Meyer v. United Parcel Service, Inc.Meyer v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} This аppeal requires us to consider the relationship of the several provisions of R.C. Chapter 4112 applicable to a statutory claim for age discrimination brought by an employee claiming that he was wrongfully discharged from employment. The primary issue is whether defendant-appellant, United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a claim of age discrimination brought by plaintiff-appellee, Robert Meyer. In particular, we must determine whether Meyer’s age-discrimination claim under
{¶ 2} UPS terminated Meyer’s employment as a package-delivery driver on December 1, 2003. At the time of his discharge, Meyer was 48 years old and had worked for UPS for about 25 years. UPS had terminated Meyer’s employment two previous times in 2003. But on both of those previous occasions, Meyer had filed a grievance, his discipline had been reduced to a susрension without pay, and he had returned to work after serving his suspension. However, Meyer’s grievance over his December 1 discharge was denied, and his discharge was upheld by UPS’s “Ohio Joint State Committee” in January 2004.
{¶ 3} Meyer filed a complaint in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas on May 7, 2004, alleging that he had been wrongfully terminated in retaliation for filing several workers’ compensation claims. Meyer raised two claims in his initial complaint going to the alleged retaliatory discharge: that UPS had violated
{¶ 4} In July 2005, the trial court granted Meyer leave to file an amended complaint. In the amended complaint, he added a claim of age discrimination under
{¶ 5} On May 1, 2006, UPS moved for summary judgment on all of Meyer’s claims. This motion was premised, in part, on the contention that
{¶ 6} The case proceeded to a jury trial in August 2006.
{¶ 8} We accepted UPS’s appeal under our discretionary jurisdiction for review of a single proposition of law: “In order to preserve the detailed framework for age discrimination claims that the General Assembly enacted, an age discrimination claim brought under the general language of
II. Relevant Statutes and Case Law
A. Statutes
{¶ 9}
{¶ 11} “A person who files a civil action under this division is barred, with respect to the practices complained of, from instituting a civil action under
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13} “(A) No employer shall discriminate in any job opening against any applicant or discharge without just cause any employee aged forty or older who is physically able to perform the duties and otherwise meets the established requirements of the job and laws pertaining to the relationship between employer and employee.
{¶ 14} “(B) Any person aged forty or older who is discriminated against in any job opening or discharged without just cause by an employer in violation of division (A) of this section may institute a civil action against the employer in a court of competent jurisdiction. If the court finds that an employer has discriminated on the basis of age, the court shall order an appropriate remedy which shall include reimbursement to the applicant or employee for the costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, of the action, or to reinstate the employee in the employee’s former position with compensation for lost wages and any lost fringe benefits from the date of the illegal discharge and to reimburse the employee for the costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, of the action. The remedies available under this section are coexistent with remedies available pursuant to
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} “Whoever violates this chapter is subject to a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief.”
B. Case law
1. Elek v. Huntington Natl. Bank
(¶ 18} In Elek v. Huntington Natl. Bank (1991),
2. Bellian v. Bicron Corp.
{¶ 19} In Bellian v. Bicron Corp. (1994),
{¶ 21} “[W]e have held that where there is no manifest legislative intent that the general provision prevail over the specific provision, the specific provision applies. State v. Chippendale (1990),
{¶ 22} Because
3. Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Mgt. Co., Inc.
{¶ 23} In Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Mgt. Co., Inc. (1994),
{¶ 24} A concurring opinion in Cosgrove specifically addressed the reasons why Bellian and Cosgrove were decided the way they were, thereby reconciling the holdings of the two cases. See
{¶ 25} Although both Bellian and Cosgrove involved plaintiffs who brought claims under
{¶ 26} There was “no specific R.C. Chapter 4112 provision that conflicted] with
{¶ 27} The concurring opinion in Cosgrove observed that “
III. Analysis
A. Structure of R.C. Chapter J¡112 for age-discrimination claims
{¶ 28} A consideration of the foregoing authorities yields several conclusions regarding R.C. Chapter 4112 directly relevant to this case. Because age-
{¶ 29} Furthermore, contrary to Meyer’s arguments, the fact that
{¶ 30} The fundamental reasoning in Bellian regarding age-discrimination claims filed under
{¶ 31} Related sections of the Revised Code must be construed together, and in cases involving statutory construction, “ ‘our paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute.’ ” State v. Buehler,
{¶ 32} Consistently with the statutory framework for age-discrimination claims set forth within R.C. Chapter 4112, and with our precedents interpreting that framework, we hold that an age-discrimination claim brought pursuant to
B. Leininger v. Pioneer Natl. Latex
{¶ 33} In Leininger v. Pioneer Natl. Latex,
{¶ 34} In Leininger, we examined the statutory remedies available under R.C. Chapter 4112 in order to determine whether the jeopardy element, a prerequisite for recognizing a common-law public-policy claim for wrongful discharge, was met for a claim based on age discrimination. See Painter v. Graley (1994),
{¶ 35} In deciding that question, we first discussed the remedy provisions of
{¶ 37} Our discussion in the text of the opinion continued: “We reject this argument.
{¶ 38} The foregoing discussion in Leininger must be understood within its context. Of particular importance to that understanding is the statement within footnote 4 of Leininger explaining that this court was looking “at all the remedies available to a plaintiff at the time the claim accrued.” (Emphasis added.) Id., ¶ 31, fn. 4. Notably, “when an age discrimination claim accrues,” no statute of limitations has yet expired, and therefore an age-discrimination plaintiff at that time potentially can seek “the full spectrum of remedies available” under R.C. Chapter 4112, as the quoted passage of ¶ 31 of Leininger noted. Pursuant to our precedent, when a plaintiff files an age-discrimination claim solely under
{¶ 39} The court of appeals was mistaken when it read our mention of Elek in the quoted passage from Leininger as reiterating the “prior holding that had rejected the argument that the specific-remedies provisions of subsections within the chapter prevail over the more general provisions of
{¶ 40} We emphasize that all age-discrimination employment-related claims must be governed by the specific statutory directives in R.C. Chapter 4112, and Leininger should not be read as indicating otherwise. To read Leininger out of context the way the court of appeals did elevates
C. R.C. U12-U(C)
{¶ 41} The dispositive issue in this case is whether Meyer’s age-discrimination claim is barred by
{¶ 42} “The cause of action described in division (B) of this section and any remedies available pursuant to
{¶ 43} In resolving this issue, the court of appeals first held that Meyer’s termination had been upheld in a proceeding that was the equivalent of arbitration for
1. Arbitration
{¶ 44} The court of appeals summarily determined that Meyer’s termination had been upheld in a proceeding that qualified as “arbitration” under the statute
{¶ 45} In Hopkins, the employee challenged his termination by UPS through established grievance procedures, and after the termination had been upheld at a local hearing, he appealed that result to “the Ohio Joint State Committee” in Columbus. The Ohio Joint State Committee grievance panel, which was made up of two UPS representatives and two union representatives, conducted a hearing and “held that Hopkins’s termination was for just cause.” Hopkins then filed an R.C. Chapter 4112 action in common pleas court. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the action was barred by
{¶ 46} In rejecting Hopkins’s argument that “the grievance process lacked the indicia of impartiality that the term ‘arbitration’ implies,” the First District in Hopkins found persuasive the holdings of other courts that “the UPS grievance mechanism does possess the requisite procedural safeguards to be deemed arbitration.”
{¶ 47} Those cited decisions both equated the UPS grievance-review process to an arbitration. See, e.g., VanDerVeer, 25 F.3d at 405 (terming the proceeding before the Ohio Joint State Grievance Committee in which the plaintiffs termi-. nation was upheld an “arbitration”). Furthermore, Meyer has not taken issue in any way with this aspect of the court of appeals’ reаsoning. We therefore accept the court of appeals’ holding that this case involves the functional equivalent of arbitration for
2. Applicability ofRC. 1112.11(C)
{¶ 48} In holding that Meyer’s age-discrimination claim under
{¶ 49} The court of appeals misinterpreted the reach of
{¶ 50} Even though Hopkins interpreted a different version of the statute, it does not follow that
{¶ 51} We hold that pursuant to
D. Other Issues
{¶ 52} UPS asserts that
{¶ 53} Although our discussion of Leininger touched upon these issues, we decline to more specifically address UPS’s argument for two reasons. First, because we have determined that Meyer’s age-discrimination claim is barred by
{¶ 54} Second, an important component of UPS’s argument in this regard is that the trial court erred in allowing Meyer to amend his complaint to add his age-discrimination claim, because that claim should not relate back under
{¶ 55} Finally, for the same reasons, we decline to address the argument advanced by amicus curiae Ohio Management Lawyers Association that all age-discrimination claims filed under
IY. Conclusion
{¶ 56} We hold that an age-discrimination claim brought pursuant to
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Notes
.
. Meyer voluntarily dismissed his public-policy age-discrimination claim during the trial.
. We did not accept for review Meyer’s cross-appeal, which challenged the court of appeals’ holding that there should not have been a jury trial on his statutory claim of workers’ compensation retaliation. As a result, the court of appeals’ determination that the trial court’s judgments on the jury verdicts and on additional issues must be reversed and remanded stands as conclusively established and is not within the scope of this appeal.
. {¶ a}
{V b} “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
{¶ c} “(A) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, military status, national origin, disability, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.”
.
. Former
. At the time Elek was decided,
. Perhaps in response to the suggestion of the concurring opinion in Cosgrove that the General Assembly should expressly designate statutes of limitations for claims brought under R.C. Chapter 4112, see
. Our consideration of Hopkins goes solely to the issue of whether the UPS grievance procedure is the equivalent of arbitration and not to any other aspects of that decision.
. {¶ a} The General Assembly attempted to amend
{¶ b} This attempted amendment of
{¶ c} The court in Hopkins applied the House Bill 350 version of
. {¶ a} UPS has conceded in this case, both in this court and in the court of appeals, that an age-discrimination claim covered by
{Kb} The source of the holding that a six-year statute of limitations applies to an age-discrimination claim that is covered by
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 57} Although otherwise extraordinarily precise, the majority opinion is remarkably loose in describing
{¶ 58} In concluding that
{¶ 59} Furthermore,
{¶ 60} The majority opinion states: “We did not accept for review Meyer’s cross-appeal * * *. As a result, the court of aрpeals’ determination that the trial court’s judgments on the jury verdicts and on additional issues must be reversed and remanded stands as conclusively established and is not within the scope of this appeal.” ¶ 8, fn. 3. I disagree with this court’s practice of picking and choosing, within a case, the issues that we are willing to review. If a case is worthy of review, in the interests of providing justice to the parties and because, until we see the entire record, it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain the interplay of various issues, all appealed issues should be before us. Whether we address each issue at that point is, of course, within our considered discretion.
I dissent.