Carrie Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters
828 F.3d 501
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Braun, a female co-pilot, alleged repeated sexually harassing conduct by two male co-workers and reported it orally to operations director Parsons multiple times and in a February 20, 2012 email titled "Cease and desist!" to Parsons and coworker Rossi. She was fired about three weeks after the email.
- UJC (Ultimate Jetcharters) defended at trial chiefly on non-retaliatory, performance-related grounds and presented testimony from its CEO Gordon and others; the jury returned verdict for Braun awarding compensatory and punitive damages.
- UJC moved for JMOL and for a new trial; the district court denied those motions, denied remittitur, and awarded Braun attorney fees; appeals followed. After judgment, confusion arose about whether the defendant was Ultimate Jetcharters, Inc. or Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC.
- The district court corrected the judgment under Rule 60(a) to substitute Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC, finding the misnomer clerical and noting UJC’s own filings and trial conduct contributed to confusion and that no prejudice resulted.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed: (1) the evidence sufficed to establish Braun’s prima facie retaliation case (protected activity, notice, adverse action, causation) and pretext; (2) punitive damages and attorney fees were supportable; and (3) Rule 60(a) amendment was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Braun engaged in protected activity by complaining of coworker harassment | Braun argued her multiple calls and the written "Cease and desist!" email expressly conveyed a good-faith belief of sex-based harassment and thus constituted protected opposition | UJC argued complaints were vague and insufficient to put employer on notice of a discrimination complaint | Held: Braun’s oral reports and email were sufficiently specific and objectively reasonable to constitute protected activity under § 4112.02(I)/Title VII analysis |
| Whether decisionmakers knew of Braun’s protected activity | Braun pointed to Parsons (who input into firing) and Gordon (who made the decision and knew of complaints) | UJC contended lack of linkage between complainant and decisionmaker | Held: Evidence showed decisionmakers knew of the complaints (Parsons and Gordon), satisfying the knowledge element |
| Whether there was causation between complaint and termination | Braun relied on temporal proximity (≈3 weeks) plus evidence that alleged performance problems were disputed or common among male pilots | UJC emphasized legitimate performance reasons and denied retaliatory motive | Held: Three-week proximity coupled with comparative evidence and disputed factual basis for the proffered reasons supported an inference of causation |
| Whether UJC’s proffered reasons were pretextual; and whether punitive damages/attorney fees were proper | Braun argued the proffered reasons lacked factual basis, were inconsistent with the stated motivation, and similarly situated males were treated differently; sought punitive damages and fees because jury found actual malice | UJC argued insufficient evidence of actual malice and that punitive damages/fees were unwarranted | Held: Jury reasonably found pretext; record supported clear-and-convincing evidence of actual malice for punitive damages; attorney fees recoverable under Ohio law when punitive damages are proper |
| Whether correcting the judgment to substitute LLC for Inc. under Rule 60(a) was permissible | Braun argued the misnomer was clerical: the case was litigated against the employer entity (LLC) and defendant’s conduct contributed to confusion; amendment caused no prejudice | UJC argued the substitution altered parties and deprived it of due process | Held: Rule 60(a) correction was proper because the misnomer was clerical, the LLC was litigated as the real party in interest, and no practical prejudice resulted; amendment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (establishes burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (explains burden-shifting and proof of employer’s legitimate reason)
- Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (cat’s-paw theory; imputing non-decisionmaker bias when applicable)
- Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir.) (good-faith, objectively reasonable belief test for opposition activity)
- Spengler v. Worthington Cylinders, 615 F.3d 481 (6th Cir.) (temporal proximity and other evidence support causation)
- Fluoro Elec. Corp. v. Branford Assocs., 489 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1973) (Rule 60(a) correction of misnomer where case litigated against real party and no prejudice)