Carol Smith v. Perkins Board of Education
708 F.3d 821
6th Cir.2013Background
- Smith, age 71, taught in Perkins Local Schools since 1976 and developed diabetes requiring insulin by 1999.
- She was reprimanded in 2008 for alleged class-sleep during a disciplinary conference and requested accommodations for her disability.
- Accommodations included snacks in class, private insulin injections, staff awareness, and emergency contact provisions; the district granted some measures.
- Plaintiff was suspended on three occasions and terminated on April 14, 2010 for sleeping, tardiness, and use of provocative material in class, deemed good and just cause.
- A referee at a July–August 2010 termination hearing found just cause; plaintiff sought relief in federal court in 2011 with four counts including Ohio age discrimination, ADA accommodations, ADA retaliation, and IIED.
- The district court granted summary judgment on all claims, later finding collateral estoppel applied to some counts; on appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed age-discrimination disposition but reversed on the other claims and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 4112.14(C) bars the age claim | Smith’s termination was not arbitrated; no valid arbitration bar. | The termination proceeding is the functional equivalent of arbitration and thus bars the claim. | Yes, age claim barred by § 4112.14(C). |
| Whether collateral estoppel bars ADA claims | ADA claims precluded by referee’s just-cause finding. | Collateral estoppel applies to all remaining claims. | No; collateral estoppel does not apply to ADA claims. |
| Whether collateral estoppel applies to ADA under federal law | ADA follows broader collateral-estoppel doctrine. | ADA aligns with Title VII/ADEA standards de-emphasizing estoppel. | Collateral estoppel does not apply to ADA claims. |
| Whether the district court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment on alternative grounds was proper | Defendant did not raise those grounds; plaintiff lacked notice and discovery was stayed. | Sufficient grounds existed and review appropriate. | Remand required due to lack of notice and potential prejudice. |
Key Cases Cited
- University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 F.3d 788 (U.S. 1986) (state agency findings receive no automatic preclusion in federal court under collateral estoppel)
- Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1991) (ADA and Title VII contexts deprive collateral estoppel effect when Congress intended de novo review)
- Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 909 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio 2009) (functional equivalence of arbitration to bar § 4112.14(C))
- Elliott v. City of Manhattan, 478 U.S. 788 (U.S. 1986) (preclusion rules in state agency findings; Title VII context)
- Featherstone v. Columbus Public Sch., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (termination proceedings are judicial in nature with safeguards)