Carmelo Quintana v. Nedra Chandler, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14890

Background

In 1999 Quintana restrained a woman in a van while a co-defendant attempted sexual assault; the victim escaped by jumping naked from the moving van. Quintana confessed and was charged with aggravated sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping.
The State offered a plea: concurrent four-year sentences served at 50% (effectively one more year because Quintana had already served one). Quintana rejected the offer, insisting he was innocent and blaming another person.
Trial resulted in convictions; the court imposed consecutive sentences: 21 years for sexual assault and 6 years for kidnapping, with good-time limited to 15% (i.e., served at 85%).
Quintana’s trial counsel, Dennis Kellogg, had limited felony-trial experience and had limited, often translated, communications with Quintana. Kellogg later admitted he did not know the sentences would be consecutive and testified there was some discussion about good-time changes.
Quintana pursued state post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance for failing to advise him correctly about consecutive sentences, good-time percentages, and accountability (accomplice) liability; state courts denied relief on prejudice grounds. The federal district court found counsel deficient regarding consecutive/85% advice but held Quintana not prejudiced; the Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of habeas relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel’s performance was objectively deficient regarding plea advice (consecutive sentences and 85% good-time)	Kellogg failed to inform Quintana sentences would be consecutive and served at 85%, not concurrent at 50%	State concedes deficiency on these points but disputes prejudice	Court: Counsel was deficient on consecutive/85% advice (concession)
Whether counsel was deficient in explaining accountability (accomplice) liability	Quintana says he was not told he could be held liable for another’s acts and relied on that when rejecting plea	Kellogg says he explained accountability in simple terms; records and testimony create ambiguity	Court: No deficiency proven on accountability; petitioner failed to overcome presumption of adequate counsel
Whether Quintana was prejudiced (would have accepted plea)	Quintana’s affidavits assert he would have accepted plea if properly advised about sentence length and good-time	State argues Quintana insisted on innocence and there is no objective corroboration that he would have accepted plea	Held: No prejudice; state appellate decision was reasonably supported and entitled to AEDPA deference
Standard of review under AEDPA and scope of deference	Quintana contends state-court errors; district court applied AEDPA deference broadly	State urges deference to state rulings on prejudice; where state court ruled only on prejudice, effectiveness prong reviewed de novo	Court: Reviews effectiveness (accountability) de novo; defers to state court on prejudice under §2254(d) because state addressed that issue

Key Cases Cited

Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (prejudice standard for ineffective assistance in plea context)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: performance and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference applies to summary state-court decisions; petitioner must show no reasonable basis for denial)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (limits federal habeas review to the state-court record when applying §2254(d))
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (deference under §2254(d) applies only to issues the state court actually decided)
Woolley v. Rednour, 702 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2012) (distinguishes when AEDPA deference applies to Strickland prongs; review effectiveness de novo if state decided only prejudice)
Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (review standards when district court holds evidentiary hearing on habeas claims)