899 F.3d 36
1st Cir.2018Background
- Lara Carlson, a tenured UNE faculty member in Exercise and Sport Performance (ESP), complained in 2012 about repeated sexual harassment by her department chair, Dr. Paul Visich; UNE HR acknowledged the emails constituted sexual harassment.
- Carlson reported incidents to HR and successive deans; she asked not to continue reporting to Visich and sought reassignment or a surrogate supervisor.
- Dean Francis-Connolly told Carlson she could be moved to another department and Carlson agreed to transfer only on the condition she "keep [her] classes and continue to do [her] job." Carlson followed up by email confirming the condition.
- After Carlson transferred out of ESP, she lost lab time, was removed from teaching upper-level Exercise Physiology and Environmental Physiology, was taken off the ESP website, lost advising duties, and was reassigned to lower-level courses; UNE also cut a small merit raise in later years.
- Carlson sued for retaliation under Title VII and the Maine Human Rights Act; the district court granted summary judgment for UNE, finding Carlson’s transfer was voluntary and broke causation; the First Circuit reviewed de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the transfer can be an adverse action where Carlson consented | Carlson contends Dean induced her consent by misrepresenting that she could keep her classes and duties, so the transfer was effectively involuntary and adverse | UNE argues the transfer was voluntary, so it cannot be an adverse employment action supporting retaliation | Reversed: a jury could find Dean induced consent by false promises, making the transfer adverse and causally connected to protected activity |
| Whether post-transfer changes (course assignments, website removal, advising removal) were caused by protected activity | Carlson says these harms flowed from the misrepresented transfer and were retaliatory | UNE says these changes resulted from Carlson’s voluntary transfer and other non-retaliatory reasons | Reversed in part: genuine disputes of material fact exist as to causation and pretext; summary judgment improper on these claims |
| Whether UNE articulated a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for changing Carlson’s assignments | Carlson argues UNE’s explanations shifted and are pretextual (e.g., to "create distance" from Visich) | UNE offered explanations (departmental needs, broader teaching expectations, communications problems) | Court found UNE failed to sufficiently articulate non-retaliatory reasons for the induced-transfer claim; credibility and pretext are for the jury |
| Whether smaller raises in 2016–2017 constitute adverse actions | Carlson contends reduced raises (percent-wise) were retaliatory compared to prior years | UNE/ district court argued record lacks benchmarks (funding, accomplishments) to assess whether raises were adverse | Affirmed: no genuine dispute because Carlson failed to provide necessary comparative evidence to show raises were adverse |
Key Cases Cited
- Collazo v. Nicholson, 535 F.3d 41 (1st Cir.) (summary-judgment facts viewed in plaintiff's favor)
- Town of Westport v. Monsanto Co., 877 F.3d 58 (1st Cir.) (de novo review of summary judgment)
- Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39 (1st Cir.) (employer burden to articulate non-discriminatory reason)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (objective standard for adverse action in retaliation claims)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination/retaliation)
- Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) ("but-for" causation standard in retaliation cases)
- Caraballo-Caraballo v. Corr. Admin., 892 F.3d 53 (1st Cir.) (transfer adverse if materially changes conditions of employment)
- Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31 (1st Cir.) (application of McDonnell Douglas in First Circuit)