Carmen Contreras Aybar v. Secretary United States Depart, 916 F.3d 270

Carmen Contreras Aybar obtained a U Visa after cooperating with law enforcement and later adjusted to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m)(1).
She filed to adjust status for her son Dario under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m)(3), which permits DHS to grant LPR status to a spouse, child, or parent of a U-1 principal when necessary to avoid extreme hardship.
The INA defines “child” as an unmarried person under 21 years of age. Dario was one day shy of 21 when the application process began but had turned 21 by the time DHS adjudicated the application.
DHS denied the § 1255(m)(3) application based on its regulation (8 C.F.R. § 245.24(g)(2)) requiring the qualifying relationship to exist through adjudication, i.e., allowing “age-out.”
The Administrative Appeals Office and the District Court upheld the regulation; Carmen and Dario sued under the APA challenging the regulation as inconsistent with § 1255(m)(3) and arbitrary and capricious.
The Third Circuit applied Chevron deference, held the statute unambiguous that eligibility is assessed at adjudication, found the regulation consistent with that reading, and affirmed summary judgment for the Government.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether DHS may require the qualifying family relationship to exist at the time of adjudication under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m)(3) (i.e., whether the regulation’s "age-out" rule is consistent with the statute)	The phrase "Upon approval of adjustment of status" means eligibility should be measured as of when the principal obtained LPR status (protects children from aging out)	The statute’s text authorizes adjustment only for a spouse, child, or parent at the time DHS grants status; thus "child" must exist at adjudication	Court held statute unambiguous: eligibility is determined when DHS adjudicates; regulation is consistent and valid
Whether the regulation is arbitrary and capricious under the APA	The age-out rule produces unfair, unpredictable results and depends on agency processing times	DHS’s interpretation follows the statute and Congress provided other, express protections when it intended to prevent aging out (e.g., other U-visa and CSPA provisions)	Court rejected the arbitrary/capricious claim; did not reach deference step because statute was unambiguous, and found no absurdity requiring contrary construction

Robinson v. Napolitano, 554 F.3d 358 (3d Cir.) (eligibility depends on status at adjudication)
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41 (2014) (acknowledging the "aging out" phenomenon in immigration law)
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for reviewing agency statutory interpretations)
De Leon-Ochoa v. Attorney General, 622 F.3d 341 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing Chevron two-step in this circuit)