Carvalho v. Kenneway
1:18-cv-12018
| D. Mass. | Nov 10, 2020Background
- In Aug. 2010 Jonathan Carvalho shot and killed Luis Rodriguez in a Chelsea parking lot; Rodriguez was unarmed and suffered three gunshot wounds, including a fatal shot to the back. Carvalho was convicted at a 2011 Suffolk County jury trial of second-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm without a license.
- Carvalho received life imprisonment on the murder conviction and a concurrent 4–5 year term on the firearm conviction.
- Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed; SJC denied further review and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Carvalho then filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
- Carvalho raised four habeas claims: (1) trial court refused a self-defense instruction; (2) jury was not instructed that reasonable provocation may exist without physical contact; (3) prosecutor’s remarks about the victim learning he was to become a father were improper; (4) trial judge initiated but failed to complete a Batson inquiry concerning peremptory strikes.
- The district court applied AEDPA deference to the Massachusetts Appeals Court (MAC) decision, denied habeas relief on all claims, but granted a certificate of appealability (COA) limited to the reasonable-provocation jury-instruction issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Self-defense instruction | Carvalho argued evidence supported instruction because he reasonably believed he faced imminent harm and tried to retreat verbally | MAC/comm. said Massachusetts law required use of all reasonable means of retreat and evidence did not show he exhausted escape options | Denied — MAC reasonably concluded no entitlement to instruction and error did not violate due process |
| Reasonable-provocation instruction (physical-contact requirement) | Carvalho argued jury should have been told reasonable provocation does NOT require physical contact | Comm. noted model instruction and MAC said the charge as a whole cured any ambiguity | Mixed — habeas denied on merits, but COA granted because reasonable jurists could debate whether the model language created misleading ambiguity |
| Prosecutorial comments about victim’s impending fatherhood | Carvalho argued repeated references appealed to jurors’ sympathy and deprived due process | Comm. argued comments were permissible to explain victim’s presence; trial court gave curative instruction | Denied — MAC reasonably applied Darden/Donnelly standard; comments did not so infect trial as to violate due process |
| Batson inquiry/peremptory strikes | Carvalho argued judge’s sua sponte remark triggered Batson and court failed to pursue second-step inquiry | Comm. and MAC said the brief exchange did not constitute a Batson inquiry and no prima facie showing was made (defense never objected) | Denied — MAC reasonably found no Batson violation and no obligation to initiate inquiry in these circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Janosky v. St. Amand, 594 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2010) (look to last reasoned state-court decision for AEDPA review)
- Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312 (2015) (only Supreme Court holdings, not dicta, constitute clearly established federal law)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA standards: "contrary to" and "unreasonable application")
- Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988) (defendant entitled to instruction on any defense with sufficient evidence)
- Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (federal habeas courts must accept state-court rulings on state-law issues)
- Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973) (jury instructions must be viewed in context of whole charge)
- Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179 (2009) (examination of jury instructions under habeas review)
- Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (prosecutorial remarks warrant reversal only if they so infect trial with unfairness as to deny due process)
- Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (prosecutorial comments are evaluated under narrow due-process standard)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibits race-based peremptory challenges)
- Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257 (2015) (articulates Batson three-step framework)
- Hardy v. Maloney, 909 F.3d 494 (1st Cir. 2018) (Mathews language treated as dicta; not clearly established for AEDPA purposes)