Carlton Baptiste v. Attorney General United States
841 F.3d 601
| 3rd Cir. | 2016Background
- Petitioner Carlton Baptiste, a lawful permanent resident, has a 1978 New Jersey assault conviction and a 2009 conviction for second-degree aggravated assault (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1b(1)); the 2009 record does not specify which disjunctive mental-state theory applied.
- DHS charged Baptiste with removability as: (1) an aggravated felon because the 2009 conviction was a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (thus an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)), and (2) removable for two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs), based on 1978 and 2009 convictions.
- The Immigration Judge sustained both charges; the BIA affirmed, concluding the 2009 conviction qualified under § 16(b) and was a CIMT.
- On review the Third Circuit first analyzed whether the 2009 New Jersey reckless aggravated assault is categorically a § 16(b) crime of violence (using the categorical approach and the “ordinary case” framework).
- The court held that while New Jersey reckless aggravated assault, in its ordinary case, qualifies as a § 16(b) crime of violence, § 16(b) itself is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
- Because § 16(b) is void for vagueness, Baptiste’s 2009 conviction cannot support an aggravated-felony removal charge; however, the court upheld that the 2009 conviction is a CIMT, so Baptiste remains removable based on two CIMTs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Baptiste’s 2009 New Jersey reckless second-degree aggravated assault is a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) | Baptiste argued the statute’s least-culpable conduct (e.g., drunk driving causing injury) can be nonviolent, so the offense is not categorically a § 16(b) crime | Gov argued use the “ordinary case” of the offense (not least culpable) and the ordinary case presents a substantial risk of intentional use of force | Court: Using the ordinary-case categorical approach, the ordinary case falls in the middle of the culpability spectrum (substantial risk that force will be intentionally used), so the New Jersey offense is categorically a § 16(b) crime of violence |
| Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment post-Johnson | Baptiste contended § 16(b) suffers the same indeterminacy as the ACCA residual clause—ordinary-case and substantial-risk inquiries are unworkable | Gov maintained § 16(b) differs linguistically and in scope from the residual clause and is not void for vagueness | Court: § 16(b) is void for vagueness—Johnson’s reasoning applies because § 16(b) requires the same ordinary-case abstraction and an indeterminate substantial-risk inquiry |
| Effect of invalidating § 16(b) on aggravated-felony removability | Baptiste argued invalidation means his 2009 conviction cannot be an aggravated felony | Gov argued other definitions (e.g., § 16(a)) or facts might still support aggravated-felony status | Court: Because § 16(b) is invalid, Baptiste was not convicted of an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(F); case remanded so Baptiste may seek relief previously barred by aggravated-felony status |
| Whether the 2009 conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) | Baptiste argued the statute could cover non-turpitudinous conduct | Gov argued the recklessness+broad aggravating language (extreme indifference; serious bodily injury) equates to depravity and thus is a CIMT | Court: The New Jersey reckless aggravated-assault offense (recklessly causing serious bodily injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life) is a CIMT under existing precedent (Knapik) — removal for two CIMTs affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague and identifying the ordinary-case and risk inquiries as problematic)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (interpreting § 16(b) to cover offenses that naturally involve a person acting in disregard of the risk that physical force might be used)
- Aguilar v. Attorney General, 663 F.3d 692 (3d Cir. 2011) (Third Circuit categorical analysis of § 16(b) and discussion of recklessness offenses as crimes of violence in some circumstances)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (adopting the “ordinary case” inquiry for categorical-analysis residual-clause questions)
- Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding a New York recklessness offense with depraved-indifference and grave-risk elements qualifies as a CIMT)