Carole Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523

Plaintiff Carole Tingle alleged retaliation under Ohio Rev. Code § 3721.24(A) and Title VII after being disciplined and terminated from Arbors at Hilliard.
Arbors claimed termination was based on a progressive discipline policy and actual work-rule violations; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants on both counts.
Key incidents included a June 27, 2008 Class II DAR alleging failure to instruct CPR and notify a physician, leading to investigations by Arbors and later the Ohio Department of Health.
An October 23, 2008 Class III-to-Class II DAR involved failure to follow a supervisor’s direct order regarding an orientee; Barrows, Collins, and Davis provided testimony supporting the DAR.
A July 24, 2008 DAR for the CPR-card issue followed a suspension; the DAR was later placed in a sealed file and the employee was paid for missed days.
A March 31, 2009 DAR alleged improper documentation and safety violations; Tingle contended the DAR contained false information and inconsistencies, culminating in her termination.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was there a prima facie case of retaliation?	Tingle contends actions were retaliatory for protected activity.	Arbors argues the discipline followed its policy and relied on documented work-rule violations.	Court held that, given the record, the prima facie case was not dispositive; the analysis focused on pretext.
Did Arbors have a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discipline and termination?	Tingle claims the reasons were false and pretextual.	Arbors asserts honest belief in particularized facts supporting DARs and termination.	Court held defendants provided a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason and the focus was on pretext, not the underlying facts.
Was there evidence that the reasons for termination were pretextual?	Tingle points to inconsistencies and conflicting statements to show lack of honest belief.	Arbors argues the decisions were based on reasonably investigated facts and not on protected activity.	Court concluded Tingle failed to show that the reasons were not honestly believed or that retaliation was the real motive.
Did the employer have an honest belief in its nondiscriminatory reasons	Tingle argues inconsistencies undermine honest belief.	Arbors emphasizes the investigation and corroborating observations support honest belief.	Court affirmed summary judgment, finding no genuine issue on whether the employer reasonably relied on particularized facts.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court 1973) (establishes the burden-shifting framework for circumstantial retaliation claims)
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (Supreme Court 1981) (defines pretext framework within McDonnell Douglas strategy)
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (Supreme Court 1993) (pretext requires showing both false reason and discriminatory motive)
Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106 (6th Cir. 2001) (honest-belief rule; employer may prevail if it honestly believes its nondiscriminatory reason)
Chen v. Dow Chemical Co., 580 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2009) (employer’s reason may be upheld if based on reasonably informed decisions)
Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 2012) (recognizes that evidence from witnesses with animus can still support honest belief in nondiscriminatory reasons)
Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1998) (employer may rely on particularized facts even if later found mistaken)
Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472 (6th Cir. 1989) (pretext burden to defeat summary judgment; evidence must negate movant’s denial)