Carvajal v. Artus, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1456

Carvajal, a New York State prisoner, was convicted in New York for conspiracy and three counts of possession of a controlled substance; all drugs forming the basis of the possession counts were found in California.
New York court precedent deemed Carvajal constructively present in New York for jurisdictional purposes and allowed possession counts based on conspiracy conduct and control over co-conspirators and the stash house in California.
Carvajal argued the possession offenses could not be prosecuted in New York because neither he nor the drugs were in New York, raising a territorial-jurisdiction issue under New York law.
The New York Court of Appeals held jurisdiction existed under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 20.20(1)(c), basing on conspiracy and conduct within New York, despite the drugs being located in California.
Carvajal sought habeas relief in federal court; the district court granted a certificate of appealability limited to whether New York lacked territorial jurisdiction, which this court dismissed on procedural default grounds.
The Second Circuit reviews de novo whether a habeas petition is barred by exhaustion and procedural default, given AEDPA’s standards.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did New York have territorial jurisdiction to convict for possession counts?	Carvajal contends no territorial jurisdiction since drugs were in California and he was outside New York.	New York law extended territorial jurisdiction via § 20.20(1)(c) due to conspiracy and conduct within New York and over the conspirators.	No federal relief; state-law jurisdictional interpretation stands.
Was Carvajal’s federal claim fairly presented to state courts (exhausted)?	Carvajal raised federal concerns that New York lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the possession counts.	State courts interpreted state statutes; Carvajal failed to present federal constitutional grounds clearly.	Procedural default; exhaustion not satisfied; relief denied.
Did the prosecution waive the exhaustion requirement or otherwise affect default?	Prosecution did not press waiver; thus no waiver of exhaustion should bar review.	AEDPA allows waivers only when expressly waived; the record does not show express waiver.	Waiver not established; default stands.
If not exhausted, could the federal court review the claim on the merits under AEDPA?	If fairly presented federally, the court should review de novo under AEDPA standards.	State-law decision predates federal review; AEDPA requires that the claim be fairly presented and exhausted.	AEDPA bars relief; claim dismissed.

Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (U.S. 1911) (out-of-jurisdiction acts with within-effects justify punishment)
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (U.S. 1995) (exhaustion requirement for federal habeas corpus)
Daye v. Attorney Gen. of N.Y., 696 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1982) (fair presentation test for federal claims in state courts)
Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442 (2d Cir. 1993) (AEDPA exhaustion and waiver considerations)
Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001) (waiver and exhaustion standards in habeas corpus)
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (U.S. 2003) (standard for evaluating federal-law claims in habeas context)
Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (U.S. 1982) (fair presentation requires alerting state courts to federal nature)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (defining governing law for federal review of state-court decisions)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (habeas review limitations; retrospective remedies)
Mannix v. Phillips, 619 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2010) (state-law questions are for states; federal courts defer to state interpretations)