowed to infer that these difficulties caused the personality change. We agree with both of his claims.
The law of this Commonwealth is well settled as to when medical testimony will be required to establish a causal connection between the event demоnstrated and the result sought to be proved. Though most of the cases deal with plaintiffs who wish to show that a certain еvent caused a given injury, the rules are equally applicable when a defendant seeks to disprove the сausal connection (the automobile accident) presented by the plaintiff by proving one (the marital difficulties) of his own. Thus in
Florig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
But where “the disability complained of is the natural and probable result of the injuries, the fact-finding body may be permitted to so find, even in the entire absence of expert oрinion.”
Florig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
supra at 424,
In our view the instant case clearly comes within the Florig line of cases. While it is true that the jury could infer from the testimony presented that the appellant was upset, it seems entirely outside their capability to infer that the mаrital discord recited in the excerpt from the divorce testimony produced the severe personality disorders which all admit appellant had undergone. We could hardly say that the causal connection betweеn appellant’s marital difficulties and the alleged paranoia and schizophrenia is “so closely connected and so readily apparent” that we would allow a jury to reach that conclusion without some expеrt opinion to aid them. Rather, this is the type of case where the causal connection is anything but obvious, *52 where the disability is not the natural and probable result of the injuries.
Just as the plaintiff was required to offer expert testimony in order to establish the medical connection between the injuries arising from the accident and the personality change, so too is such expert testimony required by the party seeking to establish that it was not the injury but some other fаctor which caused the change. This is clearly required by our case law, because the causation here “involves explanations and inferences not within the range of ordinary training, knowledge, intelligence and expеrience.”
Commonwealth v. Nasuti,
Judgment vacated and a new trial awarded.