Carroll v. Community Health Care Clinic, Inc.
2017 IL App (4th) 150847
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff David Carroll alleged medical malpractice for care received at Community Health Care Clinic by APN Sue McGinnes and collaborating physician Dr. Paul Pedersen in March–April 2013, resulting in a myocardial infarction.
- Clinic and providers moved to dismiss under 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9), asserting immunity: McGinnes under the Good Samaritan Act §30; Pedersen under the Medical Practice Act §54.5(e); Clinic asserting immunity as a free clinic and/or vicarious immunity because the providers were immune.
- Trial court granted dismissal with prejudice (Sept. 2015). Plaintiff later filed a 2-1401 petition after discovering a 2002 Lease Agreement between OSF and the Clinic that assigned employees (including an NP) to the Clinic and invoiced the Clinic for their pay.
- Plaintiff argued the Lease meant McGinnes (and Pedersen) were compensated by the Clinic (so no Good Samaritan immunity) and that Clinic could be vicariously liable. Defendants argued leased employees remained OSF employees paid by OSF.
- Trial court denied the 2-1401 petition (Aug. 2016), finding leased employees were OSF employees; appellate court consolidated the appeals and affirmed dismissal on statutory-immunity grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §30(a) of Illinois Good Samaritan Act immunizes providers who receive compensation "from that source" | "From that source" means compensation for the performance of services (i.e., any compensation tied to the services), so leased/route-paid providers are not immune | "From that source" means compensation from the free clinic itself; immunity applies if the provider receives no fee/compensation from the free clinic | Court construed "that source" as the free clinic itself; providers who did not receive payment from the Clinic are immune under §30(a) |
| Whether the Lease Agreement showing Clinic paid OSF for leased employees defeats §30(a) immunity | Lease routed Clinic-paid funds to OSF, so Clinic was the source of compensation and immunity is unavailable | Lease establishes OSF remained employer and paid salaries/benefits; Clinic’s payments to OSF do not make Clinic the source of employee compensation | Lease showed OSF was the actual employer and payor; compensation came from OSF, so §30(a) immunity applies |
| Whether Pedersen is additionally immune under Medical Practice Act §54.5(e) as a collaborating physician | Pedersen supervised and thus not immune | Pedersen was only a collaborating physician and did not provide the care at issue | Court did not reach §54.5(e) because Pedersen was immune under the Good Samaritan Act; alternative immunity unnecessary |
| Whether Clinic is liable vicariously for providers | Clinic is vicariously liable because it paid for services (via lease) or by operation of respondeat superior | If providers are immune, Clinic cannot be vicariously liable; agent’s immunity bars master’s liability | Because providers are immune, Clinic is immune from plaintiff’s vicarious-liability claim; dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Leetaru v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 2015 IL 117485 (section 2-619 immunity burden allocation)
- Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 237 Ill. 2d 217 (2010) (statutory amendment declared void; controlling version of statute)
- Murphy-Hylton v. Lieberman Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2016 IL 120394 (statutory-construction principles)
- Bd. of Educ. of Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 186 v. Att’y Gen. of Ill., 2017 IL 120343 (apply statute as written when unambiguous)
- Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352 (employer liability principles in tort)
- Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 117 Ill. 2d 507 (principle that master cannot be liable where agent is not guilty)
- Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518 (review standard for 2-619 motions)
- Guinn v. Hoskins Chevrolet, 361 Ill. App. 3d 575 (appellate court may affirm on any record-supported ground)
- Padilla v. Vazquez, 223 Ill. App. 3d 1018 (affirmance on alternate ground for 2-1401 petitions)