Carroll v. Lane County
340 Or. App. 514
Or. Ct. App.2025Background
- Petitioners, Sharon Simpson Carroll and the Carroll Inheritance Trust, sought legal lot verification from Lane County for a property (Property 1) originating as an unnamed remainder after an early 1900s conveyance.
- Property 1 was not specifically described in deeds from 1907 and 1908 but was left as the remainder of the parent parcel after those conveyances; it came to petitioners in 1973 via quitclaim deed.
- Lane County denied lot verification, relying on a legal maxim from Hurd v. Byrnes to presume Property 1 was conveyed earlier or was not lawfully created, and citing ambiguous chain of title.
- The Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) affirmed the county's denial, holding that a deed must specifically describe a unit of land to have “created” it, so Property 1 was not a legal lot.
- Petitioners sought judicial review, arguing that Property 1 was lawfully established in 1908, prior to relevant land use regulations, and maintained its boundaries since that time.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed whether LUBA’s order was “unlawful in substance” and focused primarily on statutory construction of "created" in the relevant state and local laws.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Property 1 “created” as a lawfully established unit of land by the 1908 deed under ORS 92.010(3)(a)(B)(ii)? | The 1908 deed, by conveying all but Property 1, legally established Property 1 as a new unit of land, regardless of whether it was specifically described. | A deed must specifically describe a lot to “create” it; mere remainders are not legally established lots unless described. | A deed creates a unit of land by the legal consequence of its terms, not only by specific description; Property 1 was legally created as a remainder in 1908. |
| Was LUBA correct to use substantial evidence review regarding the interpretation of the deed? | Deed construction is a question of law, not fact; LUBA erred in using substantial evidence review. | Deed interpretation involved ambiguities and factual uncertainties, requiring substantial evidence review. | Deed interpretation is a legal question; LUBA erred in applying substantial evidence review. |
| Does the maxim from Hurd v. Byrnes apply to this case to presume Property 1 was conveyed or not separately retained? | Hurd applies only to ambiguous conveyances of narrow strips or boundaries, not to entire remainder parcels as here. | Hurd supports presuming Property 1 was conveyed or not separately retained since it was a small, undescribed parcel. | Hurd's maxim applies only in boundary/narrow strip disputes with ambiguity, not here; it is inapplicable. |
| Does the chain of title after 1908 affect whether Property 1 is a lawfully established unit of land? | Title changes after 1908 are relevant only to ownership, not to whether the unit was legally created in 1908. | Gaps or ambiguities in title or lack of evidence of changes may affect legal lot status. | Chain of title post-1908 does not affect legal lot status if original parcel was lawfully created; not within judicial review scope. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hurd v. Byrnes, 264 Or 591 (Or. 1973) (establishes a maxim for deed construction, usually applied to ambiguous boundary or narrow strip conveyances)
- Tab Enterprises of Bend, Inc. v. Heare, 37 Or App 879 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (deeds conveying only part of a parcel leave the remainder with the grantor, thus creating a legal remainder parcel)
- Copeland Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Estate of Dillard, 267 Or App 791 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (deed construction follows contract principles; ambiguity is a legal question)