Carrico v. City and County of San Francisco, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18485

Proposition M amended San Francisco's rent-stabilization ordinance to prohibit bad-faith coercive offers to vacate with threats or intimidation by landlords or their agents.
SPOSFI (a nonprofit landlord association) and individual Figone filed suit seeking declaratory relief and injunctive relief against portions of Proposition M.
District court dismissed the facial First Amendment and vagueness challenges as moot or insubstantial and declined supplemental state-law jurisdiction.
Appellants argued the ordinance violated the First Amendment, due process notice, and ballot-adequacy; they asserted facial invalidity and sought to block enforcement.
The district court held the challenged provision implicated only commercial speech, applying Central Hudson; concluded bad-faith and other terms were sufficiently definite.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit sua sponte raised standing issues and vacated with remand for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Do SPOSFI and Figone have standing to challenge Proposition M?	SPOSFI asserts associational standing; Figone asserts personal injury from enforcement.	City argues no injury in fact or credible threat of enforcement against either plaintiff.	Lack of standing; dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Does associational standing apply to SPOSFI under Lopez/Pennell principles?	SPOSFI represents members who would be injured by Proposition M.	No concrete intent or threatened conduct alleged by SPOSFI members.	No associational standing; allegations insufficient to show injury in fact.
Does Figone have standing based on concrete adverse effect beyond mere status as landlord?	Figone alleges direct disputes and enforcement against her by others under Proposition M.	Enforcement against a private party does not imply the City aligns with expansive interpretations.	Figone lacks standing; allegations do not show prospective injury tied to city enforcement.
Should the court allow amendment to cure standing deficiencies?	Amendment could cure standing and target prohibited conduct.	Amendment would be futile; no adequate injury described.	Leave to amend denied; amendment would be futile.
What is the result given lack of jurisdiction on standing?	Court should address merits if standing were shown.	Without standing, court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate merits.	Vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775 (9th Cir.2010) (standing and injury-in-fact for pre-enforcement challenges)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (injury in fact requires concrete, particularized injury)
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (U.S. 1979) (pre-enforcement standing requires credible threat of enforcement)
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1988) (context matters; associational standing can hinge on likely enforcement)
Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.2004) (overbreadth and injury-in-fact requirements for standing)
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (U.S. 1980) (commercial speech regulation test for First Amendment challenge)
Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996 (9th Cir.2001) (standing and overbreadth considerations in First Amendment challenges)
Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703 (9th Cir.2011) (standing where alleged vagueness of ordinance was actually enforced)
Lombardi, Inc. v. Smithfield, 11 A.3d 1180 (Del. 1989) (not included for analysis (example format))