623 F. App'x 163
5th Cir.2015Background
- Ibarra-Leyva, a Mexican native, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1992.
- In 1996 he killed Claudia Cruz in Texas through involuntary manslaughter; he was convicted and sentenced to 10 years.
- In 1998 the INS began removal proceedings based on the manslaughter conviction as an aggravated felony.
- The BIA affirmed removal, holding manslaughter to be a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
- Ibarra-Leyva was removed in 2001; he illegally reentered and was arrested; in 2014 DHS reinstated the original removal order.
- He challenged the reinstatement, arguing the original removal was improper, and the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the reinstatement review is jurisdictionally permitted | Ibarra-Leyva argues the court can review because of a gross miscarriage of justice. | The government contends reinstatement orders are generally unreviewable. | Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
| Whether the “gross miscarriage of justice” exception applies | Ibarra-Leyva asserts the BIA’s error in 1999 made the removal unlawful. | Court should not adopt a broader exception; must show clear error at time of final order. | Not satisfied; no gross miscarriage. |
| Whether the BIA correctly treated involuntary manslaughter as a crime of violence under §16(b) at the time | Dominguez-Hernandez shows Manslaughter not a crime of violence; law was settled accordingly. | BIA correctly applied the then-existing framework and context. | BIA’s conclusion not clearly wrong given evolving circuit law until 2004. |
| Whether a categorical approach was required and properly applied by the BIA | BIA failed to apply strict categorical analysis; referenced conduct impermissibly. | BIA applied the proper categorical approach; any conduct mention was dictum. | BIA's approach was not clearly erroneous. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001) (recklessness suffices for 16(b) when it shows substantial risk of intentional force)
- United States v. Garcia-Cantu, 302 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2002) (injury-to-a-child not a crime of violence for lack of intentional force element)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2004) (crime of violence requires substantial risk of force; not merely resulting injury)