Casey Joe Cochnauer v. the State of Texas
02-19-00165-CR
| Tex. App. | Sep 2, 2021Background
- Allegations: two boys reported indecent acts by Casey Joe Cochnauer that occurred in early 2011 when they were ages 13 and 10.
- Warrants issued Feb. 26, 2016; Cochnauer was in TDCJ on unrelated convictions since 2012; warrants executed May 7, 2018 at Kyle Facility.
- Indictment returned June 7, 2018; State announced ready June 12, 2018; trial began April 23, 2019; jury convicted Cochnauer of two counts of indecency with a child.
- Representation: counsel Michael Valverde appointed May 10, 2018; Valverde sought to withdraw in March 2019; Cochnauer elected to represent himself on March 11, 2019 and standby counsel was appointed.
- Pretrial motions: Cochnauer filed pro se motions including a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial motion (Feb. 25, 2019) and an amended IADA/Speedy Trial Act motion (Mar./Apr. 2019).
- Appeal: Cochnauer argued (1) deprivation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel and (2) violation of Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Cochnauer's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sixth Amendment — right to counsel / self-representation | Trial court "dragooned" him into pro se; he did not clearly/unequivocally assert Faretta nor knowingly waive counsel | He timely and unequivocally asserted Faretta; court admonished him; standby counsel appointed and used; waiver was knowing and intelligent | Overruled. Court found a clear, timely assertion of self-representation, adequate admonitions, appointment/use of standby counsel; waiver valid |
| Sixth Amendment — speedy trial | ~3-year delay from warrant issuance (Feb 2016) to trial (Apr 2019) violated his speedy-trial right; requested dismissal | Delay measured from actual arrest (May 7, 2018); court granted his request for a trial setting on or before May 8, 2019; statutory motions (IADA/1974 Act) did not preserve constitutional claim; Barker factors do not show violation | Overruled. Constitutional claim not preserved by statutory motion; even on merits Barker factors do not establish a violation (delay <1 year from arrest to trial, defendant delayed asserting right, no demonstrated prejudice) |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (establishes four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to self-representation and requirement for knowing, intelligent waiver)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (delay approaching one year triggers Barker inquiry)
- Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (discusses Barker factors in Texas practice)
- Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (speedy-trial claims and error-preservation rules)
- Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (one-year delay guidance; weighing of Barker factors)
- Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (timeliness of asserting self-representation before jury empanelment)