Casillas v. People, 2018 CO 78

In 2008 juvenile probation officer took a buccal (cheek) swab from Ismael Casillas during a one-year deferred adjudication and uploaded his DNA profile into CODIS, although § 19-2-925.6 excluded deferred adjudications from mandatory DNA collection.
Casillas completed the deferred adjudication; his juvenile case was dismissed in 2009.
Months later, DNA from a carjacking matched Casillas’s CODIS profile; a detective used that match to include Casillas in a photo array and the victim identified him.
At suppression hearing the People conceded the swab violated the statute and the Fourth Amendment; the trial court denied suppression, and a jury convicted Casillas of criminal mischief.
The court of appeals unanimously held the swab violated the statute and the Fourth Amendment but a panel majority declined to suppress the evidence on deterrence grounds; this Court granted certiorari solely to decide whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed: it held the swab was an unlawful search and that suppression under the exclusionary rule was required because (1) the probation officer’s action was policing conduct (not a mere judicial error), (2) the officer should have known the search was unauthorized, and (3) exclusion would serve deterrence given the risk of systemic misuse of juvenile DNA collection.

Issue	Casillas' Argument	People/Probation Officer's Argument	Held
Does the exclusionary rule require suppression of evidence derived from the juvenile probation officer's unauthorized DNA swab?	Suppression required because the cheek swab violated the statute and the Fourth Amendment; evidence is fruit of the unlawful search.	Suppression unnecessary: the officer was effectively performing a court function (like a court employee) so exclusion would not deter; alternatively, any error was a reasonable mistake of law.	Yes. Suppression required. The officer’s conduct was law‑enforcement activity (not a mere judicial clerical error), the officer could be charged with knowledge the search was unlawful, and exclusion would have a deterrent effect.
Does violation of the DNA‑collection statute alone require suppression?	Statutory violation that amounted to an unreasonable search triggers exclusion because the statutory violation directly implicated Fourth Amendment rights.	The People conceded statutory violation but argued suppression is not an automatic remedy and can be inappropriate where deterrence is lacking.	The Court treated the statutory violation as coextensive with the Fourth Amendment violation here and ordered suppression because deterrence and culpability criteria for the exclusionary rule were satisfied.

Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (U.S. 2013) (buccal swab to obtain DNA is a Fourth Amendment search)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (U.S. 1984) (exclusionary rule deters police misconduct; suppression inappropriate when error is judicial)
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (U.S. 1987) (limits on suppression when officer reasonably relies on statute later held invalid)
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (U.S. 2009) (exclusionary rule applies only where police conduct is sufficiently deliberate, reckless, or systemic to warrant deterrence)
Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (U.S. 2014) (objectively reasonable mistakes of law can negate Fourth Amendment violation)
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (U.S. 2011) (suppression unwarranted when police reasonably rely on binding precedent)
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1995) (suppression unwarranted for clerical error by court employees)
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (U.S. 1960) (exclusionary rule’s purpose is to remove incentives to disregard constitutional rights)