Carrie Willis v. United States, 993 F.3d 545

Background

Federal agents seized 364 boxes of recently minted one-dollar presidential coins (1,000 coins per box) from Carrie Willis and turned them over to the IRS.
An IRS agent removed the coins from packaging, ran them through a coin counter, and deposited $364,000 (face value) into an IRS account within the timeframes the IRS manual prescribes.
The agent did not investigate whether the coins had numismatic (collector) value; Willis later demanded return and claimed the coins were worth far more than face value.
Willis sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for conversion; the district court found for Willis and awarded $94,880.
The government appealed, asserting the FTCA discretionary-function exception bars the suit because the agent's conduct involved discretionary policy judgments required by IRS/DOJ asset-forfeiture policies.
The Eighth Circuit held the agent's decision was discretionary and susceptible to policy analysis (balancing expeditious deposit against preserving value), so the discretionary-function exception applied; the judgment for Willis was reversed and the case remanded for dismissal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the agent's decision to process and deposit seized coins was "truly discretionary" or mandated by IRS rules	Willis: IRS manual imposed mandatory duties to investigate and realistically estimate value, so the agent failed to follow non-discretionary rules	Gov: Manual required prompt counting/deposit but left the determination whether currency is a "collectible asset" to agent discretion	Held: Decision was discretionary; manual did not prescribe specific investigative steps, so discretion remained
Whether the discretionary-function exception applies when an agent negligently makes a discretionary classification	Willis: Agent's failure to investigate negates policy-based discretion and is not protected	Gov: Even negligent discretionary decisions are covered if they are the kind of choices grounded in policy	Held: Negligence in making the discretionary choice is irrelevant; exception can still apply
Whether the decision was "susceptible to policy analysis" (i.e., balancing competing policy interests)	Willis: Agent did not engage in policy balancing because he never investigated value	Gov: The choice inherently balances competing policies—security/accounting concerns vs preserving property value	Held: The decision was susceptible to policy analysis (balancing deposit timing and preservation), so the exception applies
Whether precedent distinguishing failures to perform mandatory duties (Buckler, Appley Brothers) controls	Willis: Those cases show discretionary-function exception does not shield total failures to perform mandatory tasks	Gov: Here the agent did perform the mandatory antecedent task—he classified the coins as ordinary currency—and exercised discretion in doing so	Held: Distinguishable from Buckler/Appley; agent made the requisite classification, so the exception covers his conduct

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (discretionary-function exception test; policy-based conduct exclusion)
United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (Congress intended to prevent judicial second-guessing of policy-driven decisions)
Buckler v. United States, 919 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2019) (distinguishes mandatory duties that remove discretion)
Appley Brothers v. United States, 164 F.3d 1164 (8th Cir. 1999) (failure to perform a mandatory inspection not covered by discretionary-function exception)
Layton v. United States, 984 F.2d 1496 (8th Cir. 1993) (negligence in discretionary decision does not defeat the exception)
Herden v. United States, 726 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2013) (decision is protected if objectively susceptible to policy analysis)
Metter v. United States, 785 F.3d 1227 (8th Cir. 2015) (policy-analysis susceptibility in related FTCA context)
Barnes v. United States, 448 F.3d 1065 (8th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff must show unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity)
Brownback v. King, 141 S. Ct. 740 (Supreme Court) (context on FTCA waiver requirements)