Carlos Trevino v. Lorie Davis, Director
861 F.3d 545
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Carlos Trevino was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death; at punishment the defense presented only a single short mitigation witness (his aunt).
- Trial counsel conducted a limited mitigation investigation and did not contact Trevino’s mother, who later said she drank heavily during pregnancy.
- In federal habeas proceedings Trevino developed new mitigation evidence: affidavits from family and three experts diagnosing or finding signs consistent with fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD) and significant cognitive/functional deficits.
- Trevino argued trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to discover and present FASD mitigation; his claim was initially procedurally defaulted but Martinez/Trevino excused the default for state habeas counsel’s ineffectiveness.
- The Fifth Circuit granted a COA on the FASD mitigation claim and reviewed whether counsel’s performance was deficient and, crucially, whether Trevino was prejudiced under Strickland.
- The majority affirmed denial of habeas relief, finding no reasonable probability the new FASD evidence would have changed at least one juror’s vote because the evidence was potentially "double-edged" and trial counsel had presented some mitigation; a dissent argued the new evidence reasonably undermined confidence in the sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martinez/Trevino excuses procedural default of the IATC mitigation claim | Trevino: state habeas counsel ineffective; Martinez/Trevino applies to excuse default | State: Trevino failed to raise claim in initial state habeas so claim is defaulted | COA assumed Martinez/Trevino satisfied; panel proceeded to merits (procedural-default issue treated as satisfied for review) |
| Whether trial counsel’s mitigation investigation was constitutionally deficient | Trevino: counsel failed to conduct reasonable mitigation investigation and did not discover FASD evidence | State: counsel presented some mitigation and investigation was adequate | The panel assumed deficiency (as prior panels had) but focused decision on prejudice |
| Whether Trevino was prejudiced under Strickland by failure to present FASD evidence | Trevino: new expert and lay evidence of FASD and life history would likely have influenced at least one juror | State: new evidence was double‑edged (could show he knew right/wrong; includes violent acts) and cumulative of what jury already heard | Held: No prejudice — no reasonable probability of different outcome because evidence was potentially aggravating and jury had already heard significant aggravators |
| Whether newly proffered mitigation (FASD) is outweighed by aggravating evidence | Trevino: FASD contextualizes conduct and reduces moral culpability despite some negative facts | State: additional testimony would have added cumulative negative facts and experts noted Trevino could appreciate wrongfulness | Held: Majority — double‑edged nature and existing aggravation foreclose finding of prejudice; Dissent — totality would likely have swayed at least one juror |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (mitigation‑investigation prejudice: reweigh totality of mitigation against aggravation)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can excuse procedural default of IATC claims)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (undiscovered mitigation evidence might have influenced jury’s appraisal of culpability)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (additional childhood‑abuse and mental‑capacity evidence may undermine confidence in sentence)
- Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (strategic decisions after reasonable investigation may not be deficient; context for double‑edged evidence)
- Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (counsel’s strategic choices entitled to deference when investigation was reasonable)
- Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2002) (recognition that detailed mitigation may sway jurors despite some double‑edged aspects)